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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigated the role of monetary policy in Namibia for the period 1993 to 
2011. It aims at achieving six objectives. First, it reviews the evolution of monetary 
policy in Namibia for the period 1980 to 2011. Second, it investigates the interest rate 
channel of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in Namibia. Third, it analyses 
the credit channel of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in Namibia. Fourth, it 
evaluates the exchange rate channel of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in 
Namibia. Fifth, it studies the money effect model in the context of the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism in Namibia. Sixth, it examines the exchange rate pass–
through (ERPT) to domestic prices in Namibia.  
 In order to achieve the objectives of the relative importance of the different channels of 
monetary policy transmission, a structural vector autoregressive model of the Namibian 
economy is constructed. Specifically the responses of the output and prices to monetary 
policy shocks for Namibia over the quarterly period 1993:Q1 to 2011:Q4 are 
investigated using impulse response functions and forecast variance error 
decompositions obtained from a structural vector autoregressive model (SVAR). The 
thesis also examined the exchange rate pass-through from exchange rate to domestic 
prices using both SVAR and the single equation error correction model (ECM). 
Estimation results on the different channels of monetary policy transmission mechanism 
showed that the interest rate channel and the credit channel are effective in transmitting 
monetary policy actions. The exchange rate channel is also operative but not effective. 
The money effect model confirms that inflation in Namibia is not a monetary 
phenomenon. The results of the pass-through relationship showed that there is an 
incomplete but high exchange rate pass-through from exchange rate to domestic prices.  
 
Keywords: Monetary policy, exchange rate, inflation, nominal anchor, structural vector 
autoregressive, South African rand, Namibian dollar, interest rate, credit 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background and Problem Statement 
 
Before independence Namibia was known as South West Africa and was assigned to 
South Africa by the League of Nations after World War I in 1920. This led to the merging 
of Namibia into the South African monetary system. In fact, the South African Reserve 
Bank (SARB) has maintained a branch in Windhoek since 1961 (Bank of Namibia 
[BON], 2002:41-42). Among its roles were the distribution of currency (notes and coins), 
administration of exchange controls, provision of clearing facilities to commercial banks 
and being a banker to commercial banks (Kalenga, 2001:3). Furthermore, major South 
African banking institutions were established, primarily aimed at financing commerce 
and trade. 
 
After independence, monetary policy conduct in Namibia incorporated the practice of 
fixed exchange rate regimes where the exchange rate was the main policy instrument 
used to control inflation in order to maintain financial stability (BON, 2008). This has 
been the practice since 1990, at the time of independence, when Namibia was 
confronted with a situation of choosing between monetary policy options and exchange 
rate regimes. The two options that were available to Namibia were (1) to leave the 
Common Monetary Area (CMA1) to pursue an independent monetary policy, such as 
the use of interest rate by the central bank on money supply to influence the economy, 
or (2) to remain in the CMA. The country chose the second option. In the process the 
country‘s exchange rate was pegged to that of South Africa, leading to the assertion 
that monetary policy had been abandoned.  
 
                                                 
1
 The CMA was formerly known as the Rand Monetary Area, which consisted of Botswana, Lesotho, 
Swaziland and South Africa. Botswana moved out in 1976 and Namibia joined in 1990 after attaining 
independence. The CMA is now comprised of the following members: Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia and 
South Africa. 
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Subsequent to joining the CMA, a separate bilateral agreement between Namibia and 
South Africa on features of the peg was concluded in 1992 (Kalenga, 2001:3). The 1992 
bilateral agreement was in anticipation of the peg, which was formally instituted in 1993, 
after the introduction of the Namibian currency, the Namibian dollar. The Namibian 
dollar was then pegged to the South African rand on a one-to-one basis in line with the 
requirement to satisfy the backing rules (Kalenga, 2001:3). Even after the introduction of 
the Namibian dollar, the rand remained legal tender in Namibia.  
 
As a member of a CMA, Namibia does not engage in any active discretionary monetary 
policy. This is primarily subordinated to South Africa‘s conduct of monetary policy. The 
fixing of the Namibian dollar to the South African rand was done to attain the ultimate 
objective of price stability, which is the aim of Namibia‘s monetary policy. That is why 
maintenance of the peg appear as an intermediate target that ensures the ultimate goal 
of price stability by importing stable inflation from the anchor country, in this case South 
Africa. According to Kalenga (2001:4), the experience of countries with a fixed 
exchange rate has generally demonstrated that, provided the exchange rate is fixed to a 
low inflation rate and a stable currency, the attainment of exchange rate stability 
(implied by pegging the Namibian dollar to the rand) will help to ensure that domestic 
prices approximate prices in South Africa. Therefore, under this monetary arrangement, 
economic agents‘ expectations are heavily dependent on the movements of the nominal 
exchange rate. The influence of nominal exchange rates in the formation of 
expectations creates an indexation mechanism in the price-setting process (Baþçý, 
Özel & Sarýkaya, 2008:475). Therefore efficient conduct of monetary policy is the pre-
requisite for it to exert a systematic influence on the economy in a forward-looking 
manner. 
 
Exchange rate pegging also suggests that developments of the South African rand have 
both a direct and an indirect impact on the Namibian dollar. This occurs by implication 
through imported goods, especially since South Africa is Namibia‘s main trading 
partner. Records show that about 80 per cent of Namibia‘s trade is with South Africa 
(ADB, 2009:2). It is expected that imports from South Africa will play a significant role in 
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determining inflation in Namibia. Moreover, Namibia‘s monetary policy is by default 
determined by South Africa because of the country‘s membership of the CMA. It poses 
difficulties in examining the monetary policy transmission mechanisms. Therefore there 
is a need to examine what these developments mean for the transmission mechanisms 
of monetary policy in Namibia. 
 
Although the specific classification of transmission mechanisms varies at times, the 
following four channels of monetary policy transmission are generally distinguished in 
literature: (1) interest rate channel; (2) credit channel; (3) exchange rate channel and (4) 
asset price channel. 
 
The transmission of monetary policy depends on the openness of the capital account 
and the exchange rate regime (Saxena, 2008:82). Namibia is a small open economy 
and there has been a steady increase in trade with the rest of the world. However, a 
number of implications arise, given the current monetary policy arrangement in place. 
The starting point is the famous trilemma from the Mundell-Fleming model that states 
that countries cannot simultaneously fix their exchange rate, have an open capital 
account and pursue an independent monetary policy. If the capital account is open, then 
domestic monetary policy will be determined by the exchange rate regime and the 
degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign financial assets. On the other 
hand, the pro-fixed exchange rate outlook has influenced the formulation and conduct of 
monetary policy in Namibia. There are instances where the BON has sometimes opted 
for tight monetary policy for the sake of defending the exchange rate in the absence of 
inflationary pressures or in the absence of serious heated economic activities. Against 
this background, questions are raised about what the monetary policy transmission 
channels in Namibia are and which of these channels is most effective. In order to 
answer these questions, a number of research objectives have been identified.   
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1.2. Research Objectives 
 
The main objective is to study monetary policy in Namibia. Although monetary policy 
has implications and interacts with macroeconomic variables, the scope of this thesis is 
limited to the following specific objectives:  
(1) To review the evolution of monetary policy in Namibia for the period 1980 to 2011.  
(2) To investigate the interest rate channel of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism in Namibia.  
(3) To analyse the credit channel of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in 
Namibia. 
(4) To evaluate the exchange rate channel of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism in Namibia.  
(5) To study the money effect model in the context of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism in Namibia. 
(6) To examine the exchange rate pass–through (ERPT) to domestic prices in Namibia.  
 
1.3 Relevance of the Study  
  
This study is particularly relevant for a small open economy such as that of Namibia. 
For a long time Namibia‘s monetary authorities have considered exchange rate stability 
as the primary goal of the monetary policy. The transmission of monetary policy 
depends on the openness of the capital account and the exchange rate regime. 
Namibia is a small open economy and there has been a steady increase in trade with 
the rest of the world. However, a number of implications arise, given the current 
monetary policy arrangement in place. 
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First and foremost, monetary policy can affect economic variables through different 
mechanisms. It is inevitable that in order to conduct monetary policy successfully, 
monetary authorities need to segregate the relevant transmission mechanisms in the 
economy. The different transmission mechanisms have different implications on how 
monetary policy can stabilise output and inflation. Moreover, different channels of 
monetary policy transmission raise a variety of empirical and policy questions about the 
modalities of monetary theory and policy that need to be empirically tested. The key 
question is how do macroeconomic variables (especially output and the price level) 
respond to changes in the interest rate (monetary policy instrument)?  
 
Secondly, the obvious implication for Namibia is that a country cannot simultaneously fix 
its exchange rate, have an open capital account and pursue an independent monetary 
policy. This is often used as justification for the fact that the exchange rate channel 
under a fixed exchange rate is inactive. For example, according to Uanguta and Ikhide 
(2002), the exchange rate channel of monetary transmission is not active in Namibia 
because the country is pursuing a fixed exchange rate. This is because domestic 
interest rates adjust in such a way that they leave the exchange rate unchanged.  
However, even if a nominal exchange rate is fixed, monetary policy may be able to 
affect the real exchange rate by acting on the price level. In this way monetary policy 
retains its ability to affect net exports, though to a much more limited extent and with 
much longer lags (Afandi, 2005:49). Therefore, it is worth examining this channel 
empirically to make pronouncements in terms of policy-making.  
 
Thirdly, in studying monetary transmission mechanism it is very difficult to find truly 
exogenous variables because practically every variable in the monetary/financial sector 
is to some extent endogenously determined given well established financial markets 
and rational expectations. Therefore, employing a general (unrestricted) vector 
autoregressive (VAR) modeling framework may impose limitations. The study by 
Uanguta and Ikhide (2002) utilized this approach on the premises of the argument of 
Bernake and Mihov (1998:873) that‖… the fact that tracing the dynamic response of the 
economy to a monetary policy innovation provides a means of observing the effects of 
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policy changes under minimal identifying assumptions justifies the emphasis of the 
VAR-based approach on monetary policy shocks‖. This may have led to a deficiency in 
modelling the effects of monetary policy shocks in the sense that in an unrestricted 
approach the structural innovations have a fundamentally different role. That is, these 
errors simply represent the aggregate effects of a large number of individually 
unimportant variables, and hence lack economic significance. In response to these 
difficulties a structural vector autoregressive framework is commended which allows to 
impose plausible restrictions that will allow for careful modelling of the impulse response 
to monetary policy. SVAR models first decompose all variables into their expected and 
unexpected parts. The identifying restrictions are then imposed only on the unexpected 
part, where plausible identifying restrictions are easier to find (Gottschalk, 2001:18-25). 
With respect to monetary policy, the SVAR approach recognizes that the policy 
instrument is for the most part endogenously determined, which precludes treating this 
variable as exogenous. Hence, this exercise is crucial in monetary policy analysis and 
this study will therefore address the issue.  
 
Fourthly, in their analysis of monetary policy transmission in Namibia, Uaguta and 
Ikhide (2002) used the Cholesky decomposition; however, this approach imposes a 
restriction on the ordering of the variables in the VAR. To avoid the impact of the 
ordering restriction, there is a particular way of dealing with it. Some researchers 
introduced the generalised impulse response function (GIRF) as an alternate tool to the 
traditional Cholesky impulse response and variance decomposition (Koop et al, 1996; 
Pesaran & Shin, 1998). The main advantage of the suggested generalised approach is 
that it is not affected by the ordering of the variables used in the VAR model. This also 
motivates the researcher to address this issue. 
 
Fifthly, the study by Uanguta and Ikhide (2002) did not estimate the money effect model 
in the context of monetary policy transmission separately. This is critical for Namibia, 
since the major concern in an exchange rate pegging arrangement involves an 
obligation by the central bank (BON) to limit money creation to levels comparable to 
those of the country (South Africa) to which its domestic currency is pegged, because 
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money creation is associated with domestic inflation pressures. As an alternative 
channel of monetary transmission from the viewpoint of the monetarist, this channel 
downplays the role of interest rates and liquid asset adjustment in the transmission 
mechanism, reducing the process to a direct link between changes in aggregate money 
supply and absorption (Bolnick, 1991). According to this view, prices and output 
respond to monetary impulses because households and businesses fail to anticipate or 
perceive correctly all the future implications of past and current actions (Meltzer, 1995). 
This is also a motivation to address this deficiency in this study, in order to determine 
whether the Namibian authorities applied corrective measures by maintaining the peg 
through the control of monetary growth. If so, this would imply that the BON actively 
pursued monetary policies that ensured that effectiveness. 
 
Finally, Uanguta and Ikhide‘s (2002) work is the most recent study exclusively on 
monetary policy in Namibia. That means that for nine years no new data have been 
gathered, even though the situation is likely to have changed in respect of the channels 
they investigated, namely the interest rate and credit channels. The same is true of 
other channels that they did not investigate, particularly the exchange rate channel. This 
is another motivation for this study: to address time-gap deficiency regarding monetary 
policy in Namibia. 
   
1.4. Structure of the Study 
 
The rest of the thesis is organized into five chapters, as follows: Chapter two presents 
an overview of Namibia‘s monetary policy, particularly an analysis of the various 
monetary policy frameworks that are discussed, by comparing their advantages and 
disadvantages. The discussion extends to monetary policy rule. This is done with the 
aim of enhancing understanding of how the central bank alters nominal interest rates in 
response to development in inflation and macroeconomic activities. The chapter also 
looks at the alternative or unconventional monetary policy to understand how the central 
bank responds in the wake of a financial crisis. The discussion also touches on the 
situation of small open economies, of which Namibia is one, by taking an interest in the 
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problem trilema (having free capital flows, a fixed exchange rate and independent 
monetary policy). Finally, the chapter discusses the evolution of monetary policy in 
Namibia. Thereafter, an evaluation of monetary policy in terms of macroeconomic 
indicators is also conducted.  
 
Chapter three presents a survey of a literature review for each channel of the monetary 
policy. The aim of this discussion is to find gaps in the literature that may be filled in for 
the purpose of this study. The discussion is divided into two parts, namely theoretical 
literature and empirical literature. The theoretical section presents various theoretical 
arguments on how monetary policy impulses are transmitted to the real sector. The 
discussion is extended to look at how changes in the exchange rate alter relative prices, 
better known as exchange rate pass-through (ERPT). The empirical literature reviews 
the empirical modelling of monetary policy shocks. Subsequently, empirical evidence on 
the channels of monetary policy transmission, both locally and internationally, are 
discussed.  
 
Chapter four presents the methodology employed in conducting empirical analysis. In 
doing so the chapter reviews the VAR framework, its critics and a formal exposition of 
the VAR model. The chapter extends the discussion to the identification strategies. It 
also presents the construction of an SVAR model for Namibia. This model is estimated 
to assess the relative strength of channels of monetary policy transmission in Namibia. 
A brief discussion on the various steps of analysis is also presented. Finally, the chapter 
presents the data, data sources and data measurements. 
 
Chapter five presents the empirical estimation of the six specifications of the SVAR 
model and that of the price-generating process (ERPT) of the Namibian economy. 
These results are used in examining the extent to which these specifications are able to 
identify the effects of monetary policy shocks in Namibia. In doing so the chapter 
analyses the impulse response function of each variable to a monetary policy tightening 
shock based on individual model specification. The specifications, together with their 
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identification assumptions, are assessed by comparing the implied dynamic responses 
to monetary policy disturbances with the predictions derived from the theory.  
 
Chapter six concludes the thesis. It briefly highlights the major empirical findings and 
makes some policy recommendations. The chapter also extends the discussion on the 
shortcomings of this study and makes suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
  
2. AN OVERVIEW OF NAMIBIA’S MONETARY POLICY 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter presents a historical overview and background of Namibia‘s monetary 
policy. The chapter is divided into eight sections. In section 2.2 a brief discussion on the 
definition of monetary policy is presented. This is done with the aim of understanding 
the meaning of monetary policy. An overview of different monetary policy frameworks is 
presented in section 2.3. Section 2.4 discusses monetary policy in small open 
economies to contextualise the operations of monetary policy in Namibia. The evolution 
of monetary policy in Namibia is presented in section 2.5. The monetary policy tools 
used in Namibia are discussed in section 2.6. Section 2.7 gives a brief description of 
monetary policy communication in terms of how monetary policy decision information is 
conveyed to the economic agents. A discussion on the independence of the Central 
Bank of Namibia is presented in section 2.8. After having discussed the general aspect 
of monetary policy, a specific case for monetary policy evaluation in terms of 
macroeconomic indicators in Namibia is presented in section 2.9. Section 2.10 
concludes the chapter.  
 
2.2 Definitions  
 
Monetary policy can be defined in two ways, namely the narrow and broader definition. 
In its narrow concept monetary policy can be defined as the measures aimed at 
controlling money supply (CBK, 1988:4). Kalenga (2001:4) defines monetary policy as 
the action of the central bank to influence the short-term interest rates, supply of money 
and credit to achieve certain objectives. This is often referred to as discretionary 
monetary policy where decisions are usually taken on the basis of the prevailing 
economic conditions. However, other researchers have deemed it appropriate to define 
the concept of monetary policy in harmony with monetary policy goals and as one of the 
central bank‘s functions. Patnaik and Shah (2007:3) define monetary policy as the 
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management of money supply and interest rate by central banks to influence prices and 
employment. Therefore monetary policy is defined as ―the set of procedures and 
measures taken by monetary authorities to manage money supply, interest and 
exchange rates and to influence credit conditions to achieve certain economic 
objectives‖. The common view of this definition is that it appears to be more consistent 
with the practical applications of monetary policy in the real world. It is practical in the 
sense that monetary policy objectives vary among countries, hence the link between the 
instruments of monetary policy and their ultimate goals (Caprio & Honohan, 1990:3).   
 
A monetary policy instrument is defined as a tool that central banks use to reach their 
operational targets. Various measures can be employed by the central bank to meet 
such targets (BON, 2008:9). An operational target is further defined as an economic 
variable that the central bank wants to influence, largely on a day-to-day basis, through 
its monetary policy instruments (BON, 2008:8).  
 
2.3 Monetary Policy Frameworks 
 
Conducting monetary policy requires the central bank to choose the appropriate 
monetary-policy framework. A monetary-policy framework serves as a means to 
achieve monetary policy objectives. In its most basic form, a monetary-policy framework 
comprises two methods, namely monetary policy based on rules, and monetary policy 
based on discretion (Bordo & Schwartz 1997; Tuma 2000). However, Bordo and 
Schwartz (1997) define monetary-policy framework as a set of monetary arrangements 
and institutions accompanied by a set of expectations by the public with respect to 
policy-makers‘ action and expectations by policy-makers about public‘s reaction to their 
actions.  
 
There is a tendency of change in the monetary-policy frameworks that is they are 
constantly evolving in response to new developments in economic and financial 
markets. Maumela (2010:87) highlighted that a certain theoretical framework may be a 
trend for central banks around the world in one era, and out of favour in the next. In the 
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1970s, monetary targeting was a popular monetary-policy framework adopted by 
several countries such as the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. 
However, this framework was not successful in controlling inflation in these countries. 
By the early 1980s, it was very clear that the relationship between monetary 
aggregates, and inflation and nominal income had broken down and all three countries 
formally abandoned monetary targeting. Hence, this is a good example of this was the 
highs and lows of monetarisms in the 1980s. 
 
The traditional rule for central banks‘ objectives involves price stability and economic 
growth. A number of prominent central banks, including the European Central Bank, 
Bank of England and Bank of Japan, have adopted price stability as the single objective 
of monetary policy. The Federal Reserve of the USA continues to pursue multiple 
objectives of monetary policy, including a) maximum employment, b) stable prices, and 
c) moderate long-term interest rates. On the other hand, central banks in a number of 
developing countries have exchange rate management as an objective. The 
transmission mechanism involves the process through which changes in the monetary 
policy are transmitted to the ultimate objectives, hence the name ―monetary policy 
transmission mechanism‖ (Reddy, 2002:3). In general, operating procedures refer to the 
day-to-day implementation of monetary policy by central banks through various 
instruments (classified into two broad categories, namely direct and indirect 
instruments). However, there are factors that influence the choice of a monetary policy 
strategy that the monetary authorities follow, including: (i) the form of the government 
system, (ii) economic and legal systems, (iii) the level of expertise in monetary policy 
matters that exists both inside and outside the central bank, (iv) the policy history of a 
country, (v) the analytical capacities of a central bank and (vi) institutional arrangements 
and the structure of the financial sector (Mishkin, 1999).  
 
Neupauerova and Vravec (2007:220) discuss three main monetary policy frameworks, 
namely monetary targeting, exchange rate targeting and inflation targeting. However, 
the following basic monetary-policy frameworks are found in the literature: exchange 
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rate targeting, monetary targeting, interest rate targeting, discretionary monetary policy, 
nominal income targeting and inflation targeting. 
 
Each of these issues is dealt with in this discussion; the Namibian experience is 
touched upon briefly in a later section. 
 
2.3.1 Exchange rate targeting 
Historically, exchange rate targeting is the earliest monetary policy strategy used by 
central banks. In the literature exchange rate targeting is better known as ―rule-directed 
policy-making‖ (Kahveci and Sayilgan, 2006), meaning that monetary policy conduct is 
based on the exchange rate as a nominal anchor, better known as exchange rate 
targeting.  
 
The exchange rate targeting regime is defined as a monetary-policy regime whose 
primary focal point is the level of the exchange rate (Calvo et al., 1995). Under this 
regime the control is on the level of and movements in the level of the exchange rate in 
determining the stance of the monetary policy. This implies that the exchange rate is the 
epic of macroeconomic policy. In fact, countries practise monetary policy based on the 
exchange rate as a nominal anchor. In particular, this practice involves the use of the 
nominal exchange rate as a nominal anchor that can help in controlling domestic 
inflation (Mishkin, 1998:82). Chow and Kim (2003:333) articulate that using a nominal 
anchor serves as a stabilisation policy for domestic prices in the economy. They argue 
that a nominal anchor would serve the purpose of price stabilisation, irrespective of 
economic status. It is usually practised in small, yet relatively open economies following 
the stabilisation of inflation when credibility is rather low (Wagner, 2000). Ghosh et al 
(1996:6) also support this argument by indicating that countries with low credibility can 
use an exchange rate target as an anti-inflationary policy. This is because a pegged 
exchange rate is often meant to import credibility into countries with a high inflation rate 
to achieve a lower inflation rate effectively (Mishkin, 1998:82).  
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Wessels (2007:708) further highlights that the exchange rate target can be set at 
different levels because there are different levels of inflexibility. These include 
conventional fixed pegs, crawling pegs, horizontal bands, crawling bands or a hard 
(fixed) peg exchange rate, such as currency board and dollarisation (El-Mefleh, 
2004:50; Fischer, 2001:3). Calvo (2001) and Macfarlane (1999) highlight different types 
or arrangements of exchange-rate targeting regimes classified as follows:   
 
(i) Fixed arrangements such as currency unions, currency boards and a fixed exchange 
rate  
(ii) Intermediate arrangements such as an adjustable peg, a crawling peg, and a basket 
peg 
(iii) Target-zone or band and floats arrangements, such as managed and free floats.  
 
In recent years, exchange-rate targeting policy has implied the fixing or linking or 
pegging of the exchange rate of one country to another currency or basket of 
currencies. In most cases the peg country is a neighbour or major trading partner of the 
pegging country and the pegging country in turn imports low inflation, provided that its 
currency is relatively stable (Wagner 2000). Therefore, any country that follows an 
exchange-rate targeting policy or regime will implicitly be following a policy of the peg 
country. Moreover, exchange-rate targeting is said to enhance the importation of 
credibility of the anchored country, that is, if the exchange-rate target is credible. 
Velasco (2003:3) argues that the commitment by authorities to a pegged exchange rate 
arrangement conveys credible signals about predictions of expected inflation. It follows 
that under a pegged exchange rate arrangement, the prediction of inflation is so simple 
and clear that it is easily understood by the public (Giucci & Trebesch, 2004:3). Latter 
(2001:36) supports this argument by arguing that when economic agents understand 
the system, it enhances the credibility of the peg. That is why a currency peg as nominal 
anchor facilitates the convergence of policy targets in the domestic economy to the 
levels prevailing in the country of anchor, ie low inflation (Krueger, 1997:2). Moreover, 
exchange-rate targets have a disciplinary effect on both monetary and fiscal policy; for 
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example, governments‘ budgetary pressures are often associated with expansionary 
monetary policies (Keller and Richardson, 2003:13-14; and Hoffmann, 2007:425).  
 
Exchange rate targeting has its pros and cons. Mishkin (1999), Bernanke et al (1999), 
Houben (2000) and Nell (2004) pin-point some advantages of an exchange-rate 
targeting framework.  
 
First, the exchange-rate target as a nominal anchor directly links the inflation rate to 
internationally traded goods; hence it contributes directly to keeping inflation under 
control by containing the imported inflation of an open economy. That is why the 
exchange-rate targeting regime is advocated for controlling inflation in open economies 
that are largely dependent on imports of goods.  
 
Second, under the exchange-rate targeting regime inflation expectations are anchored 
to the inflation rate of the country to which the currency is pegged. However, in the 
presence of restrictions on capital movements, an exchange rate target suggests that 
the monetary policy of the pegged country is subordinated by the peg country, meaning 
the country adopts monetary policy for the anchor country.  
 
Third, the central bank uses an automatic mechanism; this involves depreciating factors 
that bring about monetary policy restriction or alternatively, appreciating factors that 
bring about monetary policy relaxation. This helps in mitigating the time-inconsistency 
problem where policymakers are enticed to exploit the short-run trade-off between 
employment and inflation. In this case, policymakers might, for example, pursue short-
run employment objectives using an expansionary monetary policy.   
 
Fourth, an exchange-rate target has the advantages of simplicity and clarity that make it 
easily understood by the public. For instance, exchange rate targeting is a good signal 
for the creation of private sector expectations; this in turn increases the strength of the 
currency. 
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Fifth, an exchange-rate target is also advocated because of its role in helping to shape 
and advance economic and political integration. A good example is that of the exchange 
rate mechanism (ERM), which was in place in the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
states prior to the introduction of the euro. 
 
Sixth, the exchange-rate targeting regime enhances the harmonisation of both fiscal 
and monetary policy, ie, co-operation between the government and the central bank. 
This inclusiveness forces government to share responsibility for the achievement of the 
target jointly and it cannot implement policies that are in contrast with its objective. 
Therefore, exchange-rate targets have a disciplinary effect on both monetary and fiscal 
policy, because governments‘ budgetary pressures are often associated with 
expansionary monetary policies.   
 
Seventh, exchange-rate targeting eases foreign financing by reducing or eliminating the 
exchange-rate risk.  
 
Eighth, the exchange rate has been used as an anti-inflationary policy, especially in an 
open economy, because it ties the pegging country to commit to low inflation. This 
strategy is used as a price stabiliser and credibility enhancer in fighting inflation.   
 
Even though a number of advantages have been highlighted above, exchange rate 
targeting has its disadvantages. There have been bad experiences emanating from this 
framework. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), Mishkin (1999), Houben (2000) and Nell (2004) 
share some of the disadvantages of the exchange-rate targeting regime that are 
discussed below.  
 
First, exchange rate targeting leads to loss of monetary policy independence. This is 
because economic agents hardly follow domestic interest rates, since these are 
determined from outside by the subordinating country. Furthermore, exchange-rate 
targeting binds the domestic currency to the currency of an anchor country; the 
domestic country has to do what the partner country does, restricting the ability of the 
17 
 
central bank to respond to both domestic and external shocks. Thus, monetary policy 
does not respond to domestic economic conditions and this raises questions regarding 
the effects of these on output growth and employment.  
 
Second, exchange-rate targeting is only, if not mainly, appropriate for small, open 
economies where the exchange rate plays a major role in determining domestic price 
developments. Therefore, the exchange rate is relatively good as a nominal anchor in 
the presence of capital flow regulation. This is because a reduction in capital flow 
decreases the risk of exchange-rate speculation and allows alternative schemes of 
exchange autonomous monetary-policy regulation to be applied.  
 
Third, by default, the exchange-rate target forces the central bank to use monetary 
policy to keep the exchange rate on target or within the target range. This implies that it 
becomes a primary goal, while domestic economic considerations will be secondary 
when implementing monetary policy.  
 
Fourth, under an exchange-rate targeting regime, signalling by the foreign-exchange 
market regarding the monetary policy stance becomes unidentifiable. This impedes the 
central bank in adapting to changing financial markets. This in itself is regarded as 
weakening of the accountability of the central bank.  
 
Fifth, an exchange-rate targeting regime is fragile by nature, because it lays a country 
open to speculative attacks on the capital account, suggesting to economic agents that 
the central bank will not be able to buy or sell sufficient quantities of foreign exchange to 
defend the peg. Therefore, exchange-rate targeting could bring about financial fragility 
and possibly a full-fledged financial crisis. Calvo and Mishkin (2003) acknowledge a 
number of financial crises that are said to have been caused by the unsustainability of 
an exchange-rate targeting framework. A number of the crises associated with 
exchange-rate targeting framework are discussed below.  
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The ERM crisis of 1992  
 
The European ERM is a system introduced by the European Community in March 1979, 
as part of the European Monetary System (EMS), with the following aims:  
(i) To reduce exchange-rate variability  
(ii) To achieve monetary stability in Europe  
(iii) To prepare for joining the Economic and Monetary Union  
(iv) To advocate the introduction of a single currency, the euro. This took place on 1 
January 1999.  
In the United Kingdom, after joining the EMS in October 1990, there were too many 
speculative compressions on the external value of the pound sterling in September 
1992. On 16 September 1992 (also known as Black Wednesday) the Bank of England 
stopped intervening in the foreign-exchange market owing to foreign-exchange losses 
and abandoned the exchange-rate target. Black Wednesday refers to the date, 16 
September 1992, when the UK was forced out of the ERM (Calvo & Mishkin, 2003; 
Maumela, 2010).  
 
The “Tequila Crisis” of 1994 and 1995  
 
This refers to the economic crisis in Mexico in 1994, widely known as the ―Mexican peso 
crisis‖; the situation became an effective crisis with the sudden devaluation of the 
Mexican peso in December 1994. This crisis also spread to other countries in the 
region, such as Brazil and Argentina. This event created fears that other emerging-
market economies might be prone to similar problems. Chile and Uruguay were also 
affected by this crisis (Calvo & Mishkin, 2003; Maumela, 2010).  
 
The Asian financial crisis in 1997  
 
The Asian financial crisis affected the larger part of Asia at the start of July 1997. This 
started in Thailand with the financial collapse of the Thai baht that was caused by the 
19 
 
decision of the Thai government to float the baht, cutting its peg to the US dollar. At the 
time, Thailand had acquired a liability of foreign debt that led to bankruptcy even prior to 
the collapse of the baht. Countries such as Japan and others in Southeast Asia were 
also affected, resulting in phenomena such as slumping currencies, devalued stock 
markets and other asset prices, and a quick rise in private debt (Calvo & Mishkin, 2003; 
Maumela, 2010). 
 
The Russian financial crisis in 1998  
 
The Russian financial crisis (also called "ruble crisis") hit Russia on 17 August 1998. 
This crisis occurred as a result of the Asian financial crisis, which started in July 1997. 
The Russian financial crisis was primarily a result of non-payment of taxes by the 
energy and manufacturing industries (Calvo & Mishkin, 2003; Maumela, 2010). 
 
The Turkish crises of 2000 and 2001  
 
Turkey experienced a crisis in February 2001, which resulted from failure of the public 
sector to maintain strict targets and implement the free-market rationale of globalisation 
fully. Pressures emanating from the process of integration with global capital markets 
worsened the financial crisis (Calvo & Mishkin, 2003; Maumela, 2010).  
 
The crises of 2001 and 2002 in Argentina  
 
The economic crisis in Argentina was a financial situation that affected its economy 
during the early 2000s. Argentina adopted the currency board system from 1 April 1991 
to 6 January 2002. The adoption of the currency board was aimed at ending the cycle of 
inflationary surges. Under this arrangement, the peso/dollar was fixed at one to one. 
However, in 1998, Argentina entered a recession phase, resulting in banking crises and 
the default of government debt. However, monetary policy under the Currency Board 
could not be used by the central bank to stimulate the economy as a way of curbing the 
recession. Moreover, the Currency Board did not allow the central bank to fulfill its 
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function as the lender of last resort; it was constrained by the Convertibility Law of 1 
April 1991. Speculative attack against the Argentine Currency Board quickly turned into 
a major banking crisis. As a result of these developments, the currency depreciated by 
more than 70 per cent, which led to a full-scale financial crisis in 2002 (Calvo & Mishkin, 
2003; Maumela, 2010).  
 
Based on the experiences discussed above, the authors suggest that unsustainable 
exchange-rate regimes are inherently crisis-prone. This has led to the advocacy of an 
alternative nominal anchor, namely monetary aggregate targeting, especially with the 
increasing liberalisation of capital flows and the globalisation of financial markets. In 
fact, various countries shifted to monetary targeting, abandoning exchange-rate 
targeting. 
 
2.3.2 Monetary targeting 
In the wake of set-backs concerning exchange rate targeting, monetary economists 
considered monetary-aggregate targeting as an alternative monetary policy framework 
that could remedy problems associated with exchange-rate targeting (Campbell & 
Dougan, 1988). Monetary targeting is defined as a strategy that a central bank uses by 
observing and targeting monetary aggregates (Meltzer, 1998). This may vary from 
country to country but it includes monetary base, M1, M2 or M3 aggregate (Cagan, 
1982). Hence, monetary policy under such a regime focuses on ensuring an appropriate 
growth rate of the chosen monetary aggregate (Croce & Khan 2000). According to 
Neupauerova and Vravec (2007:220) monetary targeting is based on three main 
elements: 
(i) The central bank should rely on the information signalled by monetary aggregate 
evolution.  
(ii) The central bank should announce the targeted level of monetary aggregate to 
economic players.  
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(iii) The central bank should have a controllable mechanism that would permit the 
elimination of big and systematic gaps from assigned monetary objectives. 
 
The German Bundesbank was the first central bank to practise money-supply targeting 
in 1975 (Bernanke & Mihov, 1997). This framework requires that the growth of money 
supply be controlled over time; this in turn results in stable prices (Moore, 1988). 
McCallum (1985) also mentions various countries that used monetary-aggregate 
targeting.  According to Goodfriend (2007), this principle is based on the following 
arguments:  
 
(i) The remedy for inflation is monetary-based.  
(ii) In the long run, price growth is affected by money-supply growth.  
(iii) The central bank is in a position to control the money supply sufficiently in order to 
control inflation because it has a monopoly on currency and bank reserves.  
(iv) There should be a stable relationship between nominal expenditure and the quantity 
of money.  
 
Monetary-policy targeting strategy is based on the quantity theory of money, where MV 
= PQ, with M = nation‘s money supply, V = velocity of circulation of money, P = general 
price index, and Q = physical output or quantity (Salvatore, 2011:575). The quantity 
theory of money is the theory that money supply has a direct, positive relationship with 
the price level. Moreover, the quantity theory of money states that changes in money 
supply-growth are followed by an equal change in the rate of inflation through nominal 
interest. This theory proves that the quantity of money available in an economy 
determines the value of money. If V remains stable in this equation, any change in M 
will have an impact on nominal PQ, which is GDP. This suggests that control over the 
rate of growth will also ensure control over a nominal GDP, where GDP = PQ and 
control price changes.  
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As in the case of the exchange rate targeting framework, monetary-aggregate targeting 
also has its advantages and disadvantages. The advantages of monetary targeting are 
discussed by Mishkin (1999), Houben (2000), Mishkin and Savastano (2001) and 
Neupauerova and Vravec (2007), who mention the following: 
 
First, under monetary targeting the central banks can adjust monetary policy to respond 
and be in the position to cope with domestic economic conditions. That is why it is 
argued that monetary targeting takes into account that monetary policy decisions are 
inclusive of individuals with different preferences. 
 
Second, under this framework, central banks have a large degree of independence in 
the conduct of monetary policy. This implies that the central bank has greater 
independence, hence it is in a position to conduct monetary policy in response to 
domestic economic shocks. Furthermore, a country can have its goal but can also 
accommodate other monetary policy goals.  
 
Third, a monetary-targeting framework exhibits the characteristics of control, which can 
be exercised when necessary to prevent the monetisation of government debt. This is 
advocated particularly when the central bank is targeting a narrow monetary aggregate.  
 
Fourth, an announced monetary-aggregate target is a self-imposed commitment. It is 
used as a benchmark for evaluation as to whether the central bank is progressing or not 
by all the economic agents. 
  
Fifth, it is transparent; the computation of target ranges becomes a public exercise. 
Furthermore, the intentions of policy-makers to control inflation become clear to both the 
public and the markets.  
 
Sixth, there is accountability to the monetary authorities to keep inflation low and 
prevent time-inconsistency problems.  
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Seventh, monetary targeting provides a nominal anchor that is fairly easily understood 
and communicated to the public.  
 
The disadvantages of the monetary-aggregate targeting framework have been 
highlighted by various authors including Bryant (1982), McCallum (1985), Cagan and 
Dewald (1985), Taylor (1995), Wagner (2000), Dalziel (2002), Fontana and Palacio-
Vera (2004), Söderström (2005) and Neupauerova and Vravec (2007). These 
disadvantages include the following:  
 
First, there is a limitation on control over money supply. This results in inaccurate 
measurement and target miss, which may consequently require frequent adjustments of 
the policy instrument.  
 
Second, monetary-aggregate targets are largely dependent on a stable money-inflation 
relationship. This relationship produces poor outcomes. It is even more challenging in 
an environment of financial innovation, improvements in transaction technology, market 
computation and globalisation. This relationship started deteriorating in the 1980s as 
money-demand equations were off track, resulting in the limited role of money in the 
modern approach to monetary policy. In this light this strategy was abandoned by the 
majority of monetary targeters in the 1980s.  
 
Third, the relationship between the monetary aggregates and goal variables is weak, 
undermining the transparency and accountability of the central bank to economic 
agents. Furthermore, it undermines monetary targeting‘s ability to serve as a 
communication device. Hence, the credibility of the central bank is questioned.  
Fourth, the monetary-targeting framework is not proactive because it only reacts to 
overshooting of the target, with delays between monetary aggregates and nominal 
income.  
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Fifth, there is confusion between the intermediate target, ultimate goal and a directly 
controllable instrument. This can lead to the actual goal not being achieved or policy 
mistakes.  
 
Sixth, this framework subordinates other macroeconomic goals to monetary-aggregate 
targeting. Therefore, little is achieved if the central bank successfully meets its monetary 
target but inflation and output growth are not close to their desired rates.  
 
Seventh, the extent to which the government views an explicit monetary target as the 
central bank target might be problematic. This might encourage the government 
unknowingly to pursue policies that are not supportive of target achievement.   
 
There are some experiences with monetary-aggregate targeting that are worth 
discussing briefly. For example, the People‘s Bank of China has been applying this 
strategy since late 1980. This has occurred in phases, with the last phase being in effect 
since 1998. In this phase credit ceilings were eliminated and money supply, in particular 
M2, became the single intermediate objective. The experience has been that China has 
observed instability between monetary aggregates and the inflation rate. 
 
Peru‘s central bank also applies monetary targeting in a very dangerous and risky way, 
as highlighted by Mishkin and Savastano (2001:15). The central bank does not publicly 
announce its monetary targeting. Given the history of high instability of the relationship 
between money and inflation in Latin America, this can be harmful to the economy. 
 
Mexico had adopted monetary targeting as its strategy but gradually replaced it by 
inflation targeting during the last decade and the first positive results are already 
obvious (Mishkin & Savastano, 2001:14). 
 
The German Bundesbank is another central bank that engaged in monetary targeting, 
resulting in a favourable impact on the economy. Despite its success, there were 
problems with the money-inflation relationship. This led to the establishment of a two-
25 
 
pillar strategy, namely monetary aggregate growth but also a forecast inflation rate. This 
yielded some positive results for the Bundesbank, because of its high credibility, 
flexibility and transparency. 
 
The European Central Bank has also applied monetary targeting but it has a relatively 
low level of transparency and credibility because of its short history. 
 
Slovenia has practised monetary targeting from 1991 to 1995, with M1 as an 
intermediate target. This strategy yielded positive results for the inflation level and other 
macroeconomic indicators (Caprirolo & Lavrač, 2003:8). 
 
There is evidence of failure of this monetary policy strategy. The disadvantages 
indicated are the reasons for abandoning this monetary-policy strategy in favour of 
interest rate targeting. In fact economists proposed that central banks target the 
interest-rate level, ie switch from monetary-aggregate targeting to interest-rate targeting 
(Parkin, 1998). 
 
2.3.3 Interest-rate targeting  
Monetary authorities, in particular central bankers and even several economists, 
advocate interest rate targeting as a means to control inflation. Interest-rate targeting is 
simply a monetary-policy strategy that targets a given level of interest rate through 
which the central bank seeks to influence short-term interest rates (Maumela, 
2010:105). This strategy relates to nominal interest rates because it is in the realm of 
the systematic control of the central bank. Furthermore, this monetary policy strategy is 
associated with the ―Ricardian‖ regime or ―money-dominant‖. This is a regime of the 
fiscal analogue to interest-rate targets or accommodative money supply rules that can 
leave the price level indeterminate in the quantity theory (Cochrane 1999:335). In fact, a 
long time ago, Poole (1970) argued that when the major source of instability in the 
economy is the money-demand function, central banks should rather concentrate on the 
interest-rate target.  
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Barro (1989) used the term interest-rate targeting to indicate both (1) the choice of an 
interest rate as a short-run policy instrument of monetary-policy control and (2) as an 
objective of a central bank that involves the smoothing of interest rates. This implies that 
interest-rate targeting was then used as an operational objective and as an intermediate 
objective. The use of interest rate targeting is based on the argument that the central 
bank has power to control the interest rate as a means of conducting monetary policy. 
This policy regime assumes that all other interest rates move in line with the interest 
rate target set. For example, a nominal interest rate is targeted to influence aggregate 
demand and consequently inflation. Ideally, a central bank chooses to keep the policy 
rate at a prescribed level to achieve its objective of price stability or change the target 
range when economic or market conditions require it. However, experience shows that 
the market rate deviates from the target at times, hence transitory liquidity shocks.  
 
In view of the above, interest-rate targeting is considered to have advantages and 
disadvantages. Among others, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1996), Quiggin (1997:179 -180), 
Houben (2000:87) and Teruyoshi (2004) highlight the following advantages:  
 
First, this monetary policy strategy has the advantage of offsetting real shocks, for 
example cutting interest rates in trying or difficult times.  
 
Second, it eliminates distortions caused by sluggish portfolios; for instance, it allows 
labour, and thus output and consumption, to respond optimally to economic shocks.  
 
Third, it is simple, easy to understand and observed by the public. Hence, the central 
bank can be held accountable.   
 
Fourth, it has the ability to deal with the time-inconsistency problem.  
 
Fifth, it allows for minimal interventions by the central banks, which confines the scope 
of uncertain preferences of the central bank to affect the economy.  
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Sixth, it enhances communication policy intention; for example, the public can be 
informed that the rates will be kept at a predetermined margin above the rate of 
inflation.  
 
Seventh, variations in the inflation rate translate directly into variations in the interest 
rate. Hence, stabilising real interest rates translates into eliminating unanticipated 
inflation.  
 
Eighth, obedience to interest-rate targets increases the building-up of credibility of the 
monetary authority because it precedes the policy outcomes in terms of inflation and 
output.  
Ninth, interest rate changes are highly visible and tightly controllable, thus strengthening 
transparency and accountability for monetary policy-making.  
 
Tenth, it ensures interest-rate stability if successfully targeted, in particular once the 
public accepts the credibility of such a policy.  
 
As in all other monetary policy frameworks, interest-rate targeting has attracted criticism 
included in various texts in literature, such as the work of Barro (1989), Quiggin 
(1997:180), Balduzzi et al. (1998), Houben (2000:88) and Maumela (2010).  
 
First, interest rates must rise significantly beyond the inflation level to alleviate inflation, 
irrespective of the circumstances or prevailing economic condition.  This is detrimental 
to economic growth and it does not address inflation per se.   
 
Second, it is immune to the fiscal temptation of inflating the interest rate in an attempt to 
boost the economy.  
 
Third, the use of an interest-rate targeting framework makes the economy lose its 
nominal anchor and in turn the rate of monetary growth passively accommodates 
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inflation. This is because in the long run the nominal anchor value for inflation is non-
existent.  
  
Fourth, there is limited scope for predicting the short-term rates because inflation does 
not remain fixed or constant over time. In fact, changes in in the inflation rate directly 
translate into changes in the nominal interest rate.  
 
Fifth, because of the problem of changes in inflation and inflation expectations, interest-
rate targeting requires complementary mechanisms to pin down the levels of nominal 
variables. 
 
Sixth, in the absence of an equilibrium level of interest rates, interest rate targeting does 
not provide a nominal anchor for the price level. Hence, there is no fixed relationship 
between the interest rate level and the end objective of monetary policy, namely, 
inflation and output.  
 
Seventh, a rise in indirect taxes results in a rise in nominal interest rates, to protect the 
predetermined real interest rate margin.   
Eighth, the interest rate targeting framework makes monetary policy more susceptible to 
outside pressures. This is because there is no objective measure of whether a specific 
interest-rate target is inflationary or deflationary; alternatively, whether monetary policy 
is loose or tight.  
Argument in literature points out that government can regard an interest-rate target as 
the target of the central bank alone, because the interest rate is not collectively set by 
the fiscal and monetary authorities.   
 
2.3.4 Discretionary monetary policy  
A discretionary (combined) monetary-policy regime is also described in literature as the 
―just trust us‖ or ―just do it‖ approach to monetary policy, with an implicit but no explicit 
nominal anchor (Bernanke et al, 1999). It is referred to as a regime with an implicit 
nominal anchor and targets certain nominal variables not announced explicitly but 
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adopted only internally within the central bank without a specific parameter. 
Consequently no specific objectives for monetary policy are put forward. It targets 
multiple variables such as inflation, unemployment and economic growth, and identifies 
sources of monetary disturbances instead of simply one indicator to guide monetary 
policy (Maumela, 2010).  
 
A discretionary monetary-policy strategy has the following advantages, as cited in 
Mishkin (1999), Houben (2003) and Maumela (2010): 
 
First, this strategy has the potential to solve the problem of time inconsistency by 
adopting ―forward-looking behaviour‖.  
 
Second, having multiple targets minimises loss of credibility as a result of missing a 
specific target.  
 
Third, having multiple targets also serves as a diversification device and helps to spread 
the risks ensuing from an unstable relationship between an individual intermediate 
target and the final objective.  
 
Fourth, discretionary monetary policy enriches the autonomy of the central bank, 
particularly when target variables are fully within the dominion of the central bank.  
This strategy was successfully used in the past in the USA, where the rate of inflation 
was reduced from double-digit levels to a level of 3,0 per cent by the early 1990s. Since 
then, the rate of inflation has been stable at this level or below it. Despite the 
abovementioned advantages, this monetary policy strategy also has some 
disadvantages, as highlighted by Mishkin (1999), Houben (2000) and Maumela (2010):  
First, in the absence of an explicit nominal anchor, it becomes difficult to assess the 
performance of the central bank. Furthermore, this may lead to a rise in inflation 
expectations due to failure to understand the reasons for the interest rate hike. 
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Second, there is a high likelihood of loss of independence of the central bank due to 
political influence on monetary-policy decision-making.  
 
Third, it lacks transparency because economic agents would find it difficult to determine 
the intentions of the central bank, given the absence of an explicit nominal anchor. 
Fourth, it also results in a time-inconsistency problem, leading to the pursuit of short-
term objectives at the expense of long term objectives. 
  
Fifth, it may deter the central bank from taking action even when economic 
circumstances require it to act. An example is when a set of indicators that were chosen 
are moving in opposite directions. 
 
Sixth, this strategy relies heavily on the preference, trustworthiness and skills of 
individuals in the central bank.  
 
2.3.5 Nominal gross domestic product level targeting 
The weakness of the exchange rate targeting framework and monetary targeting 
framework led to another monetary policy strategy known as the nominal GDP target. 
The targeting of nominal GDP was first proposed by Tobin (Parkin, 1999:805). This 
strategy is advocated particularly when the monetary policy objective is not only inflation 
(McCallum, 1989).  Nominal-income targeting is defined as a monetary-policy strategy 
through which a central bank seeks to achieve price stability by directing the expansion 
of a nominal income at the same rate as that of the potential output (Houben 2000). 
However, the literature suggests consideration of three types of nominal income policies 
(Hall & Mankiw, 1994:77): 
 
(i) Growth-rate targeting. Keep the growth of nominal income as close to a constant as 
possible. 
(ii) Level targeting. Keep the level of nominal income as close as possible to a path that 
is prescribed, once and for all, at the time the policy is first put into effect. 
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(iii) Hybrid targeting. Keep the growth of nominal income over the coming year as close 
as possible to a constant plus the current percentage gap between real income and its 
equilibrium level. 
 
As in the case of other monetary-policy regimes, nominal GDP targeting also has its 
advantages and disadvantages. Maumela (2010) highlights the advantages of nominal 
GDP targeting: 
 
First, it does not rely on knowledge of the output gap.  
 
Second, it binds policy-makers to effect policy directed at affecting output and prices. 
That is, the movement of output and prices dictates the changes in the monetary policy 
stance.   
 
Third, nominal GDP targeting minimises volatility in the price level and the inflation rate. 
 
Fourth, it brings about harmonisation between fiscal and monetary policy in the sense 
that government is forced to publicise its estimate of the potential real GDP target  
relative to the nominal GDP target included.   
 
Fifth, there is an inherent logic to targeting nominal income because it brings together 
the two principal macroeconomic objectives that are directly influenced by monetary 
policy, at least in the short to medium term, namely low inflation and high, real output.  
  
Sixth, it has the ability to communicate the basic goals of monetary policy to the outside 
world.  
 
Seventh, it provides leverage by ensuring that objectives are equally pursued, ie 
inflation and growth objectives.   
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Eighth, nominal-income targeting effectively minimises the destabilising effects of shock 
disturbances.  
 
A number of disadvantages of nominal GDP targeting also surfaced, as cited by Axilrod 
(1985), Poole (1985), Mishkin (1999), Houben (2000) and Maumela (2010). 
 
First, there is limited scope for influencing short-run movements in the nominal income.  
Second, there is a delay in making national income statistics available, making it difficult 
to ascertain the policy stance or consider timely adjustments to the policy to ensure 
achievement of the target.  
 
Third, there is a misunderstanding about the concepts of nominal GDP and real GDP.  
 
Fourth, estimates of potential real GDP growth can be problematic, as such estimates 
are far from precise, even in retrospect. 
 
Fifth, nominal GDP targeting is ineffective in achieving short-run stabilisation. 
 
Sixth, nominal GDP targeting is regarded as less transparent because of greater 
problems concerning the measurement of target quantities.  
 
Seventh, it is difficult to project nominal income precisely and reliably.  
 
The limitations of the strategy discussed earlier have led to the establishment of another 
strategy, known as the inflation targeting framework, which is discussed in detail in the 
next section. 
 
2.3.6 Inflation targeting 
Defining inflation targeting has posed difficulties in the sense that this framework has 
been considerably redefined over time (Maumela, 2010:7). However, Bernanke and 
Mishkin (1997) and Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (1999) define inflation 
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targeting as an arrangement for monetary policy that is conducted through public 
announcement of official quantified goals for the inflation rate. The rate can be 
quantified for one or several future periods. This goal quantification should be 
accompanied by an explicit confirmation that low and stable inflation is a long-term 
primary monetary policy goal. The central bank attains this goal directly through 
monetary policy instruments, usually through interest rates (Neupauerova & Vravec, 
2007:224). 
Svensson (2000), Mishkin and Savastano (2001) and Nell (2004:12) indicate that 
inflation targeting as a framework of monetary policy is based on the following basic 
elements: 
First, it is necessary for the monetary authorities to announce mid-term inflation goals or 
targets publicly by conveying some numeric value. Second, price stability should be the 
primary, final and long-term goal. 
Third, the importance of other goals is secondary and they are only relevant in the short 
term. Fourth, there must be transparency and clear communication of plans, objectives 
and decisions to the public by the monetary authorities. This would therefore imply that 
monetary measurements should also be made public. Fifth, there should be a high rate 
of monetary authority accountancy. Lastly, economic agents must know that the central 
banks‘ strategy and behaviour are exactly in line with the primary goal and strengthen 
the overall activities of the monetary authority.  
 
The main question would then be whether, given these basic elements, inflation 
targeting guarantees that whoever practises it would automatically experience low and 
stable prices. Furthermore, is inflation targeting a monetary policy strategy for all? This 
question arises because the advocates of inflation targeting argue that it institutionalises 
good monetary policy and imposes discipline on reluctant central banks (Maumela, 
2010:14). However, according to literature, inflation-targeting strategies vary from 
country to country, depending on individual circumstances. Hence there are numerous 
versions of the inflation-targeting framework. Nell (2004), Carare and Stone (2006) and 
Maumela (2010) highlight three inflation-targeting frameworks, namely, full-fledged 
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inflation targeting (explicit inflation targeting), eclectic inflation targeting (implicit inflation 
targeting) and inflation targeting lite (implicit inflation targeting). 
 
Full-fledged inflation targeting is known as an explicit form of inflation targeting, where 
countries have clearly committed to their inflation targets and satisfy most of the 
inflation-targeting conditions. Under this modification the central bank announces 
explicitly and publicly a numerical value for inflation targeting in the medium term. 
 
The second form of inflation targeting is eclectic inflation targeting. This form differs 
from the full-fledged form in the sense that it excludes full transparency and 
accountability for inflation targets by the monetary authorities. It is ideal for countries 
whose monetary policy frameworks include inflation and other objectives. It is referred 
to as implicit inflation targeting because the central bank sets the value of inflation 
targeting in the short term implicitly but not officially. The drawbacks of this modification 
are that the central bank does not have to meet the targeted value strictly and precisely. 
In fact, output stabilisation is given similar weight to inflation. 
  
The last form of inflation targeting is inflation-targeting lite. Inflation-targeting lite is 
common among emerging-market economies that from time to time report numerical 
inflation targets or objectives as part of government‘s economic plan for the coming 
period. The monetary policy framework in these countries does not prioritise inflation 
targeting in relation to other objectives. It is also referred to as the transitional 
framework to a full-fledged inflation-targeting framework. This is because, during the 
transition period, monetary authorities implement reforms required before full-fledged 
inflation targeting can be practised. Hence, it is also classified as an implicit inflation-
targeting framework. Under implicit inflation targeting, the central bank would also have 
other intermediate targets, such as exchange-rate or monetary-aggregate targets. 
 
The discussion of the different inflation-targeting frameworks suggests that the 
underlying economic structures dictate the regime that best fits their circumstances. 
This is supported by Svensson (1997), Wagner (2000), Jansen (2001) and Maumela 
35 
 
(2010). They highlight other factors that make it impossible to have a uniform inflation-
targeting framework for all economies. These factors include, among others: (i) a history 
of high inflation, (ii) macroeconomic instability, (iii) vulnerability to speculative attack, (iv) 
implementation problems, (v) supply shocks, (vi) the impact of monetary policy on the 
exchange rate, (vii) unusual features such as vulnerability to volatile international capital 
flows, (viii) the objective of monetary policy, (ix) instruments of monetary policy, (x) the 
inflation process, (xi) designing the inflation target and (xii) forecasting inflation.  
 
Another factor that suggests that inflation targeting is not uniform for all countries is 
preconditions necessary for the effectiveness of an inflation-targeting strategy. If these 
conditions are not met, a country will not benefit from this framework (Maumela, 
2010:18). Nell (2004:13-18) and Otker-Robe (2009) highlight some of these conditions, 
namely: 
 
(i) The Central bank should have a maximum level of independence so that it can bear 
the responsibility for results achieved. 
(ii) The central bank should avoid multiple anchors to avoid conflicts between its 
previous nominal anchors and price stability, ie the central bank should articulate a 
numerical value of inflation targeting.  
(iii) Inflation targeting should be jointly announced by the central bank and government. 
This requires coordination between fiscal and monetary policy.  
(iv) A transparent, accountable and comprehensible monetary strategy is required.  
(v) There should be financial stability, a well-developed financial system and institutional 
development in the economy. 
(vi) The central bank should also be in a position to make predictions about the future of 
macroeconomic indicators to set a realistic inflation target goal. This would mean that if 
the predictions are precise, appropriate monetary instruments will be chosen. 
(vii) There should be external (balance) stability, e.g. limited fluctuations in the 
exchange rate.  
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Nell (2004) mentions the central banks of some countries that implemented inflation 
targeting, among others the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of Canada, the 
Bank of England and the Reserve Bank of Australia. Different variants of inflation 
targeting in emerging-market economies can be found in Brazil, Israel, Korea, Mexico, 
South Africa and others. Recently, this policy has also been adopted in some countries 
in transition, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. Studies have 
shown that this approach is yielding positive results thus far and none of the central 
banks that adopted the policy has abandoned the approach (Bernanke, 2003:1).  
 
Advocates of inflation-targeting argue that the best way to achieve low and stable 
inflation is the adoption of this approach. There is general consensus that low and 
stable inflation is a pillar of macroeconomics and consequently of monetary-policy 
decision-making. Bernanke et al (1999), Palley (2007:62) and Maumela (2010:57) cite 
four reasons why low and stable inflation is a pinnacle of monetary policy under inflation 
targeting: 
 
(i) The inflation rate is the sole macroeconomic variable that monetary policy can affect 
in the long run.  
(ii) Maintenance of a low and stable inflation rate eases the process for achieving other 
macroeconomic goals.  
(iii) Price stability facilitates policy-making.  
(iv) High inflation has an undesirable impact on economic growth and the allocation of 
resources.  
 
Moreover, given the role of inflation expectations in monetary-policy decision-making, it 
compels monetary authorities to make decisions with greater emphasis on price 
stability. However, despite evidence that the inflation-targeting framework is performing 
well thus far, it must be kept in mind that this approach has both advantages and 
disadvantages, as discussed below.  
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Debelle et al (1998), Mboweni (1999), Schaechter et al (2000), Mishkin and Savastano 
(2001), Rochon and Rossi (2006), Svensson (2009), Walsh (2009) and Maumela (2010) 
cite some of the advantages of inflation targeting, using the following arguments:  
 
First, this approach allows monetary authorities to focus on domestic economic 
conditions and also to respond to shocks that originate from both domestic and foreign 
sources. This implies that there is autonomy in monetary policy conduct, particularly in 
the world of continuing globalisation, financial innovation and liberalised capital flows.  
 
Second, this approach is independently in the sense that, unlike monetary-aggregate 
targeting, the inflation-targeting framework does not depend on a relationship between a 
monetary aggregate and inflation. It is based on a holistic approach that acknowledges 
a broader approach to the causes of inflation.  
 
Third, it is highly transparent and readily understood by the public. This is in line with the 
goal of most central banks at present, which is to inform the public about inflation in a 
way that includes explaining the principles of the authorities‘ decision-making and the 
rules governing their monetary and political interventions. According to Maumela 
(2010:59-60), transparency of the central bank can be classified into five main 
categories, namely: 
 
(i) Political transparency – this provides the legal mandate of the central banks. 
(ii) Economic transparency – this refers to the publication of the economic data, models 
and forecasts used by the central bank to arrive at its policy decisions.  
(iii) Procedural transparency – this refers to the communication of the explicit policy 
strategy and information on the decision-making process.  
(iv) Policy transparency - timely announcement and explanation of policy actions and 
some indication of likely future actions.  
(v) Operational transparency – this refers to the discussion of economic disturbances 
and policy errors that are likely to affect the transmission of policy. 
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The advocacy of transparency is based on the fact that information presented in these 
reports makes it relatively easy to monitor central banks‘ performance. Moreover, the 
quality and results of a bank‘s analysis can be scrutinised by external experts and 
observers. 
 
Fourth, the inflation-targeting framework reduces political pressure for time-inconsistent 
policy. An explicit numerical inflation target increases the accountability of the central 
bank and reduces the likelihood of time-inconsistent policy-making (Mishkin & 
Savastano 2001).  
 
Fifth, this approach enhances accountability for both monetary and fiscal authorities in 
the sense that any irresponsible action by the central bank increases the cost of policy 
mistakes for policy-makers. A practical example is that specific forms of accountability 
to parliament have been put in place in inflation-targeting countries, notably open letters 
and parliamentary hearings.  
Sixth, this approach focuses more strongly on communication with the political 
authorities, financial markets, government, and the general public. Communication is 
important because it keeps all economic agents continuously informed about the 
following:  
 
(i) The goals and limitations of monetary policy  
(ii) The rationale for inflation targets  
(iii) The numerical values of the inflation targets and how they were determined  
(iv) Methods for achieving the inflation targets, based on the prevailing economic 
conditions.  
(v) Reasons for any deviations from targets.  
 
The various forms of communication include an inflation report, annual reports, inflation 
forecasts, press releases, press briefings, speeches, website information, brochures, 
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econometric models, voting records, the release of the minutes of the meetings of the 
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), and articles in the publications of the central bank 
that are issued to explain to the public the conduct of monetary policy under the 
inflation-targeting framework (Maumela, 2010:68).  
 
Seventh, the inflation-targeting framework serves as a fiscal-monetary policy co-
ordination device for inflation expectations that should translate to less volatile inflation 
and output.  
Ninth, it helps in absorbing the effects of inflationary shocks.  
 
Tenth, because of its forward-looking nature, it compels the monetary authorities to 
explicitly recognise lags in the impact of the operation of the central bank. 
 
Eleventh, its medium term focuses on inflation targets, bringing it in line with the 
relatively long lag between monetary-policy measures and their effects on inflation.  
 
As in the case of all the previous monetary policy strategies, inflation targeting has also 
been criticised. A number of disadvantages of inflation targeting that have been 
identified are described by Mboweni (1999), Epstein (2003), Buiter (2006) and Maumela 
(2010:73-77): 
 
First, it is perceived to be too rigid or inflexible. That is, it compels the monetary 
authorities to pay attention to inflation only and ignore stabilisation and potentially other 
objectives, such as financial stability, employment, and economic growth.  
 
Second, others perceive inflation targeting as giving too much discretion to monetary 
policy-making in countries with a weak institutional environment, which results in an 
undesirable outcome.  
 
Third, inflation targeting is said to result in weak central bank accountability because the 
central bank is accountable only for factors that are under its control. 
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Fifth, the exchange-rate flexibility that is required under inflation targeting may result in 
and cause financial instability. This is due to the possibility of exchange-rate shocks that 
may occur in the liberalised and foreign-exchange markets.  
 
Sixth, it increases exchange-rate volatility because of the central banks‘ inability to 
target the inflation and the exchange rate simultaneously.  
 
Seventh, it is too complicated to implement because lack of proper skills, infrastructure, 
and quality data to forecast inflation may lead to many forecasting errors.  
 
Eighth, there is no consensus on the appropriate rate and measure of inflation. Even in 
the wake of recent financial inflation, targets are said to be adjusted upwards.  
 
Ninth, it focuses more strongly on the consumer and gives a relatively low weighting to 
asset-price growth. Hence, more asset-price bubbles are likely to build up.  
 
Tenth, inflation targeting has limited its ability to reduce the sacrifice ratio, ie, the 
unemployment costs of fighting inflation.  
 
2.3.7 Monetary-policy rules 
One of the monetary-policy rules is the Taylor Rule that specifies how a central bank 
should alter its nominal interest rate in a systematic manner in response to 
developments in inflation and macroeconomic activity (Orphanides, 2007:6). 
Particularly, it stipulates by how much the interest should change when there are 
divergences of actual inflation rates from target inflation rates and of actual GDP from 
potential GDP (Maumela, 2010:44). It was first proposed by a US economist, John B. 
Taylor, in 1993. It can be used in general as a guide for monetary policy conduct to 
indicate the ideal level at which the central bank should set its interest rate under 
different economic conditions (Svensson, 1998). It is highlighted in literature that by 
using the Taylor Rule, the interest rate is determined according to the following factors 
that specify the state of the economy:  
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(i) Actual inflation relative to target level  
(ii) Economic activity and its ―full employment‖ level  
(iii) The level of interest rate consistent with full employment.   
 
Based on a seminal paper, Taylor (1993) suggests a very specific and simple rule for 
monetary policy. The original formulation is shown in the following equation:  
)(5.0*)(5.0* tttt yri               (2.1) 
 
where  
 
ti = Central bank policy rate  
*r = Equilibrium real interest rate  
t = Average inflation rate over the contemporaneous and prior three quarters 
*  = Inflation target of the central bank  
ty = Output gap (100 x (real GDP-potential GDP) / potential GDP).  
 
According to the CAM (2004:6), the rule ―recommends‖ or requires a relatively high 
interest rate or tight monetary policy under the following economic conditions:  
 
(i) When inflation is above its target.  
(ii) When real GDP rises above potential GDP.  
(iii) When the economy is above its full employment level  
Furthermore, the rule ―recommends‖ or requires a relatively low interest rate or ease 
monetary policy in the case of opposite situations, that is, when inflation is below the 
target or real GDP decreases below potential GDP.  
 
Moreover, under this rule, when there is no difference between output and inflation, 
central banks select a neutral policy rate. Therefore, the Taylor Rule sets the policy rate 
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of interest as a function of the difference between the current rate of inflation and the 
target rate of inflation, the current output gap (the gap between actual and potential 
output), and the equilibrium real interest rate (CAM, 2004:6).  
However, sometimes there are conflicting episodes among the goals; for example, 
inflation may be above its target while the output is below full employment, as in the 
case of stagflation. If such cases occur, the rule also provides guidance to policy-
makers on how to balance these competing scenarios in setting an appropriate level for 
the interest rate. ―Moreover, the presence of both the inflation gap and output gap in the 
Taylor Rule indicates that the central bank not only cares about keeping inflation under 
control, but also about minimising business-cycle fluctuations of output around its 
potential‖ (Maumela, 2010:46).  
 
Svensson (1997) argues that the inflation-targeting framework is a forward-looking 
approach or ―inflation forecast targeting‖, a very critical question has always been how 
the monetary authority should formulate and implement its policy decisions aimed at 
achieving the ultimate policy objectives, such as price stability and full employment over 
time. Maumela (2010:46) indicated that inflation-targeting central banks have worked to 
strengthen and improve their forecasting as well as their modelling capabilities. 
Moreover, under inflation-forecast targeting, central banks construct quantitative 
projections of the anticipated future evolution of the economy to indicate how the central 
bank intends to control short-term interest rates. Under the inflation-targeting 
framework, monetary-policy rule also provides for both targeting rules and instrument 
rules (Svensson, 2005).  
 
(i) Targeting rules   
The focus of targeting rules entails a particular loss function that has to be minimised 
and a description of the objectives and constraints with which policy-makers are faced. 
This approach is believed to capture the essence of monetary policy-making better in 
countries that practise inflation targeting (Islam, 2011:136). Targeting rules can further 
be classified into two categories, namely general targeting rules and specific targeting 
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rules. A general targeting rule is specified as an operational loss function to which 
monetary policy is committed. In case of a specific targeting rule, a condition for setting 
the instrument is specified (Malik & Ahmed 2007).  
(ii) Instrument rules 
 
―Monetary policy instruments as prescribed functions of predetermined or forward-
looking variables or both are expressed by instrument rule‖ (Islam, 2011:137). In the 
literature two groups of instruments rules have been identified, namely explicit 
instrument rule and implicit instrument rule. Policy instruments as a function of only 
predetermined variables are prescribed by explicit instrument rules, while policy 
instruments as a function of forward-looking variables are prescribed by implicit 
instrument rules. The Taylor Rule, r*t = πt + π* + α(πt + π*) + β(Yt - Y*), is an example of 
an instrument rule. It can be regarded as an explicit or implicit instrument rule, 
depending on the nature of πt and Yt. If πt and Yt are predetermined in period t, the 
Taylor Rule is an explicit rule, but if πt and Yt are forward-looking in period t, it is an 
implicit rule (Islam, 2011:137).  
 
Taylor and William (2010) highlight three features of a ―better‖ policy rule: (1) an interest 
rate instrument performed better than a money supply instrument, (2) interest rate rules 
that reacted to both inflation and real output worked better than rules which focused on 
either one, and (3) interest rate rules which reacted to the exchange rate were inferior to 
those that did not. One specific rule that has the above properties is the Taylor Rule 
(Islam, 2011:137). 
 
In view of the above there is general consensus that a well-designed monetary policy 
can neutralise macroeconomic disturbances and diminish cyclical fluctuations in prices 
and employment; this in turn will bring about overall economic stability and welfare. 
 
2.3.8 Unconventional (heterodox) monetary policy 
There has been a general tendency among central banks around the world to engage in 
implementing diverse policy measures in response to the global financial crisis that 
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started in 2007. This includes buying a wide array of securities, lending to financial 
institutions, exchange rate interventions and paying interest on reserves. The most 
critical issue is the case where some central banks have reduced monetary policy 
interest rates to minimum levels (lower bound). Some of these banks have explicitly 
announced their commitment to keeping the interest rates at that level for a longer 
period (Cespedes, Chang & Garcia-Cicco, 2009:1). This approach is in contradiction 
with a conventional view embedded in dominant models of monetary policy where 
central banks control short-term interest rates only. The question is what are the 
reasons for the above conduct? Cespedes et al (2009:1) highlight the following: 
 
(i) Since there seems to be high financial uncertainty, some of these actions could be 
viewed as a response to increasing demand for liquidity. 
(ii) Some actions are in response to the malfunctioning of the financial markets. 
(iii) Other actions are implemented to deal with the need to enhance the monetary policy 
stimulus under the lower bound constraints. 
 
The use of unconventional monetary policy emerged as a result of a constraint on the 
usual monetary policy instrument, ie control over an overnight interest rate in the 
interbank market reached its limit (Cespedes et al, 2009:3). In other words, this is a 
situation when a monetary policy stimulus is considered desirable but the nominal policy 
rate cannot be pushed below zero. This forces the central bank to seek an alternative 
monetary stimulus. 
 
Macroeconomic theories have indicated that the zero bound on the interest rate will not 
be an obstacle to a central banks‘ binding commitment to future policy. Current 
economic theories have acknowledged and emphasised that a central bank can affect 
current economic decisions through current policy instruments as well as its future 
settings of the instruments, as long as the policy can sensitise the public‘s expectations 
about the future settings of the instrument (Cespedes et al, 2009:3). This can be done 
by committing to reducing future policy rates below levels previously expected. The 
essence of this argument is that it is clear that the central bank can provide some 
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monetary stimulus irrespective of whether the policy rate is at a zero bound. Bernanke 
and Reinhart (2004:85) have shown that one of the strategies for ―stimulating the 
economy that do not involve changing the current value of the policy rate....[is] providing 
assurance to financial investors that short  rates will be lower in the future than they 
currently expect.‖  
 
In view of the above, unconventional policy such as ―quantitative easing‖ or ―credit 
easing‖ can be used as a complementary policy to conventional ones (Cespedes et al, 
2009:3). Joyce, Tong and Woods (2011:200) define quantitative easing as a policy of 
expanding the central bank‘s balance sheet by purchasing assets, but financed by the 
central bank‘s money. It is a strategy that was employed by some banks in the wake of 
the financial crisis that left most international financial markets dysfunctional; credit 
conditions tightened significantly. In resuscitating the economy, several central banks 
responded by loosening monetary policy, at the same time encouraging demand. The 
Bank of England is one such example, loosening its policy while purchasing public 
(large amount of UK government bonds) and private assets using central bank money 
to achieve its inflation target of 2 per cent. This was aimed at injecting money into the 
economy in order to boost nominal spending. The Federal Reserve Bank also 
purchased private sector assets directly and provided financing to financial institutions 
to facilitate their purchase of private sector assets (Kozicki, 2011:14). 
 
Joyce et al (2011:201-202) briefly discuss numerous potential channels through which 
purchasing of assets may affect spending and inflation as intended. For instance, 
financial assets purchases may enlarge broad money holdings and rising assets prices 
and encourage expenditure by lowering borrowing costs and increasing wealth and 
spending and subsequently domestically generated inflation (Bean, 2011:4). In addition, 
Joyce et al identify channels working through asset prices, namely: 
 
(i) Policy signalling effects: This includes whatever economic agents learn or pick up 
about the likely path of future monetary policy from asset purchases.  
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(ii) Portfolio balance effects: Central bank asset purchases increase the prices of the 
assets bought and also the prices of other assets because they imply that the money 
holdings of the sellers have increased.  
(iii) Liquidity premium effects: In a case where financial markets are dysfunctional, 
central bank asset purchases can improve market functioning by increasing liquidity 
through actively encouraging trading.  
 
(iv) Confidence effects: Asset purchases may have broader confidence, for example the 
policy leads to an improved economic outlook, which might directly boost consumer 
confidence and thus people‘s willingness to spend.  
 
(v) Bank lending effects: When assets are purchased from non-banks, the banking 
sector gains new reserves at the central bank and hence an equivalent increase in 
customer deposits.  
Despite advocating unconventional policies as complementary to conventional ones, 
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) are opposed to this view. They indicate that even if 
the strategy for setting current and policy rates is in place, real allocations and asset 
prices are independent of what the central bank does with the composition or size of its 
balance sheet during the period in which the policy rate is zero.  Although their view 
provides some insight into these issues, Cespedes et al (2009:6) argue against this 
view in the sense that their model does not hinge on the absence of imperfectly 
substitutable assets. This may have led to the suspicion that changes in the size and 
composition of the central bank balance sheet would have ―portfolio balance‖ effects. 
This could be a significant gap in their model, hence models featuring such an effect 
may overturn the irrelevance argument posed by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). 
 
On the other hand, if one maintains the ―irrelevance‖ argument, it could be asked why 
central banks have been unable to emerge from deflationary liquidity traps by just 
promising expansionary policy in the future. The conjecture is that promises made by 
central banks are not convincing enough. It is crucial that policy announcements be 
believable to enable central banks to manage expectations of interest rate policy 
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independently (Cespedes et al, 2009:7). There are various views on inspiring credibility 
among economic agents. The one that relates best to this discussion is that central 
banks can change the size and composition of their balance sheets to nurture the 
credibility of their future policy. Some authors have acknowledged that this is indeed the 
main role of unconventional policies. Bernanke and Reinhart (2004:88) indicate that the 
setting of high targets for bank reserves ―is more visible, and hence may be more 
credible, than a purely verbal promise about future short term interest rates‖. In the 
same manner Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) infer that ―shifts in the portfolio of the 
central bank could be of some value in making credible to the private sector the central 
bank‘s own commitment to a particular kind of future policy ... Signalling effects of this 
kind ... might well provide a justification for open market policy when the zero bound 
bids‖.  
 
The set of instruments available to monetary authorities varies, based on political 
systems, economic structures, statutory and institutional procedures, development of 
money and capital markets and other considerations. Generally, in most advanced 
capitalist countries, monetary authorities use one or more of the following key 
instruments: changes in the legal reserve ratio, changes in the discount rate or the 
official key bank rate, exchange rates and open market operations. In many instances, 
supplementary instruments are used, known as instruments of direct supervision or 
qualitative instruments. Developing countries use one or more of these instruments; 
however, taking into consideration the difference in their economic growth levels, the 
dissimilarity in the patterns of their production structures and the degree of their link with 
the outside world, many resort to the method of qualitative supervision, particularly 
countries that face problems arising from the nature of their economic structures. 
Although the effectiveness of monetary policy does not necessarily depend on using a 
wide range of instruments, coordinated use of various instruments is essential to the 
application of a rational monetary policy.  
 
It is clear that there are various monetary policy strategies from which a country can 
choose. Since the world is a global village, the conduct of monetary policy in one 
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country will also be affected by the economic activities of other countries. One may 
question how monetary policy is conducted in an open economy.  
 
2.4 Monetary policy in small open economies 
There is an enormous amount of literature on simple rules for monetary policy. 
Publications contain theoretical research and historical estimates of monetary policy 
rules in various countries. The theoretical literature contains research comparing rules 
that respond to alternative intermediate and final targets, backward- and forward-looking 
rules, as well as rules that include/exclude interest rate smoothing terms (Batini, 
Harrison & Millard, 2001:2). However, the literature does not clearly articulate simple 
rules for monetary policy for open economies. These are economies where the 
exchange rate channel of monetary policy is critical in the transmission mechanism. The 
benchmark for the simplest rule is that of interest rate, developed by Taylor (1993). This 
simple rule was based on the assumption of a closed economy. Alternative rules for 
open economies include those of Ball (1999), based on a monetary conditions index, 
which performed very poorly when specific types of exchange rate shocks occurred.  
 
In an open economy the exchange rate is an important channel of monetary policy 
transmission. This channel has a number of effects. The limitation of conducting 
monetary policy in an open economy was pointed out by Robert Mundell in the 1960s. 
That is where the issue of an ―impossible trinity‖ originated. The trinity concept refers to 
the choice of monetary policy and exchange rate regime. It states that out of three 
objectives, namely free capital mobility, monetary policy independence and exchange 
rate stability, policy-makers can choose only two (Rosenberg, 2010:1). This is one of 
the fundamental conclusions of his analysis of the conditions for monetary policy in an 
open economy. The issue of the impossible trinity is at the heart of the conduct of 
monetary policy. For example, in a country with an open capital account monetary 
policy can be oriented towards either an external objective such as the exchange rate, 
or an internal objective such as the price level, but not both at the same time. 
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To represent this in graphical manner, Figure 1 below illustrates the policy trilemma for 
open economies. The corners of the triangle show the policy goals. Any pair of goals is 
achievable but requires the third goal to be forsaken (Joshi, 2003). Specifically: 
 
Exchange rate stability (permanently fixed exchange rate) and free capital mobility can 
be adopted simultaneously and in turn require abandonment of monetary 
independence. According to Soo Khoon (2009:3), in situations where domestic and 
foreign government bonds are perfect substitutes, a credible fixed exchange rate 
implies that the domestic interest rate equals the foreign interest rate. This follows the 
uncovered interest rate parity condition. If the central bank increases the supply of 
money, it brings about downward pressure on the domestic interest rate. This triggers 
the sale of domestic bonds, to acquire a relatively higher yield of foreign bonds. 
Because of these arbitrage forces, the central bank is faced with an excess demand for 
foreign currency to purchase foreign bonds. Under the fixed exchange rate, the central 
bank must intervene in the currency market in order to satisfy the public's demand for 
foreign currency at the official exchange rate. Therefore the central bank sells foreign 
currency to the public. In the process the central bank buys back the excess supply of 
domestic currency that resulted from its own attempt to increase the supply of money 
(Patnaik and Shah, 2007:10). The net effect is that the central bank loses control of the 
money supply. Thus, perfect capital mobility and a fixed exchange rate implies giving up 
monetary policy. ―An open market operation only changes the composition of central 
bank‘s balance sheet between domestic and foreign assets, without affecting the 
monetary base and the domestic interest rate‖ (Aizenman, 2010:3-5). The main 
conclusion here is that in a small open economy, determination of the domestic interest 
rate is relegated to the country to which its exchange rate is pegged. 
 
Monetary independence and free capital mobility can be adopted, as well as a floating 
exchange rate, in exchange for surrendering exchange rate stability. Giving up the 
exchange rate means that the exchange rate is left to float. Similarly, under a flexible 
exchange rate regime, an expansion of the domestic money supply reduces the 
domestic interest rate. This in turn leads to capital outflows to seek the higher foreign 
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yield interest rate. Excess demand for foreign currency depreciates the exchange rate 
(Soo Khoon, 2009:3).  Therefore a higher supply of money reduces the interest rate, 
consequently increasing domestic investment, and weakens the domestic currency. 
This in turn leads to an expansion in exports, which of course leads to an expansion in 
the whole economy because of increased net exports (Aizenman, 2010:5).  
 
Exchange rate stability and monetary independence can be achieved if one gives up 
capital mobility. Alternatively, a fixed exchange rate and domestic monetary 
independence can be achieved at the cost of a closed capital account. Giving up 
financial integration actually implies that the capital account is closed (Soo Khoon, 
2009:3). This prevents arbitrage between domestic and foreign bonds and implicitly 
delinks the domestic interest rate from the foreign interest rate. Monetary policy 
operations will be oriented to the domestic economic conditions. This is in a way similar 
to a closed economy, where in the short run, the central bank controls the supply of 
money, and monetary expansion reduces the domestic interest rate (Aizenman, 
2010:6).  
 
Figure 2.1: Impossible Trinity 
 
  
 
Having established that the problem of the impossible trinity will always be observed for 
as long as the country is pursuing the three objectives, the question is what monetary 
authorities can do. Among the things that the central bank can do is trying to affect 
money supply through open market operations. This process is referred to as 
―sterilisation‖, ie ―sterilising‖ the impact of the forex intervention. However, this is not a 
Free capital flows 
Fixed exchange rate Independent 
monetary policy 
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long-term counter-intervention; it only works for a short while. Sterilisation actually refers 
to the selling of bonds. This in turn leads to an increase in the interest rate and 
consequently leads to capital inflows (Bheenick, 2008:7). The drawbacks of sterilisation 
are the possibility that the central bank may run out of bonds and mounting fiscal costs. 
There is substantial evidence that there is no uniform way of conducting monetary 
policy. Different countries use different monetary policy instruments that are available to 
them and that suit them. Moreover, different countries apply different monetary policy 
strategies.  
 
Reddy (2002:3-4) compiled a survey that demonstrates a number of common features. 
There is general concern about the potential harmful effects of persistently high fiscal 
deficits, as these may lead to excessive monetisation. There have also been significant 
reductions in the reserve ratio to relieve the pressure on the banking sector and reduce 
the costs of intermediation. A number of countries now have no reserve requirement. In 
some countries, the level of minimum deposit at the central bank has been reduced to 
such low levels that it is no longer considered an active monetary instrument. This 
explains why the deepening of financial markets and the growth of non-bank 
intermediation has induced the central banks to increase the market orientation of their 
instruments, leading to more activism of central banks in liquidity management. 
Furthermore, the advancement of market integration implies that central banks can 
concentrate on the very short end of the yield curve. In fact, there is evidence in favour 
of co-movements of interest rates of different maturity. This has simultaneously 
increased monetary policy challenges, as central banks have to keep a watchful eye on 
all markets and be cautious of any cascading effect or contagion emerging in the 
domestic economy or from a foreign economy. This has prompted central banks to 
focus on the interest rates rather than bank reserves in trying to influence liquidity. This 
has also resulted in improvement of policy coordination between the fiscal and the 
monetary authorities. The stance of fiscal policy is important, as it has a much broader 
spectrum of objectives. If fiscal authorities are the dominant players, monetary policy 
instruments are rendered less effective. As monetary policy evolves from a transitional 
setting of fiscal dominance, issues such as direct access of government to central bank 
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credit become important and crucial for fiscal-monetary coordination. This enhances the 
transparency of the long run strategic objective, but central banks may not disclose their 
tactical considerations, as some manoeuvrability in influencing the market is required. 
Information is often only revealed to the market after a delay. Central banks also 
attempt to estimate market expectations directly through surveys. While market 
expectations are a major guidepost in formulating monetary strategies, information 
management plays a crucial role in short-run stabilisation. That is why strong emphasis 
has been placed on the quantity and quality of data dissemination, ie, adequate, timely 
and reliable information in a standardised form. This came about as a result of the 
recent financial and currency crisis. 
 
2.5 Evolution of Monetary Policy in Namibia 
 
This section discusses the evolution of monetary policy in Namibia. First, it presents the 
history of monetisation in Namibia and how this has facilitated the evolution of central 
banking in Namibia. The discussion further looks at the formulation of monetary as well 
as the overall operations of monetary policy in the context of institutional framework, 
monetary policy target and how the monetary authorities monitor economic and financial 
trends (indicators). 
 
2.5.1 The history of monetisation in Namibia2   
 
The start of colonialism in particular in Namibia brought about a change in in existing 
monetary habits. This has been apparent since the arrival of the European traders, 
hunters, miners and missionaries in the early 1800s. They introduced a variety of 
commodities to Namibia. It has been reported that in the 19th century, at the time of Jan 
Jonker Afrikaner, items such as cattle and sheep were very strong currencies in 
Namibia. Statistical records show that about 3 000 head of cattle and up to 1 000 sheep 
passed through Bethanien to Cape Town markets.   
                                                 
2
 This whole subsection has been adopted from the book cited as Bank of Namibia (2002). The Financial 
System in Namibia. Gamsberg Macmillan, Windhoek. 
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The missionaries established stations in parts in the south and all the way up to the 
north-central area. The need to expand the mission stations throughout the country 
prompted the Rhenish Mission Society to establish a trading company to help finance its 
developmental expenses in the areas of education and other things. All these costs 
were dealt with in British pound sterling. 
 
It is evident that the relationship between sovereignty and currency was inseparable, as 
the country was going through various colonial influences. As the colonial masters 
changed, the currency of transaction also changed. For example, following the 
Germany occupation of South West Africa on 7 August 1884, foreign money, in 
particular the British pound sterling, remained legal tender in the country for a time. 
However it was announced that the mark would remain the only legal tender in the 
German colony after 2 July 1901. However, problems were encountered after the 
outbreak of World War I in August 1914. Individuals started hoarding money, resulting in 
a shortage of cash. The alternative was to introduce the issuance of emergency money. 
In addition, sterling money was also brought into the country to rectify the currency 
problem.  
 
Problems developed as emergency money introduced during the war started to become 
uncontrollable. On 1 January 1919 a proclamation was issued enforcing sterling as the 
only legal tender in South West Africa (SWA), which had by then become a mandated 
territory of South Africa. This is where the history of the SARB‘s operations legally 
commenced in SWA, through the Currency and Banking Act, 1920 (No. 31 of 1920). 
This act gave the Reserve Bank the sole right to issue all bank notes and coins for 
South Africa and the Mandate of South West Africa. In 1960 a branch of the SARB was 
opened in Windhoek. Thereafter a law was passed that legalised the SARB as the only 
legal institution allowed to issue bank notes. The South African rand was effectively 
used in South Africa and the then South West Africa as from 1 January 1962. 
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2.5.2 The evolution of central banking in Namibia 
 
The beginning of central banking in Namibia has to be viewed through the lens of its 
colonial relationship with South Africa. The then SWA came under the authority of South 
Africa after World War I by virtue of a mandate. This led to the automatic incorporation 
of Namibia into the South African monetary system. The establishment of the branch of 
the SARB in 1960 could be viewed as the pioneering move towards the monetary 
incorporation (BON, 2002:41). This branch had no power or authority to formulate 
monetary policy appropriate for Namibia. Its role was restricted to the following:  
(i) Distributing currency (notes and coins) issued by the SARB 
(ii) Administering exchange control 
(iii) Providing clearing facilities to commercial banks 
(iv) Serving as banker to commercial banks. 
 
In the absence of a central bank at the time of independence, the new government saw 
the need to establish such an institution. Prior consultations had already been held 
before independence to establish such an institution once the country was independent. 
With the necessary help and support from various stakeholders, Namibia established its 
own central bank, the BON (BON, 2002:42). The BON‘s establishment has its legal 
foundation in the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia. Article 128(1) of the 
Constitution states the following: 
 
There shall be established by Act of Parliament a Central Bank of the Republic of 
Namibia which shall serve as the State‘s principal instrument to control the money 
supply, the currency and the institutions of finance and to perform all other functions 
ordinarily performed by a central bank. 
 
The Bank of Namibia Act, 1990 (No. 8 of 1990), as amended in 1997, provides the legal 
framework for the BON to render central banking services. In terms of this Act, the 
functions of the Bank are to: 
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(i) Promote and maintain a sound monetary, credit and financial system in Namibia and 
sustain the liquidity, solvency and functioning of that system; 
(ii) Promote and maintain internal and external monetary stability and an efficient 
payments mechanism; 
(iii) Foster monetary, credit and financial conditions conducive to the orderly, balanced 
and sustained economic development of Namibia; 
(iv) Serve as the government‘s banker, financial advisor and fiscal agent; and 
(v) Assist in the attainment of national economic goals. 
Furthermore, the Bank of Namibia Act mandates the Central Bank to execute functions 
which lie outside the domain of other banks and financial institutions in the economy. 
Thus, the functions performed by the BON since its inception have been grouped into 
two broader categories, namely the rendering of service and policy-making. The Bank‘s 
functions in terms of the Bank of Namibia Act, as amended, are: Issuance of notes and 
coins, serving as banker to commercial banks as banker and adviser to the government 
and as custodian of foreign reserves, supervising banks and building societies and 
determining monetary policy and external relations. 
 
2.5.3 Institutional arrangements 
 
Monetary policy in Namibia is administered by the BON. The BON‘s establishment has 
its legal foundation in the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia.  
 
 With the establishment of the BON, legislation was also put in place for the Bank to 
regulate the institutions of Namibia‘s banking industry. The institutions that the Central 
Bank supervises, and through which monetary policy is conducted, are banks, building 
societies and institutions licensed or registered under the Namibian Financial 
Supervisory Association.  
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2.5.4 Monetary policy formulation 
 
The main question is how the BON deals with monetary policy. To answer this question, 
one need to understand the monetary policy framework used by the BON to implement 
and analyse its policy decisions. Lattie (2000:8) indicates that four stages of policy 
design and monitoring have been identified;, a set of monitoring variables is associated 
with each stage. In the Namibian context as adopted from the BON (2008:8), the 
components of the policy framework are: 
(a) The definition of the objective of monetary policy. In the case of Namibia the ultimate 
objective of monetary policy is price stability.  
(b) Setting intermediate targets: The BON has an intermediate target to promote an 
economic and financial environment that will ensure that the parity between the 
Namibian dollar and the South African rand is not in any way threatened. Among others, 
a threat may be posed if interest rates move away from each other, which may lead to 
undue capital inflows or outflows, and/or divergent macro-economic developments 
between the two countries. Thus, the exchange rate in this case is an intermediate 
target. 
(c) Setting operating targets: There is no formal operating target in Namibia; the BON 
monitors the level of official reserves as an operating target. This is due to the fact that 
the fixed currency peg requires the country to back its currency fully in circulation with 
international reserves in order to import stable prices from South Africa.  
(d) Manipulation of monetary policy instruments: The main policy tool that the Bank of 
Namibia uses to influence monetary conditions in the country is the repo rate. This rate 
is kept close to and dictate by the SARB‘s repo rate. This is due to the fact that the repo 
rate is the interest rate at which commercial banks borrow money from the BON and 
this, in turn, affects other interest rates in the economy. Changes to the repo rate 
usually take into account the SARB‘s decision about its repo rate, as well as domestic 
economic conditions, international economic conditions and future prospects. 
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2.5.5 Institutional framework 
 
Monetary policy is formulated by Monetary Policy Committee. The EC consists of the 
Governor of the Central Bank who is also the EC‘s Chairperson, the Deputy Governor, 
the Assistant Governor and three senior staff members appointed on the basis of their 
expertise in the area of monetary policy. With the exception of the Governor, all EC 
members hold office for a period as determined by the Governor (BON, 2008:6).  
The EC holds meetings to decide on the appropriate stance of monetary policy for the 
next two months. These meetings take place six times a year. However, the Governor 
does have authority to call for extraordinary EC meetings (BON, 2008:7). To make sure 
that the EC meeting is inclusive in its decisions, members from relevant line 
departments in the Bank are invited to make presentations to the EC regarding recent 
economic developments in the world and domestic economies, and on the inflation 
outlook. Indicators such as the performance of the real sector, interest and exchange 
rate developments, the balance of payments and fiscal trends are taken into account 
when dealing with domestic economic developments. Moreover, certain invited 
individuals may attend meetings, to provide clarification on issues raised in their reports. 
However, only the views of EC members are taken into consideration when a decision 
on the stance of monetary policy is taken. ―All decisions relating to monetary policy 
matters are taken by consensus. Where consensus does not emerge, the Chairperson 
may exercise his/her casting vote. Each member also needs to state his/her decision 
clearly, along with the reasons for taking such decision‖ (BON, 2008:7). 
 
2.5.6 Important mandates in relation to monetary policy 
 
The EC‘s key mandate regarding monetary policy matters is guided by the Bank of 
Namibia Act, 1997 (No. 15 of 1997). One of the mandates of the BON is to ensure both 
internal and external monetary stability, as well as to facilitate the attainment of national 
economic goals. In terms of Article 4 of the CMA Bilateral Monetary Agreement between 
Namibia and South Africa, it is stipulated that ―the Bank of Namibia shall maintain 
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reserves equivalent in the form of Rand assets and freely usable foreign currencies in 
such proportion as the Bank of Namibia considers appropriate‖ (BON, 2008:6). 
 
2.5.7 Monetary policy target 
 
Section 3(b) of the Bank of Namibia Act enables the central bank to enjoy operational 
autonomy in its decision-making on matters pertaining to monetary policy. The objective 
that the EC focuses on is to maintain the parity of the Namibian dollar to the South 
African rand. However, the EC keeps a close eye on the inflation rate, defined 
domestically as the national consumer price index. This is because the ultimate 
objective of monetary policy is stable prices (BON, 2008:7). 
 
2.5.8 Monitoring economic and financial trends 
All major economic and financial indicators are monitored and the EC is briefed on 
these indicators on a monthly basis. The said indicators include the liquidity of the 
banking system, inflation and exchange rate trends, financial market developments, the 
foreign exchange reserve position, real sector indicators, the balance of payments and 
fiscal trends. The Bank also uses monthly and quarterly internal inflation forecasts. The 
forecasts are based on price developments in selected commodities, using econometric 
methods. The Bank does not publicise these inflation forecasts because they are 
regarded as internal planning tools (BON, 2008:7). 
 
2.6 Monetary Policy Tools 
 
A monetary policy instrument is a tool that a central bank uses to achieve its operational 
targets. In general central banks around the world use various measures to meet such 
targets (BON, 2008:9). In the case of Namibia the Central Bank, ie, the BON, employs 
the key operational tools discussed below to meet its monetary objectives (BON, 
2008:9-10). 
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2.6.1 Seven-day repurchase transaction 
 
The BON has three systems of accommodation, namely the seven-day repo, the 
overnight repo, and the intraday repo. These facilities are intended to assist commercial 
banks to fulfil their settlement obligations. These facilities are not meant for funding or 
aid in funding banking institutions‘ credit extension to economic agents. 
 
The seven-day repo facility was introduced by the BON on 1 July 2008. It is based on a 
repurchase agreement. Under this facility banking institutions are allotted the full 
amounts that they require at auctions. However, this is subject to the prevailing local 
liquidity situation. The rate at which the main repurchase auctions are conducted is 
equivalent to the prevailing bank rate set by the Bank‘s EC. 
 
The implementation of the seven-day repo has overtaken the role of refinancing from 
other standing facilities, such as the intraday and overnight repos. These facilities are 
merely used to balance daily positions if the funds drawn from the seven-day repo by 
commercial banks are insufficient during the seven-day cycle. A penalty is charged on 
the overnight repo and it is periodically reviewed by the Bank. The Bank has the right to 
change the penalty, should borrowing under the overnight facility become permanent 
lending to banking institutions. Primarily the objective of the Bank‘s seven-day repo 
facility to banking institutions is to oversee timeous and effective operation and 
administration. It is also aimed at encouraging active and efficient interbank lending 
among the banking institutions themselves. The interbank market provides a signalling 
and feedback function and can expand the Bank‘s scope in terms of managing liquidity. 
It offers the BON a ‗real-time window‘ on the liquidity condition of the banking system. 
 
The BON uses the repo facility to inject short-term liquidity into the banking system. The 
discretional power vested in the Central Bank can also create liquidity shortages if the 
Central Bank does not allocate the full amount required by the banking institutions. This 
is likely to be in effect when the Central Bank realises that a further liquidity injection 
60 
 
may destabilise the market in particular; this may lead to outflows which in turn have a 
negative impact on the level of official reserves. 
 
2.6.2 Call account 
This is a facility where banking institutions can place funds with the BON on a daily 
basis, at an interest rate that may change from day to day. There is no specific maturity 
for the call account facility at the BON. This facility is also used as a standing facility and 
as a discretionary facility at the Bank‘s request. The interest rate on this account varies 
from day to day; hence it is also used as a prime intervention instrument. Currently, the 
interest payable on the call account facility is 25 basis points below the repo rate. This is 
subject to change at the Bank‘s discretion. Changes in the call account rate are dictated 
mainly by changes in the liquidity position of the Namibian banking system (BON, 
2008:9). 
 
2.6.3 Bank of Namibia bills 
BON bills were first issued in April 2007. These bills are used to support banking 
institutions to meet their statutory liquidity requirements, following the current shortage 
in available government securities in the primary and secondary markets. These bills 
are benchmarked on the 91-day treasury bill rate, and are issued every two weeks. 
Currently, BON bills are only available to banking institutions (BON, 2008:10). 
 
2.6.4 Other operational tools 
The BON uses other tools to withdraw surplus liquidity from the market or inject liquidity 
into it in the case of a shortage, including engaging in open market operations. Through 
such engagements, the Bank buys and sells debt securities in the market in an attempt 
to influence the liquidity situation. 
 
2.7 Monetary Policy Communication 
 
According to the BON (2008:11), monetary policy is communicated to the public based 
on certain principles of monetary policy communication. The BON‘s monetary policy 
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communication strategy is designed in such a way that it earns the Bank support among 
relevant stakeholders for its monetary policy framework, decisions and actions. The 
underlying principles for monetary policy communication are clarity, transparency, and 
predictability in the way monetary policy decisions are communicated.  
 
In making decisions, the EC takes into account quarterly inflation forecasts at its 
meetings and approves the assumptions needed to update the inflation model when 
necessary. Prior to any EC meeting, the inflation forecast is revised. This information is 
made available to the public by means of publishing an annual economic forecast at the 
beginning of each year. This forecast is revised in the middle of the year and published 
again (BON, 2008:11). 
 
One way of communicating is a formal announcement of policy decisions taken the day 
after an EC meeting. This message is made public through a press release at a press 
conference held by the Governor or, in his/her absence, by the Deputy Governor, and is 
simultaneously posted on the Bank‘s. Only the consensus views of the EC are 
communicated to the press and the reasons for the decisions are also provided. ―In 
addition to press releases, the other main channels of monetary policy communication 
include speeches by the Governor and special interviews‖. In 2009 the Bank started 
publishing a monetary policy review report twice a year (BON, 2008:11). 
 
2.8 Independence of Bank of Namibia   
 
In terms of section 3(b) of the Bank of Namibia Act, the Bank enjoys operational 
autonomy in its decision-making on matters pertaining to monetary policy. No individual, 
group or institution – government or otherwise – is permitted to interfere with the Bank 
on monetary policy matters (BON, 2008:7). 
 
The BON is responsible for administering the central government‘s financial account. In 
addition it also acts as adviser on monetary and fiscal policies and handles the periodic 
issue of treasury bills and government bonds. ―The Bank of Namibia is wholly owned by 
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the Government of the Republic of Namibia and was established with a share capital of 
Namibian Dollar (NAD) 40 million‖ (BON, 2010:60). In its role of banker to the 
government, the BON can grant loans to government in line with certain provisions in 
the Bank of Namibia Act. Such loans ―shall not exceed 25 per cent of government‘s 
average annual ordinary revenue for the three financial years immediately preceding‖ 
(BON, 2002:47). 
 
In the  Bank of Namibia Act, 1997, provision is made for consultations between the 
Governor of the Bank and the Minister of Finance. This is in line with its function of 
being a financial adviser to the government (BON, 2010:62). This harmonises the 
coordination between the government‘s financial policy and the broader national 
objective of growth in monetary stability, better known as monetary-fiscal alignment 
(BON, 2002:47). In terms of section 3B of the Act, the Bank performs its functions 
independently. This implies that in executing its duties the BON is expected to act 
independently. Moreover, in performing its duties, it is also expected to take into 
account the overall policy framework set by government from time to time. 
The financial relationship between the government and the Bank is well documented in 
the Act and formalised in a memorandum of understanding. There are regular 
consultations between the Minister of Finance and the Governor. This takes place every 
second month, in particular on economic, financial and operational issues. In addition, 
technical and operational issues are discussed every month on Permanent Secretary 
and Deputy Governor level (BON, 2010:62). 
 
In terms of Section 49, Cabinet can issue directives in terms of policies, when these are 
viewed as unfavourable. However, the board of the Bank can object to a directive of 
Cabinet. To date ―the Bank of Namibia enjoys operational independence as well as well-
coordinated with a well-defined and managed operational and financial relationship, 
which includes efficient checks and balanced‖ (BON, 2010:62). 
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2.9 Evaluation of Monetary Policy in Terms of Macroeconomic Indicators   
 
This section presents a very brief and simple analysis of some macroeconomic 
indicators through the lens of monetary policy framework that has been in effect in 
Namibia. The indicators include inflation, interest rate, money supply and GDP in 
Namibia. The most important issue to note here is that Namibia‘s monetary policy 
framework is supported by the exchange rate system parallel to the South African rand. 
This arrangement requires that Namibia‘s currency in circulation is backed by 
international reserves, ensuring that Namibia imports price stability from the anchor 
country (BON, 2008:2). 
 
As stated earlier, upon independence Namibia opted to remain within the CMA3 where 
the monetary policy is abandoned. This means giving priority to maintaining a fixed 
exchange rate.  Under this regime a fixed exchange rate is maintained between the 
Namibian dollar and the South Africa rand on a one-to-one basis. Furthermore, 
monetary policy remains compliant with the fixed peg, implying that maintenance of the 
fixed peg, the intermediate target, ensures that the goal of price stability is achieved by 
importing stable inflation from the anchor country, in this case South Africa.  
 
Figure 2.2: Repo rates for Namibia and South Africa: 1993 - 2011 
 
                                                 
3
 This arrangement was formerly known as Rand Monetary Area, which consisted of Botswana, Lesotho, 
Swaziland and South Africa. Botswana moved out in 1976 and Namibia joined in 1990 after attaining 
independence. The Common Monetary Area now comprises Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia and South 
Africa. 
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Under this regime, monetary policy remains submissive to South Africa. This implies 
that Namibia does not have any discretionary monetary policy. It follows that of South 
Africa in a sense that any change in South African policy automatically requires Namibia 
to follow suit, even when domestic economic conditions do not require this. It is also 
demonstrated in Figure 2.2 that the repo rates (policy instruments) of the two countries 
are moving in the same direction. Theoretically, Namibia‘s repo rate is supposed to be a 
little higher by a margin above that of South Africa in order to avoid capital flight. 
However, this was mostly observed during the period from 1993 to 1997. There were 
actually several occasions when Namibia‘s repo rate did not change after South Africa 
changed its rate; this was evident from 2007 to 2008.   
 
2.9.1 Inflation 
The pegging also suggests that developments concerning the South African rand have 
both a direct and an indirect impact on the Namibian dollar. This is by implication 
through imported goods, especially since South Africa is Namibia‘s main trading 
partner. 
 
Figure 2.3: CPI Inflation in Namibia and South Africa: 1993 - 2011 
 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the movements of the inflation rates from 1993 to 2011. The graph 
shows that the inflation rates of the two countries are moving in the same direction in 
most years. This pattern is attributed to the close trade integration of the economies of 
the two countries. In fact, a high proportion of consumer goods (used to determine the 
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consumer price index [CPI]) is imported from South Africa. There is evidence that South 
Africa accounts for more than 80 per cent of Namibia‘s imports (Kalenga, 2001:8). The 
financial market is also closely integrated with a massive cross-listing of South African 
firms on the Namibian Stock Exchange and Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
 
With the pegging arrangement in place, it follows that the prices of these South African 
imports will remain significant in determining domestic inflation. This might be one of the 
reasons why there are similar movements in the two inflation rates. This might also 
suggest that a correlation between the two inflation rates exists because of the pegged 
exchange rate. Theoretical models, such as the simple purchasing power parity, confirm 
that inflation from South Africa directly influences inflation in Namibia (Gaomab, 1998). 
However, there are other factors, such as changes in nominal exchange rate, that also 
have an effect. Nevertheless, what this co-movement of the inflation rates of the two 
countries suggests is that exchange rate pegging has been effective.   
 
2.9.2 Interest rates 
In terms of interest rate, monetary policy can only yield results if monetary policy actions 
are transmitted to the economy through their effects on market interest rates, ie if 
monetary policy action has the ability to affect the continuum of interest rates, ranging 
from short- to long-term interest rates. 
 
Figure 2.4: Interest rates in Namibia: 1993 - 2011 
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Figure 2.4 shows a relationship between the policy instrument (repo rate) and short-
term as well as long-term interest rates. The graph shows that the interest rate moves in 
the same direction as the monetary policy instrument. This indicates that the BON can 
influence long-term rates by operating at the short end of the market, implying that 
monetary policy action is capable of moving short-term and long-term interest rates in 
the same direction and thus,  of having the intended impact on economic activities. 
Therefore, this suggests that the operation of the monetary transmission mechanism 
through the interest rate channel is effective in Namibia.  
 
2.9.3 Money supply 
Broad Money Supply (M2) is defined to include currency outside depository 
corporations, transferable and other deposits in national currency of the resident 
sectors, excluding deposits of the Central Government and those of the depository 
corporations. In terms of money supply, monetary policy had to be implemented in order 
to maintain the pegged exchange rate. That means that the money stock growth rate in 
Namibia had to be maintained at a similar growth rate as in South Africa (BON, 
1996:21-23). Namibian authorities would then be required to correct the money stock 
growth rate if there was a deviation. 
 
Figure 2.5: Growth of Money Stock in Namibia: 1993 - 2011 
 
This graph shows that there has not been an excessive tendency of increase in money 
supply. In most years the increase has been below 10 per cent, except for 1994 and 
2006. If the increase in money had been excessive, it would have prompted one to raise 
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a question as to whether the increase implied excessive expansionary monetary policy. 
However, the graph shows some erratic behaviour of growth in money stock. This is not 
surprising, because even theory dictates that the behaviours of measures for monetary 
aggregates are not as predictable as Figure 2.5 demonstrates.  
 
The pattern of not having excessive monetary expansion is attributed to the 
harmonisation of the monetary policy of the two countries.The money stock is 
influenced by various factors, including the open market operations of the central bank 
and financial flows into and out of the country. Monetary policy is precisely about how 
the central bank responds to these financial flows through its open market operations in 
order to achieve the money stock that its policy objective requires. This could also 
suggest a high correlation of money stock growth between the two countries, 
suggesting that the Namibian monetary authorities have conducted their open market 
operations in such a manner that the net effect on the growth of the money stock of 
Namibia would be growing at more or less the same rate as the South African growth in 
money stock. 
 
2.9.4 Size of Bank Credit to GDP 
 
In terms of the size of bank credit to GDP, it is important in the sense that credit is a 
significant channel of monetary policy transmission. It is a macroeconomic variable that 
helps to drive economic activity but at the same time it is also dependent on economic 
activity. For example, expenditure funded by credit growth will increase output, but at 
the same time strong output growth can stimulate the demand for credit to finance 
further expenditure, such as investment (Berkelmans, 2005:1).  
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Figure 2.6: Size of Bank Credit/GDP: 1993 - 2011 
 
 
Figure 2.6 shows that the size of bank credit to GDP has been on the increase, 
suggesting interaction between the two variables. Therefore, it implies that changes in 
monetary policy should cause changes in loan supply. This in turn should have a 
significant effect on real economic activity. Therefore, it is expected that major 
relationships in the bank lending channel will be operational in Namibia. 
 
2.9.5 GDP growth 
Other indicators, such as growth in GDP, were stable though not as high over time as 
depicted in Figure 2.7 below. Although there have been some sharp swings at times, 
they did not cause significant macroeconomic destabilisation. This indicates that 
monetary policy has been relatively favourable for output expansion. 
 
Figure 2.7: Gross Domestic Product for Namibia: 1993 - 2011 
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Although there seem to have been a relatively stable macroeconomic condition over a 
number of years, the GDP growth has not been relatively stable. There have been 
fluctuations over the number of years as shown by figure 2.7 Overall, the current 
monetary policy framework has served Namibia well. Hence, implying that there could 
be other factors into play. 
 
2.10 Conclusion   
This chapter attempted to focus on the conduct of monetary policy, particularly the 
different monetary policy strategies. These include exchange rate targets, money 
growth targets, nominal GDP targeting, interest rate targeting, discretionary policy and 
inflation targeting. This chapter established that it is difficult to find a monetary policy 
strategy that yields price stability and pleasing economic performance. Most central 
banks have experimented with different monetary-policy strategies. However, 
exchange-rate targeting have been shown to be unsafe to economic prosperity; in 
particularly they have been found to be fragile and prone to financial crisis. Monetary 
targets have been found to be untrustworthy. Furthermore, monetary-policy strategies 
with multiple objectives, such as discretionary monetary-policy regimes, offer limited if 
any guidance to policy-makers and the general public. Other monetary-policy 
frameworks have proved to be limited in terms of flexibility necessary to withstand 
different types of shocks. This has posed difficulties in maintaining price stability without 
having a volatile effect on the economy. Inflation targeting, which is the most recent 
monetary-policy framework, is becoming important as an alternative strategy that deals 
better with the failures or shortcomings of other frameworks.  
 
In the Namibian context, the monetary policy followed is exchange rate targeting. As 
expected, it had an impact on the macroeconomic variables observed. The starting 
point is that the monetary policy instrument of Namibia, the repo rate, followed that of 
South Africa, except that Namibia‘s repo rate had to be higher by a small margin. In 
terms of inflation, the inflation rates of the two countries also moved in the same 
direction. This co-movement of the inflation rates of the two countries suggests that 
70 
 
exchange rate pegging has been effective.  In terms of interest rates, it has been shown 
that the interest rates (short-term and long-term) move in the same direction as the 
monetary policy instrument. This indicates that monetary policy action is capable of 
moving short-term and long-term interest rates in the same direction and thus to have 
the intended impact on economic activities. For monetary aggregates, there has not 
been a tendency of increase in money supply. This could also suggest a high 
correlation of money stock growth between the two countries, suggesting that the 
Namibian monetary authorities have conducted their open market operations in such a 
manner that the net effect on the growth of the money stock of Namibia would be for it 
to grow at more or less the same rate as the South African money stock. The other 
variable observed is the size of bank credit to GDP and it has been on the increase, 
suggesting interaction between the two variables. Therefore, it implies that changes in 
monetary policy could cause changes in loan supply. In terms of output there have been 
some sharp swings at times, but these did not cause significant macroeconomic 
destabilisation. This indicates that monetary policy has been favourable for output 
expansion. There seem to have been stable macroeconomic conditions over a number 
of years. One can conclude that the monetary policy framework seem to have served 
Namibia well. The next chapters will empirically test whether this has been the case. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
  
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter presents the literature review for each channel of monetary policy. The 
chapter is divided into two sections. Section 3.2 presents a discussion of each channel, 
which comprises two parts, namely the theoretical and empirical literature. The 
theoretical literature discusses the competing theoretical models and arguments, while 
the empirical literature presents the quantification and empirical tests/analysis of the 
theoretical propositions. The discussion is arranged in this manner because each 
channel is analysed separately. In addition to the discussion on channels, there is an 
extension of the discussion on the theoretical and empirical aspects of ERPT which is 
generally used to refer to the effect of exchange rate changes on one of the following: 
(1) import and export prices, (2) consumer prices, (3) investments and (4) trade 
volumes. This is important because in a small open economy such as that of Namibia, 
the exchange rate channel provides an important transmission channel for monetary 
policy. It is for this reason that understanding the extent to which the exchange rate 
alters relative prices is critical. Furthermore, ERPT is critical to monetary policy design 
and exchange rate policies. Section 3.3 concludes the chapter.  
 
3.2 Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanisms 
 
As indicated earlier, monetary policy change affects the economy through a variety of 
channels. Understanding the monetary transmission mechanism requires an in-depth 
analysis of these channels. In this section, the different channels: the interest rate 
channel, exchange rate channel, credit channel and asset price channel are discussed 
in detail. 
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3.2.1 Interest rate channel  
This traditional channel of monetary policy transmission is founded upon the 
macroeconomic models of investment developed in the mid-20th century. In particular it 
is based on the neoclassical models of investment developed by Jorgenson (1963) and 
Tobin (1969). According to Boivin et al (2010:7), for investment, the key channel for 
monetary policy transmission is the direct interest rate operating via the user of capital. 
Direct interest-rate channels. The transmission channel of monetary policy is rooted in 
macroeconomic models that include the impact of interest rates on the cost of capital, 
business and household investment spending. Based on standard models of the 
neoclassical era, the investment model illustrates that the user cost of capital is the 
major factor of demand for capital. This is valid for investment goods, residential 
housing or consumer durable goods (Jorgenson, 1963).  
 
Another theoretical proposition is that of Tobin’s q. According to Tobin (1969), 
investment decisions of individual firms and households can be explained in this 
framework. q is defined on the basis of business investment, as the market value of 
firms divided by the replacement cost of capital. q is significant in taking investment 
decisions. If q is high, the market value of firms is relatively high compared to the 
replacement cost of capital. New plant and equipment capital is relative to the market 
value of firms. This implies that if the issuing of new stock is relatively cheaper than the 
cost of replacing the equipment, investment will increase (Ireland, 2005:4). Hayashi 
(1982) relates the Tobin q theory to the user of capital approach. It is shown that there 
is a direct link between stock prices and investment spending. When interest rates are 
lowered, this leads to high demands for stocks. An increase in demands for stock brings 
about an increase in stock prices. This in turn results in increased investment spending 
and consequently increases in the aggregate demand. 
 
Several factors are important in determining the effects of monetary policy operating 
through these direct user cost channels. One of the factors is the horizon over which 
interest rates influence spending. This is critical in the sense that capital assets have a 
long life span. Therefore, any adjustments of these stocks involve costs that businesses 
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as well as individual households take into account, when incorporating changes in 
interest rates into their investment decisions. It is from this viewpoint that it has been 
argued that it is the real interest rate (which is the cost of capital) and the expected real 
appreciation of the capital asset that influence spending related to the expected life of 
the asset (Boivin et al, 2010:8). 
 
The preceding relationship has been formalised by traditional econometric models by 
including the long-term interest rate in the user cost formula. This is due to the fact that 
the monetary transmission mechanism involves the link between short- and long term-
interest rates through expectation hypothesis of the term structure. Therefore, the key 
channel through which monetary policy actions are transmitted to the economy is their 
effects on market interest rates. This is known as the interest rate channel of the 
monetary policy transmission (MPT). This channel is said to be effective if monetary 
policy action can bring about an effect on a range of interest rates prevailing in the 
economy, from short- to long-term interest rates, but there seem to be a grey area 
regarding the link between short- and long-term interest rates with monetary policy. 
Nevertheless, there seem to be substantial evidence that monetary policy has 
predictable effects on short-term rates. However, the connection between monetary 
policy actions and long-term rates is not a clear-cut to be particular it is weaker and less 
reliable (Roley and Sellon, 1995).  
 
Other authors, such as Taylor (1995), have indicated that there is no clear distinction as 
to which of the interest rates has a greater influence on economic activity. In other 
words, the conflict is about the magnitude of the impact of short-term and long-term 
rates on economic activity. Intuitively, there is reason to believe that for long-term 
decisions such as investing in plants and equipment, the long-term interest rate should 
be a variable of major interest. Furthermore, economic theory indicates that in any case 
it is the long-term interest rate that matters for investment or consumption demands. 
Therefore the effectiveness of the MPT, via the interest rate channel, should depend on 
how monetary policy affects the long-term interest rate.  
 
74 
 
The theories of the term structure of interest rates postulates that changes in the short-
term interest rate as a result of monetary policy action affect long-term interest rates 
differently. Moreover, according to the expectations hypothesis of the term structure, a 
policy change in the short-term interest rate is then transmitted to medium- and long-
term interest rates through the balancing mechanism of supply and demand in the 
financial markets (see Goeltom, 2008:323; Boivin et al, 2010:8). It is in this view that 
monetary policy affects long-term interest rates by manipulating short-term interest 
rates. This in turn results in changing market expectations of future short-term rates 
(Walsh, 2003: 489). 
 
The way market participants form their expectations on the future path of monetary 
policy will definitely affect the expected future short-term rates and thus, the long-term 
interest rates (Roley and Sellon, 1995). However, the market segmentation theory of the 
term structure of interest rates infers that the relationship between interest rates of 
different maturities is unnecessary, because investors and borrowers have strong 
maturity preferences that they intend to achieve when they invest. Therefore the major 
factors that determine the interest rate for a maturity segment are supply and demand 
conditions unique to the maturity segment.   
 
Various studies have empirically looked at monetary policy transmission mechanisms to 
determine whether there is conformity and compatibility between the theoretical 
propositions with the empirical outcomes and if not, what the possible reasons could be. 
 
Among those studies is one by Cheng (2006) on Kenya, examining how the central 
bank‘s repo rate affects the economy. In particular the study examined the impact of 
monetary policy shocks on output, prices and the nominal effective exchange rate of the 
country from 1977 to 2005. In employing the SVAR technique, Cheng (2006) found that 
an exogenous increase in the short-term interest rate is followed by a decline in prices 
and an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, but that it has an insignificant impact 
on output. Furthermore, the results showed that variations in short-term interest rates 
account for significant fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate and prices, while 
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accounting little for output fluctuations. Maturu (2007) used a structural VAR to analyse 
channels of monetary policy transmission in Kenya. The results showed that interest 
rate and exchange rate channels were definitely important channels of monetary policy 
transmission in Kenya in addition to the traditional money channel. On this basis, 
Maturu argued that that there was potential for monetary policy signalling using the repo 
interest rate.  
 
As in Kenya, the interest rate channel in Malawi was found to be effective, according to 
Ngalawa (2009). He investigated the process through which monetary policy affects 
consumer prices and output in Malawi by employing a technique of innovation 
accounting in an SVAR model. Using the monthly time series data for the period 1988:1 
to 2005:12, the results showed that the officials were not only targeting reserve money, 
but also short-term interest rates. Effectively, the country employed hybrid operating 
procedures. However, the results further showed that the bank rate was a more 
effective measure of monetary policy compared to reserve money in pursuance of both 
price stability and high growth and employment objectives. It was further shown that 
price stability was the principal objective of monetary policy in Malawi. With the 
exception of exchange rate shocks, consumer prices responded weakly to monetary 
impulses, suggesting that inflation in Malawi might not be predominated by monetary 
factors. The study also illustrated that bank lending, exchange rates and aggregate 
money supply contained important additional information in the transmission process of 
monetary policy shocks in Malawi. Overall it was also concluded that the floatation of 
the Malawi Kwacha in 1994 had enhanced the monetary transmission process to evolve 
from a weak, blurred process to a fairly strong, less ambiguous mechanism. 
 
Bonga-Bonga (2009) also established that the interest rate channel was effective in 
South Africa. His study examined the responses of the short- and long-term interest 
rates to monetary, demand and supply shocks for South Africa using quarterly data for 
the period 1979 to 2007. The empirical analysis was conducted using an SVAR 
methodology with long-run restrictions. The results revealed that the effects of monetary 
and demand shocks resulted in the short- and long-term interest rates moving in the 
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same direction. Nevertheless, the short and long-term interest rates moved in different 
directions in the presence of positive supply shocks. These findings contradicted the 
theory of Ellingsen and Södeström (2001) that predicted the short- and long-term 
interest rates to move in the same direction after supply shocks. The study showed that 
positive supply shocks not only resulted in expansion but also caused the short-term 
interest rate to increase and the long-term interest rate to decrease in South Africa. 
 
As in the case of Bonga-Bonga (2009) and Ngalawa (2009), a study by Skriner (2010) 
also examined monetary policy transmission channels with specific emphasis on the 
interest rate channel and the financial accelerator issue in selected member countries of 
the European Monetary Union (Austria, Germany, Spain and Greece). The empirical 
analyses were based on time-series data, in particular monthly observations for the 
period 1999 to 2010. The study followed the SVAR methodology using four 
macroeconomic variables: interest rates, bank-lending, economic growth and prices. 
The empirical results suggested that the counter-cyclical business cycle stabilisation 
through the interest rate channel was effective only in Austria and Germany. A financial 
accelerator mechanism was observable in consumer demand in Austria and Spain, and 
in Greece the industries producing intermediate and capital goods were affected. In 
Germany there was no sign of financial acceleration either in the activities of 
households or in the goods-producing industries. 
 
Finally, in the case of Namibia only one study has been done on monetary policy 
transmission mechanisms by Uanguta and Ikhide (2002). The study used monthly data 
for the period 1990 to 1999. Two methods were applied to obtain the results, namely the 
cumulative forecast error variance and VAR. To be specific, a general (unrestricted) 
VAR model was used. Through these the results on monetary policy transmission could 
be deduced from the impulse response functions and variance decomposition. This 
study examined two main channels via which monetary policy is transmitted into the 
domestic economy, namely interest rates and credit channels. The results of the study 
revealed that a tightening of monetary policy, alternatively an increase in the repo or 
bank rate, causes lending rates to increase in the domestic economy. This in turn leads 
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to a decline in private investment, resulting in negative impacts on output and 
employment in the short run. These results showed that both channels were effective in 
the case of Namibia. Firstly, with respect to the credit channel, it was evident that some 
firms could not replace losses of bank credit with other types of finance without incurring 
costs, but rather had to curtail investment spending, especialy when faced with 
increased lending rates or contraction of bank reserves during a tight money regime. 
Thus, there was a likelihood of a deviation of investment behaviour from its optimal 
level. Furthermore, the low response of domestic lending rates to domestic money 
supply shocks was inevitable because of a Currency Board arrangement. The domestic 
economy lost control over interest rates because domestic interest rates follow anchor 
currency rates in normal times.  
 
Other studies in which the interest rate channels were found to be effective include 
those of Al-Mashat (2003) for India, Amarasekana (2008) for Sri-Lanka, Bates and 
Hachichanga (2009) for Tunisia, Acosta-Ormaecheo and Coble (2011) for Chile and 
New Zealand and Kashif and Abdul (2012) for Pakistan. However, there are also 
studies in other countries where interest rates were found to be ineffective. Studies that 
came to this conclusion include those of Shabbir (2008) for PNG, Javir and Munir 
(2011) for Pakistan, Ncube and Ndou for South Africa and many others (see appendix, 
table 3.2.1). 
 
The preceding discussion on empirical literature for the interest rate channel focussed 
much on the effectiveness of this channel. But the effectiveness is only noticeable when 
monetary policy action can affect a range of interest rates from short- to long-term 
interest rates. There seem to be a grey area regarding the link between short- and long-
term interest rates with monetary policy. However, there is also empirical evidence on 
how monetary policy action causes movements in short-term and long-term interest 
rates. See table 3.2.1 in the appendix. Among other studies Cook and Hahn (1989) 
findings in the US shows that Federal Funds rate caused large movements in short-term 
and smaller but significant movements in intermediate and long-term rates. In particular 
monetary policy raises long-term real interest rates at all maturities. Another study in the 
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US by Roley and Sellon (1995) also found that short-term interest rates follow the same 
trend as the federal funds rate (US monetary policy instrument). In Germany Hardy 
(1998) findings were that German‘s market interest rates responded significantly to 
changes in the official rates. The responses became more intensified when changes in 
official rates are classified into anticipated and unanticipated changes.  
 
Arize et al. (2002) examine the long-run relation between short-term and long-term 
interest rates in 19 countries, including South Africa, over the quarterly period 1973 to 
1998. The results of their study support the expectations hypothesis in all countries, 
except the United Kingdom. The expectation hypothesis postulates that a policy change 
in the short-term interest rate is then transmitted to medium- and long-term interest 
rates through the balancing mechanism of supply and demand in the financial markets. 
In the same vein Kaketsis and Sarantis (2006) also investigate the transmission process 
between the Bank of Greece‘s operating interest rates instruments and the market 
interest rates at various maturities during the transition period of the 1990s. The results 
of their study show an increase in anticipation and learning responses of market rates to 
policy changes during the transition period and a pronounced decline in responses 
along the maturities spectrum. Bonga-Bonga (2009) findings on South Africa are that 
the short- and long-term interest rates react positively to monetary policy shocks and 
this should indicate that the SARB can influence long-term rates by operating at the 
short end of the market. This suggest that since monetary policy action is capable of 
moving the short- and long-term interest rates in the same direction, it thus has intended 
impact on economic activities, hence this implies that the operation of the monetary 
transmission mechanism should be effective in South Africa.  
 
3.2.2 The credit channel  
Discontent with conservatism about how the effects of the interest rate explain the 
impact of monetary policy on expenditure on long-standing assets gave birth to the view 
of the monetary transmission mechanism that emphasises asymmetric information in 
financial markets. Mishkin (1996) indicates that information problems also refer to 
matters related to troubles brought about by costly verification and enforcement of 
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financial contracts. These in particular are closely related to the asymmetric information 
problem. There is a variety of credit channels, depending on how one classifies them. 
However, the most talked about are the basic channels of monetary transmission that 
develop as a result of information problems in credit markets, namely the bank lending 
channel and the balance-sheet channel. There is a great deal of literature on the credit 
channel; see for instance, Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Cecchetti (1995) and Hubbard 
(1995). 
 
Bank lending channel 
The bank lending channel is founded on the basis that banks play a special role in the 
financial system because they are suitable to deal with asymmetric information 
problems in credit markets. Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) indicate that the bank lending 
channel is based upon two critical assumptions. Firstly, bank loans and other non-bank 
assets such as commercial paper are imperfect substitutes; this is because of imperfect 
information in credit markets. Small firms are often dependent on bank loans, because 
they find it very difficult to obtain funds through other means, such as issuing securities 
or bonds, owing to high screening and monitoring costs (Markidou & Tapia, 2003:12). 
Should the bank become unwilling to offer credit, this will have repercussions in terms of 
spending by the dependent customers, which translates into lower aggregate demand. 
Secondly, through change in monetary policy, the central bank has the ability to 
constrain the supply of bank loans. For instance, a monetary policy contraction leads to 
a reduction in bank reserve money and the number of loans, hence bringing about a fall 
in spending by bank-dependent customers. To sum up, the two assumptions simply 
give an indication that monetary policy contraction leads to a reduction in the supply of 
bank loans and in turn affects real economic activity. The bank lending channel consists 
of two hybrids as discussed below. 
 
Balance-sheet channels 
One of the popular hybrid channels of the credit channel is the balance-sheet channel, 
as a result of a decline in the importance of the bank lending channel (Mishkin, 1996). 
As in the case of the bank lending channel, the balance-sheet channel also arises from 
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the presence of asymmetric information problems in credit markets. Introduced by 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), the balance sheet channel is normally coupled with the 
outcome of a policy-induced change in interest rates on the cash flows and hence the 
balance positions of non-financial firms that are heavily dependent on bank loans 
(Afandi, 2005:47).  
 
A contraction in monetary policy in the form of a rise in interest rates is a cost because it 
brings about an increase in interest expenses for the firm. This leads to a reduction in its 
cash flows, hence weakening its balance sheet position. If interest rates increase 
further, it leads to a reduction in asset prices, which in turn lowers the value of collateral. 
A tight monetary policy directly increases the net worth of business firms, thus the more 
severe the adverse selection and moral hazard problems are in, lending to these firms. 
Lower net worth means that lenders in effect have less collateral for their loans, and so 
losses from adverse selection are higher. Moreover, a decline in net worth increases the 
adverse selection problem, leading to decreased lending to finance investment 
spending. Therefore lower net worth of business firms also increases the moral hazard 
problem, because it means that owners have a lower equity stake in their firms, giving 
them more incentive to engage in risky investment projects. Since taking on riskier 
investment projects makes it more likely that lenders will not be repaid, a decrease in 
business firms' net worth leads to a decrease in lending and hence in investment 
spending (Mishkin, 1996:37). 
 
On the other hand, adopting an expansionary monetary policy in the form of lower 
interest rates is a good step for firms to take. This brings about an improvement in firms' 
balance sheets because it reflects positively on the cash flows of firms; in particular it 
increases cash flow. This in turn reduces adverse selection and moral hazard problems. 
Alternatively, an expansionary monetary policy that lowers interest rates can stimulate 
aggregate output, but it involves credit rationing (Mishkin, 1996:38). This phenomenon 
occurs when borrowers are not given loans even when they are willing to pay higher 
interest rates (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Moreover, firms and individuals with the riskiest 
investment projects are exactly the ones who are willing to pay the highest interest 
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rates, believing that should the high-risk investment succeed, the benefit will accrue to 
the individuals. It is for this reason that it has been argued that higher interest rates 
increase the adverse selection problem and lower interest rates reduce it. This is 
because when an expansionary monetary policy is implemented, in particular lower 
interest rates, less risk-prone borrowers are a higher fraction of those demanding loans 
and thus lenders are more willing to lend, raising both investment and output.  
 
Another way the balance-sheet channel operates through monetary policy effects is on 
the general price level. This is because debt payments are contractually fixed in nominal 
terms; an unanticipated rise in the price level decreases the burden of the debt, in other 
words it lowers the value of firms' liabilities in real terms. Therefore monetary expansion 
that leads to an unanticipated rise in the price level raises real net worth, which lowers 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems, leading to a rise in investment spending 
and aggregate output (Mishkin, 1996:38).  
 
Household balance-sheet effects 
It has been observed that most literature on this channel has been a little biased 
towards spending by business firms and less towards consumer spending, especially on 
consumer durables and housing. Normally declines in bank lending cause a decline in 
durable and housing purchases by consumers, who are limited when it comes to access 
to alternative sources of credit. Similarly, an increase in interest rates causes 
deterioration in household balance-sheets because consumers' cash flow is adversely 
affected (Mishkin, 1996:38). 
 
The effects of the balance-sheet channels can also be viewed through consumers via 
liquidity effects on consumer durable and housing expenditure (Mishkin, 1978). In this 
view, the importance of balance-sheet effects is their impact on consumers‘ desire to 
spend as opposed to lenders‘ desire to lend. The argument is that because of 
asymmetric information about their quality, consumer durables and housing are very 
illiquid assets. There are two possible outcomes: (1) in a case where there is a bad 
income shock, consumers are expected to sell their consumer durables or housing to 
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raise money. This would result in an anticipated big loss because they could not get the 
full value of these assets in a distress sale; (2) in contrast, if consumers held financial 
assets (such as money in the bank, stocks, or bonds), they could effortlessly sell them 
rapidly at their full market value and raise the cash. In this view one can conclude that 
when consumers expect a higher likelihood of finding themselves in financial distress, 
they would rather be holding fewer illiquid consumer durables or housing assets and 
more liquid financial assets (Mishkin, 1996:38). 
 
The illiquidity of consumer durable and housing assets is another reason why a 
monetary contraction, which raises interest rates and thereby reduces cash flow to 
consumers, leads to a decline in spending on consumer durables and housing. It can be 
concluded that a decline in consumer cash flow increases the likelihood of financial 
distress, which in turn reduces the desire of consumers to hold durable goods or 
housing, thus reducing spending on these items, and consequently aggregate output 
(Mishkin, 1996:39). 
 
Numerous authors/researchers have examined how the theory on the credit channel 
matches empirical evidence. In studies on the USA, Bernanke and Blinder (1990) and 
Romer and Romer (1990) presented some notable studies on the credit channel in 
which they assessed the impact of a restrictive monetary policy on money, credit and 
economic activity using VAR models. The results found by these authors are that a 
tightening of monetary policy causes an immediate contraction in deposits, with no 
short-term effect on lending. Lending only begins to slow down some six to nine months 
later, when the economy itself is slowing. Bernanke and Blinder conclude that the 
results support the credit view, and they attribute the delayed response of loans to their 
contractual nature. Romer and Romer (1990), on the other hand, conclude that the 
credit channel is ineffective. 
 
In a study on Greece, Markidou and Nikolaidou (2005) investigated the relevance of the 
credit channel of monetary policy transmission in Greece on both aggregated and 
disaggregated data and estimated the response of bank loans to different 
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macroeconomic shocks. This study employed the SVAR model, using monthly data for 
the period 1995 to -2005. The study distinguished between households and firms 
instead of focusing on the response of total bank credit to a tightening monetary policy 
shock. The study identified structural models to study bank credit in Greece as a source 
of macroeconomic variation for the period 1995 to 2005. The findings suggested that 
the credit channel in Greece for the period 1995 to 2005 was inoperative in spite of the 
two monetary policy variables used, the monetary base and the interest rate. The 
responses of the different bank credit measures to monetary policy changes did not 
differ significantly, rendering the credit channel ineffective for both consumers and 
business firms. 
 
In a study on Canada, Schaller and Junayed (2006) investigated the credit channel in a 
small open economy using quarterly data for the period 1980:1 to 2004:4. In estimating 
the effect of monetary policy on the economy, a structural VAR model was used. This 
study examined whether there evidence for the conventional ―closed economy‖ and 
open economy monetary transmission mechanisms, as well as for a credit channel. The 
data provided support for the conventional ―closed economy‖ and open economy 
transmission mechanisms, as well as evidence that suggested a role for the credit 
channel in Canada, ie an increase in the nominal short interest rate translated into an 
increase in the long real interest rate (due, in part, to nominal rigidities) and thus 
affected interest-sensitive components of aggregate demand, such as residential 
investment. 
 
Another study on the credit channel of monetary policy between Australia and New 
Zealand was conducted by Suzuki (2008), to test the credit view in an open economy 
context. The study looked at whether a monetary-policy shock originating in one country 
propagates to another through banks‘ shifts of funds between the two countries. In this 
study a VAR model was used to conduct the analysis. For this purpose, this study used 
quarterly data for the period 1988:Q4 to 2005:Q4 for Australia and New Zealand. The 
reasoning behind this analysis was that Australian-owned banks dominate the banking 
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market in New Zealand. A significant finding was that the supply schedule of loans 
shifted left in New Zealand after monetary tightening in Australia. 
 
In a study on Nigeria, Ogun and Akinlo (2010) examined the effectiveness of the bank 
credit channel of monetary policy. An SVAR technique was employed for analysis in this 
study. The study used quarterly data for the period 1986:1 to 2006:4 to analyse the 
responses of bank balance sheet variables to monetary policy shock. The results of this 
study revealed that bank deposits, securities holdings and total loans and advances 
responded slowly to monetary policy shock. Monetary policy shock also contributed very 
little to the forecast errors of these bank balance sheet variables. The study concluded 
that the bank credit channel was ineffective in Nigeria.  
 
In addition to the empirical studies discussed above, there are also other studies that 
found mixed results. Some found the credit channel to be effective and others not. 
There are also cases where the credit channel or its hybrids inoperative or operative but 
weak or inneffective (refer to table 3.2.2 in the appendix). These include the work of 
Kakes (2000) in Nertherlands bank lending was found to be insignificant in monetary 
policy transmission, Dabla-Norris and Floerkemeier (2005) for Armenia the credit 
channel is effective but not so significant, Markidou and Nikolaidou (2005) in Greece the 
credit channel has been inoperative hence, ineffective, Al-Mashat and Billmeier (2007) 
for Egypt the credit channel is effective, Maturu (2007) the credit channel is operational, 
Aleem (2010) credit channel is effective and Tsangarides (2010) credit channel is 
effective but not so significantly. Refer to the appendix, table 3.2.2 for more empirical 
studies and findings. 
 
3.2.3 Exchange rate channel  
The transmission mechanism of the exchange rate works directly through its impact on 
import prices to aggregate demand via net exports (Ramos-Francia & Sidaoui, 
2008:369). The analysis of this channel of transmission can be divided into two parts: (i) 
the pass-through from the policy interest rate to the exchange rate and (ii) the pass-
through from the exchange rate to the real economy (BOT, 2008:460).  
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Pass-through from the policy interest rate to the exchange rate: A policy rate change by 
the central bank also induces a change on return on domestic investments relative to 
foreign investments. The interest rate differential leads to capital outflows and affects 
the relative exchange rate. Therefore, central banks make serious attempts to keep the 
interest rate differential stable to facilitate capital account stability and to keep the 
bilateral exchange rate from being too volatile for the economy. 
 
Pass-through from the exchange rate to inflation and the real economy: Changes in the 
exchange rate are directly transmitted to the consumer price through the cost of 
imported inputs and finished goods. However, the magnitude and speed of the pass-
through depend on prevailing demand conditions, price adjustment costs and the 
perceived persistence of the depreciation/appreciation. The indirect transmission has 
lag effects through changes in the levels of demand (between domestic goods and 
import substitutes). This comes as a result of shifts in the country‘s external 
competitiveness or inflation expectations (Ramos-Francia & Sidaoui, 2008:369).    
 
It is generally known that the exchange rate channel examines the relationship between 
net private capital inflows and monetary policy. There are variant exchange rate 
regimes but for simplicity‘s sake two extreme categories are referred to in this 
discussion, namely the fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. Karamanou, 
Mahadeva, Robinson and Syrichas (n.d.) discussed the two alternatives. Under a 
flexible exchange rate regime monetary tightening, for example via an interest rate rise, 
makes domestic currency deposits more attractive. This leads to a currency 
appreciation. The appreciation of a currency means the currency has gained value. The 
high value of the currency makes domestic goods more expensive than foreign goods. 
This has a negative impact on net exports because an appreciation causes a fall in net 
exports and consequently aggregate output. However, under the alternative regime or a 
system of fixed exchange rates with no capital controls, monetary tightening or a rise in 
interest rates will cause capital inflows. This is due to the fact that a higher domestic 
interest rate becomes attractive to international investors. This puts upward pressure on 
the exchange rate. The authorities have to act on this; the central bank will have to 
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respond by increasing its foreign exchange reserves to bring the interest rate down to 
its original level. It is against this background that when the exchange rate is fixed or 
heavily managed, the effectiveness of monetary policy is reduced but not necessarily 
entirely eliminated. The authorities still have some room for manoeuvring.  
 
Despite the fact that monetary policy under a fixed exchange rate has come under 
heavy debate, there is an understanding that there are two ways in which monetary 
policy can maintain a degree of independence with the exchange rate channel present 
in the case of a fixed exchange rate regime. In particular, the exchange rate might not 
be completely fixed but may vary slightly and secondly, monetary policy can influence 
the real exchange rate by working through the price level. An exchange rate system that 
allows some fluctuation within a target zone, accompanied by some capital controls and 
a system where domestic and foreign assets are imperfect substitutes, may give the 
central bank some scope for domestic interest rates to deviate from the levels set by the 
interest rate parities. This is true for as long as the exchange rate does not reach the 
zone‘s boundaries, since when this happens maintaining [the boundaries] in the face of 
speculative pressure presents all the problems of a fixed exchange rate. However if 
domestic and foreign assets are imperfect substitutes, domestic interest rates may 
deviate from international levels. In this way, monetary policy can affect the real 
exchange rate through prices while holding the nominal exchange rate fixed. 
Furthermore, via this channel the monetary authorities can affect net exports at a limited 
degree but with much longer lags. Therefore, capital controls and imperfect 
substitutability of domestic and foreign assets, along with a target zone regime, create a 
channel for monetary policy to affect output and prices despite a fixed exchange rate 
system (Bitans, Stikuts & Tillers, 2003). 
 
The importance of evaluating the exchange rate channel is a result of suggestions that 
have been made on escaping from a liquidity trap. In particular these suggestions focus 
on the exchange rate as a tool. The most popular suggestion is that of Svensson (2001, 
2003), whose proposal consists of three elements:  Firstly, the central bank should 
announce an upward-sloping target path. Secondly, currency devaluation is announced, 
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together with a currency peg to a crawling exchange rate target. This would imply that 
the monetary authorities commit to buying and selling unlimited amounts of foreign 
exchange at the exchange rate. Furthermore, the initial level of exchange rate target 
after the devaluation is chosen with the aim of ensuring a real depreciation of the 
domestic currency relative to the steady state. Because of the assumption of the 
domestic price level being sticky, in the short run the real exchange rate moves one-to-
one with the nominal exchange rate. However, the exchange rate target corresponds to 
a nominal depreciation of the domestic currency at the rate of difference between the 
domestic inflation target and foreign inflation. The appreciation of the exchange rate in 
nominal terms takes place when domestic inflation is lower than foreign inflation, 
especially when the peg is fixed instead of crawling. Thirdly, an exit strategy is 
confidently declared when the price level target path has been reached. This is to say, 
the currency peg will be abandoned in favour of flexible price level targeting (Mehrotra, 
2006: 141-143). 
 
Below are some discussions on empirical studies on this channel. A study by Bitans, 
Stikuts and Tillers (2003) examined the transmission of monetary shocks in Latvia. It 
dealt in particular with short-term reactions of the economy to various monetary shocks. 
Monthly data for the period January 1995 to March 2002 were used. The importance of 
various channels of monetary transmission was tested empirically by using the SVAR 
model and small structural macroeconomic model. The analysis provided evidence that 
monetary shocks were transmitted to the economy mainly through the exchange rate 
channel. The analysis of the financial system of Latvia supported the view that the 
wealth channel was very weak or even non-existent at the time because of a relatively 
underdeveloped capital market.  
 
A study by Muco, Sanfey and Taci (2003) examined the conduct of monetary policy in 
Albania during the transition period. This study used monthly data for the period 
January 1994 to May 2003. By employing the VAR model, the study identified various 
channels through which monetary policy could affect prices and output and established 
their relative importance. Estimates from a VAR model of key macroeconomic variables 
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demonstrated the weak link between money supply and inflation up to mid-2000. 
However, the move during 2000 from direct to indirect instruments of monetary control 
helped to strengthen the predictability of the transmission link from money supply to 
inflation. Hence the conclusion that external influence, by contributing to exchange rate 
stability, had played an important part in keeping inflation low for most of the transition 
period. Moreover, the introduction of indirect instruments of monetary policy appeared 
to have contributed to the effectiveness of the exchange rate transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy into the real economy. These results concur with those of Hwee 
(2004) for Singapore. This study uses the real effective exchange rate as a measure for 
monetary policy and finds that output reacts immediately and significantly to a 
contractionary monetary policy shock. The study finds that the exchange rate channel 
was more effective in transmitting monetary policy to the economy than the interest rate 
channel was. 
 
In Armenia, Dabla-Norris and Floerkemeier‘s (2006) study examined monetary policy 
transmission in the context of the authorities‘ intention to shift to an inflation-targeting 
regime over the medium term. In this study monthly data for 2000:5 to 2005:12 were 
used. The Granger causality tests and a VAR model were used for analysis. The results 
from this study indicated that the capability of monetary policy to influence economic 
activity and inflation was still limited, as important channels of monetary transmission 
were not fully functional. In particular, the interest rate channel remained weak, even 
though there was some evidence of transmission to prices of changes in the repo rate 
under the central bank‘s new operating target for inflation. As in other emerging and 
transition economies with a high degree of dollarisation, the exchange rate channel had 
a strong impact on the inflation rate. The study also showed that inflation responded to 
broad money shocks, once foreign currency deposits were included. 
 
In Vietnam, Hung (2007) analysed the monetary transmission mechanism in Vietnam, 
using quarterly, seasonally adjusted data from 1996Q1 to 2005Q4. In this study the 
techniques such as VAR, impulse response function, the Granger causality test and 
variance decomposition were used to analyse the effect of monetary shocks on output. 
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In particular the focus was on the reduced-form relationships between money, real 
output, price level, real interest rate, real exchange rate and credit. The results for of 
this study revealed that monetary policy can affect output and price level. While 
examining the specific channels, namely the interest rate, the credit channel and the 
exchange rate channel, the results showed that the significance of each channel was 
weak. However, the credit and exchange rate channels appeared to be the most 
significant channels. 
 
In Egypt, Al-Mashat and Billmeier‘s (2007) study examined the monetary transmission 
mechanism in Egypt in the context of the central bank‘s intention to shift to inflation 
targeting. The study used monthly observations running from January 1996 to June 
2005. A VAR model was used to evaluate the different channels. The results revealed 
that exchange rate channel played a strong role in propagating monetary shocks to 
output and prices. Most other channels (bank lending, asset price) were rather weak. 
The interest rate channel was found to be underdeveloped but appeared to be 
strengthening after the introduction of the interest corridor in 2005, boding well for 
adopting inflation targeting over the medium term. 
 
Additional empirical studies on the exchange rate channel (refer to table 3.2.3 in the 
appendix) Zengin (2000) in Turkey exchange rate was ineffective in monetary policy 
transmission, Sezer (2002) in Turkey exchange rate was found to be effective, Citu 
(2003) in New Zealand exchange rate was effective in the transmission of the dynamic 
effect of monetary policy in smaller developed countries but not in the big developed 
countries, Hwee (2004) in Singapore exchange rate was found to be effective in 
transmitting monetary policy to the economy, Ramglon (2004) in Carribean exchange 
rate has been operational but not so significantly, Al-Mashat and Billmeier (2007) in 
Egypt exchange rate channel plays a strong role in propagating monetary shocks to 
output and prices, Samkharadze (2008) in Georgia exchange rate is effective 
particularly in determining inflation, Ornek (2009) in Turkey exchange rate channel is 
effective and Battacharya, Patnaik and Shah (2011) in emerging economies exchange 
rate is effective. 
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3.2.4 Asset price channel  
This channel focuses on the simulating effect of higher asset prices (such as equities 
and housing) on household consumption and aggregate demand (Mishkin, 2004; 
Pedram, Shirinbakhsh & Afshar, 2011:214; Huiang, 2012:3). This is in agreement with 
the monetarist view that the concentration should focus on all relative asset prices and 
real wealth. The effect of asset prices extends beyond those operating through interest 
rates, exchange rates and equity prices (Metzler, 1995). The impact of monetary policy 
shocks on market interest rates affects not only short-term but also long-term interest 
rates. This is because economic agents do not expect monetary policy actions to be 
reversed so quickly, hence the impact of monetary policy actions also spreads to long-
term interest rates. Changes in long-term interest rates could have an impact on asset 
prices to an extent that depends on the expectations of other variables affecting those 
prices and on expected future policy actions (MPC, 2003).  For example, a decline in 
monetary policy can lead to a decline in land and property values, which in turn leads to 
a decline in household wealth and thus a decline in consumption and aggregate output. 
This is in support of the argument of Taylor (1995) that changes in long-term interest 
rates do not affect the price of financial assets only; but also the price of physical assets 
such as durable consumption goods, real estate and business equipment. Changes in 
asset prices, whether financial or physical, will affect individuals‘ spending and savings 
decisions and, therefore, will affect real income and the inflation rate (Pedram et al, 
2011:216-217).  
 
There are various studies that empirically tested this particular channel. For example, 
Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2002) studied monetary policy transmission in Thailand. 
They found that from 1993 to 2001, the interest rate channel played the dominant role in 
transmission in Thailand and accounted for almost half of the transmission to the real 
sector. This study compared the relative importance of each channel; however, the 
bank lending channel, the exchange rate channel and the asset price channel each 
contributed to the pass-through of monetary policy by around 17 per cent, while the 
interest rate channel accounted for the rest, which represented almost half of the total 
transmission to the real economy. 
91 
 
Chirinko, de Haan and Sterken (2004) examined the response of the economies of 11 
EU countries plus Japan to shocks in housing and equity prices. The effects are 
assessed with an SVAR model and the findings are that housing price shocks generally 
have a substantially positive impact on output, while equity price shocks have a very 
modest effect. Housing price shocks affect real activity through consumption and are 
related to cross-country home ownership patterns. Variance decompositions indicate 
that monetary policy reacts to equity price shocks but not to housing price shocks. 
These results suggest that the task of choosing an appropriate monetary policy for 
several countries with differing institutional characteristics is complicated by asset 
shocks and their impact on the real sectors of the aggregate economy. Similar results 
were obtained by Giuliodori (2005) who used a number of VAR models to estimate the 
role of housing prices in transmission of monetary policy for nine European countries 
over the pre-EMU period. The results showed that house prices could enhance the 
effects of interest rate shocks on consumer spending in economies where housing and 
mortgage markets are relatively more developed and competitive. 
 
Bjørnland and Jacobsen (2008) also analysed the role of house prices in the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism in the USA, using structural VARs. The model is 
estimated for the US.A using quarterly data from 1983Q1 to 2007Q4.The VAR is 
identified using a combination of short-run and long-run (neutrality) restrictions, allowing 
for contemporaneous interaction between monetary policy and various asset prices. By 
allowing the interest rate and asset prices to react simultaneously to news, the role of 
house prices in the monetary transmission mechanism is found to increase 
considerably. In particular, following a monetary policy shock that raises the interest rate 
by one percentage point, house prices fall immediately by 1 per cent, to decline by a 
total of 4-5 per cent after three years. Furthermore, the fall in house prices enhances 
the negative response in output and consumer price inflation that has traditionally been 
found in the conventional literature. 
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Elbourne (2008) used an eight-variable SVAR approach, two-stage approach, and 
counterfactual simulation in investigating the role of house price changes in the UK. The 
results showed that about 12-15 per cent of the decline in consumption following an 
interest rate shock could be explained by the combined effect of house wealth and 
credit effects associated with house price changes. 
A paper by Yao, Luo and Loh (2011) paper investigates the dynamic and long-run 
relationships between monetary policy and asset prices in China using monthly data 
from June 2005 to September 2010. Johansen‘s co-integration approach based on VAR 
and Granger causality test are used to identify the long-run relationships and directions 
of causality between asset prices and monetary variables. Empirical results show that 
monetary policies have little immediate effect on asset prices.  
Ncube and Ndou (2011) estimated an SVAR model based on Elbourne‘s (2008) work to 
model the disaggregated South African Absa house prices. They showed that 
consumption could decline owing to the combined effect of house wealth and credit 
changes following a monetary policy tightening by 9.8 per cent in all-size, 3.7 per cent in 
small-size, 4.7 per cent in medium-size and 5.3 per cent in large-size houses. 
 
In Iran, Pedram, Shirinbakhsh and Afshar (2011) looked at the role of house prices in 
transmission of monetary shocks to consumption, as the largest component of 
aggregate demands. Residential investments in Iran were studied. An SVAR model was 
developed based on 1990Q1 to 2009Q2 data and a counterfactual simulation approach. 
The results showed that changes in house prices could cause about 38 per cent of the 
rise in consumption and about 67 per cent of the rise in residential investment followed 
by a monetary shock. Therefore, house prices can be considered as an important 
indicator of the assessment of the effects of monetary changes on real activity. 
 
Misati and Nyamongo‘s (2012) study investigates the effectiveness of the asset price 
channel in monetary policy transmission and the effect of stock market volatility on 
monetary policy in Kenya. The study uses quarterly data on Kenya covering the period 
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1996Q1 to 2009Q2 and specifically uses the VAR approach in analysing policy shocks 
on macroeconomic variables. The study finds that there is evidence that the asset price 
channel of monetary policy transmission in Kenya is mixed. Secondly, while the effect of 
monetary policy on stock price volatility is not significant, stock market volatility creates 
instability in monetary policy variables, implying that information from the stock market 
may be important in predicting the business cycle. 
 
3.2.5 Exchange rate pass-through  
The main theoretical basis for the concept of exchange rate pass through (ERPT) is the 
law of one price (LOOP) and purchasing power parity (PPP). The LOOP states that 
identical products should sell for the same common-currency price in different countries. 
If the LOOP holds for all products between two countries, the absolute purchasing 
power parity theory of exchange rates would also be valid between the two countries. 
However, the assumptions for maintaining the strong version of PPP are very restrictive 
because, ―there is instantaneous costless and frictionless arbitrage and secondly [the] 
same goods enter the basket of goods with the same weight in every country‖ (Eckstein 
and Soffer, 2008:335). 
 
Before proceeding any further, it is important to define the ERPT. Goldberg and Knetter 
(1997) define the ERPT as the percentage change in local currency import prices 
resulting from a 1 per cent change in the exchange rate between exporting and the 
importing countries. Similarly, Menon (1994) defines the ERPT as the degree to which 
exchange rate changes are reflected in the destination currency prices of traded goods. 
However, ERPT also refers to the effects of exchange rates on domestic inflation. 
 
 An exchange rate change which is not accompanied by a change in a local currency in 
the price of goods would be considered as a divergence from the LOOP. It is expected 
that demand and supply mechanisms will bring about the necessary change in local 
prices to bring foreign and domestic prices back to the same level. If this is true, this 
assumption implies that ERPT should be complete and might be close to 100 per cent 
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in the very long run. Literature does discuss reasons as to why the LOOP and PPP do 
not actually hold, alternatively why they are not actually observed. Some of these 
reasons are that, even if the LOOP does hold, it should hold only for tradable goods, 
and even for these products there is a significant component of locally sold services 
(Driver and Westaway, 2004). 
 
In general, the standard model based on the Ballassa-Samuelson hypothesis vindicates 
that a change in the exchange rate as a result of a productivity shock would not pass 
through to the price of non-tradables, and thus would result in a change in the real 
exchange rate. An exchange rate change which results from a nominal shock due to 
monetary policy action would in the long run pass through to the prices of both sectors 
(Eckstein & Soffer, 2008:335). 
 
Other reasons discussed in the literature are that the LOOP may not hold because of 
differences in taxation policy across countries, as well as trade barriers and 
transportation costs. Another reason has to do with the degree of competitiveness of 
different markets. If firms have some monopolistic power, they could ―price to market‖, 
and that could result in different prices in each market.  
 
Since a 100 per cent pass-through is rarely recorded in empirical studies, it is important 
to distinguish between pass-through to prices of imports and pass-through to all 
consumer prices. The former case would rely on the assumption of low non-tradable 
components together with the theory that would predict close to complete pass-through, 
and this is indeed often recorded. However, the focus is on pass-through of changes in 
the exchange rate to all consumer prices (Eckstein & Soffer, 2008:335). 
 
Dornbusch (1987) discussed the alternative to complete pass-through: the incomplete 
pass-through via models by introducing the degree of market concentration, the extent 
of product homogeneity and the relative market shares of domestic and foreign firms. 
This model shows that if there is oligopolistic competition and/or import and domestic 
goods are imperfect substitutes,  ERPT can be less than unity as firms strategically 
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modify their pricing behaviour and consumers change their pattern of consumption to 
increase or decrease imported goods. In the same fashion Baldwin (1988), Dixit (1989) 
and Baldwin and Krugman (1989) also indicated that owing to the irrevocable sunk 
costs firms are less likely to enter a market following a temporary and/or small 
exchange rate change. Depending on the large sunk costs, existing firms are also 
discouraged from leaving the market, and may continue to serve the market without 
even covering its variable costs. 
 
Other studies took the angle of new open economy macroeconomics, dealing with the 
responsiveness of consumer prices to exchange rates. These studies arise from recent 
empirical evidence that actually argues that consumer prices are not affected much by 
nominal exchange rates (Engel, 2002; Obstfeld & Rogoff, 1996).  On the other hand, 
some recent studies emphasise the importance of macroeconomic conditions on ERPT. 
For example, Taylor (2000) argues that the recent decline in pass-through or pricing 
power is due to the low inflation environment that has recently been achieved in many 
countries.  
 
There are various empirical studies on this subject. McFarlane‘s (2002) study analysed 
the relationship between the exchange rate and prices in Jamaica and indicated how 
this had evolved over the previous 12 years. Using monthly data for January 1990 to 
December 2001, he employed a vector error commercial model (VECM), impulse 
response function and variance decomposition. The results indicate that, in the long run, 
the ERPT is ‗complete‘. However, the extent of the pass-through has slowed in recent 
years, in part because of the shift to a tighter monetary policy regime and increased 
competition. 
 
Sahminan‘s (2002) study estimated the ERPT for the three Southeast Asian countries: 
Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines. Time series of quarterly data from 1974:1 to 
2000:3 for Thailand and Singapore, and from 1974:1 to 1991:4 for the Philippines was 
used. This study employed co-integration and the error correction model (ECM). The 
results of the co-integration analysis show that in the long run the rates of ERPT into 
96 
 
import prices in Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines are 0.647, 0.408, and 1.433, 
respectively. The results of the ERM show that, in the short run, the exchange rate does 
not have a significant effect on import prices in Thailand and Singapore, but has a 
significantly negative effect in the Philippines. In Thailand and Singapore, in the short 
run, import prices appear to be influenced by foreign price and foreign demand rather 
than by the exchange rate. 
 
Alper (2003) studied the determinants and the evolution of the ERPT in domestic 
inflation in the Turkish economy. The analysis covers the period 1987 to 2003. In the 
analysis, the single-equation ECM is used to estimate the ERPT. Estimation results 
suggest that, as in other emerging countries, the degree of ERPT to domestic prices is 
high and the pass-through is completed in a very short time. Estimation results also 
indicate that the main factors to account for high pass-through are the past currency 
crisis and the high degree of openness of the economy. These factors create the 
ground for the indexation behaviour of agents. Although the above-mentioned factors 
are the main determinants of the degree of ERPT, the persistency and the volatility of 
exchange rates can significantly affect the short run dynamics of the pass-through. The 
results imply that even if the pass-through slows down in reaction to the changing 
pattern of exchange rates, to achieve low and stable inflation in the long run, 
fundamental factors that exacerbate the link between exchange rates and prices should 
change. 
 
Using VAR analysis on monthly data from January 1993 to August 2005, Ito and Sato‘s 
(2006) study examines the pass-through effects of exchange rate changes on domestic 
prices in the East Asian economies using a VAR analysis. The main results are that (1) 
the degree of  ERPT to import prices was quite high in the crisis-hit economies; (2) the 
pass-through to CPI was generally low, with the notable exception of Indonesia: and (3) 
in Indonesia, both the impulse response of monetary policy variables to exchange rate 
shocks and that of CPI to monetary policy shocks are positive, large, and statistically 
significant. Thus, Indonesia‘s accommodative monetary policy, coupled with the high 
degree of CPI responsiveness to exchange rate changes, was an important factor in the 
97 
 
spiralling effects of domestic price inflation and sharp nominal exchange rate 
depreciation in the post-crisis period. 
 
In Colombia, Rowland (n.d.) looked at ERPT to domestic prices in Colombia. This study 
used two different econometric frameworks to study ERPT to import, producer and 
consumer prices in Colombia. Both frameworks are based on VAR models, the first 
using an unrestricted VAR model, and the second using the Johansen framework of 
multivariate co-integration. ERPT is shown to be incomplete. Import prices, 
nevertheless, respond quickly to an exchange rate change; about 80 per cent of such a 
change is passed onto prices of imports within 12 months. The corresponding figure for 
producer prices is 28 per cent and for consumer prices less than 15 per cent; for 
consumer prices the two different frameworks yield rather different results. It can 
therefore be concluded that pass-through is modest for producer prices and very limited 
for consumer prices. An exchange rate shock, therefore, has little impact on consumer 
price inflation. 
 
Table 3.2.5 in the appendix also presents additional empirical studies on exchange rate 
pass-through. McCarthy (2000) conducted a study in industrialized countries where the 
results revealed that exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices is modest. 
Wimalasuriya (2005) in Sri-Lanka found that there is evidence of exchange rate pass-
through. Beirne and Bijsterbosch (2009) in Central and Eastern Europe findings were 
that there is evidence of high exchange rate pass-through and even higher in countries 
with fixed exchange rate. 
 
3.2.6 A Currency Board Framework of Monetary Transmission  
For small open economies the transmission mechanism in a Currency Board 
Framework also requires particular attention as it plays a big role in monetary policy 
transmission. Uanguta and Ikhide (2002) discussed it as follow. The monetary rule 
requires that a change in the monetary base should only be brought about by a parallel 
change in foreign reserves at a fixed exchange rate. The process requires some form of 
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convertibility undertaking for the currency board to convert domestic currency into 
foreign reserves at a fixed exchange rate. The basic requirement is that the settlement 
of transactions arising from the convertibility undertaking be effected through the 
monetary base in order that the automatic adjustment mechanism under a currency 
board system can function to ensure exchange rate stability. Moreover, the currency 
board is also required and expected to hold the amount of foreign reserves adequate to 
meet restfully the anticipated reduction in the monetary base in stress conditions. In this 
case the monetary rule is more focused on the flow rather than the stock of the 
monetary base.  
 
The obvious question would be how is the money supply process in the currency board 
arrangement? Uanguta and Ikhide (2002) answered this question as follow. Apropos to 
the stability of the fixed exchange rate arrangement is the agile functioning of the 
transmission mechanism inherent in the money supply process in the arrangement. 
Monetary base constitutes the notes and coins issued by the Currency board together 
with the deposits held by commercial banks at the currency board. Therefore, strictly, a 
currency board cannot determine the monetary base given a fixed exchange rate with 
the reserve currency and a fixed reserve ratio of 100 per cent foreign reserves. This 
precludes the possibility of the currency board increasing the monetary base at its own 
discretion. A typical central bank can increase the monetary base at its discretion by 
lending to commercial banks, thus creating reserves for them even if its foreign reserves 
fall in the process. On the contrary, a currency board cannot influence the relationship 
between the monetary base and the money supply because it does not have discretion 
to create reserves for commercial banks in an inflationary manner as it is done by a 
conventional central bank. The money supply in a currency board system is fully 
determined by the balance of payments (BoP) and it is responsive to changes in 
demand. The currency board acquiring foreign reserves can expand it. The easiest way 
to acquire foreign reserves and consequently expand the money supply is for a 
currency board to run a current account surplus for example an excess of exports over 
imports.  Hence, the monetary process in this system is automatic, as it is self-adjusting 
provided the various actors in the system do not tamper with the transmission process. 
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Lessons   
There are lessons to be learnt from these studies. Firstly, there are similarities in the 
sense that the interest rate, credit and exchange rate channels all appear to be effective 
in most cases. However, there are variations in the significance of the impact. Secondly, 
the VAR technique appears to be the most useful tool in illustrating a macro view of 
interrelation among all channels of the transmission mechanism. In particular, the 
SVAR, a hybrid of the VAR, appears to be predominant when it comes to empirical 
analysis of monetary policy transmission mechanisms. It has been applied in developed 
countries, emerging markets and quasi-emerging markets. This justifies the use of a 
similar approach in this study.  
 
In the case of Namibia, the only study that comes close to the issue of monetary policy 
transmission is that of Uanguta and Ikhide (2002). However, there are gaps. Firstly, this 
study only looked at interest rate and the credit channel, leaving a gap by not examining 
the exchange rate channel. Secondly, there was no further exercise in this regard, 
meaning that  nine years passed without any data being gathered and changes in the 
interest rate channel of monetary policy now available in Namibia. The effect of such a 
gap is evident in literature; notable contradictions emerged from other empirical studies, 
particularly in the case of the interest rate channel. In the case of Kenya Cheng (2006) 
and Maturu (2007), for example, found contradicting results despite the fact that they 
used a similar approach and the time-gap was only one year. Thirdly, there is evidence 
that the exchange rate channel can also be effective in transmitting monetary policy 
actions. A particularly interesting issue in this regard is that all these countries are 
developing countries and most of them have small open economies. Furthermore some 
countries, such as Latvia, practice a pegged or fixed exchange rate, which is what 
Namibia practises. These are satisfactory reasons for a new study (research) on the 
interest rate, credit and exchange rate channel of monetary policy transmission in 
Namibia. Although Uanguta and Ikhide‘s study provides very useful insights on the 
interest rate and credit channel of monetary policy transmission in Namibia, it remains a 
research question whether the same can be said after nine years. Furthermore, this 
study differs from that of Ikhide and Uanguta in two aspects. Firstly, it will employ the 
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structural VAR technique in analysing this particular channel and secondly it will 
estimate the money effect model. The issue of non-stationarity was addressed 
differently in different studies, making it very difficult to generalise and compare the 
findings.  
 
In the case of ERPT there is evidence that the extent to which this occurs varies from 
country to country. ERPT has been found to be incomplete in many countries. However, 
it depends on the relative importance of the specific factors that determine the degree of 
ERPT in a country. Most of these studies involved developing countries, particularly 
small open economies. Furthermore, some countries practice a pegged or fixed 
exchange rate, which is what Namibia practices. In literature on Namibia the only study 
that comes close to examining ERPT is that of Gaomab II (1998), which revealed that in 
the long run about 70 per cent of the increase in prices in Namibia, occurs a result of an 
increase in South African prices. (South African prices are used as a proxy for foreign 
prices in that particular study.) There was no further exercise in this regard, which led to 
a gap of 13 years in the accumulation of data and different experiences with regard to 
exchange rate changes and monetary policy now available in Namibia. Hence, there is 
a need for a renewed study (research) on the ERPT in Namibia.  
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3.3 Conclusions  
This chapter reviewed an extensive body of literature, examining the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism both theoretically and empirically. The study focussed on 
monetary-induced changes in the financial market, which in turn alter output and price 
level. So far four channels have been identified, namely the traditional interest rate 
channel, credit channel, exchange rate channel and asset price channel.  Since the 
exchange rate channel is crucial for open economies, it was found necessary to extend 
the study to determine how changes in the exchange rate alter relative prices, better 
known as ERPT.  
 
The literature on empirical studies on the monetary policy transmission mechanism 
specifically focussed on the details of the various channels of monetary policy 
transmission. It emerged that the empirical findings are conflicting, despite the fact that 
the same methodology was employed, namely the VAR. However, there are variations; 
some studies employed a general VAR framework without identifying restrictions and 
the plausibility of impulse responses to monetary policy shocks. 
 
Most of these studies, if not all of them, employed the VAR; however, the issue of non-
stationarity was addressed differently across studies. Some studies did not bother to 
test for a unit root, while others decided to leave the data in level form in fear of 
distorting the long-run information. This makes it very difficult to generalise and 
compare the findings. Hence, it is necessary that a country case study be conducted to 
determine what can be said about each specific country.  
 
In the case of ERPT there is evidence that the extent to which this occurs varies from 
country to country. ERPT has been found to be incomplete in many countries. However, 
it depends on the relative importance of the specific factors that determine the degree of 
ERPT in a country. Most of these studies involve developing countries, particularly small 
open economies. Furthermore, some countries practice pegged or fixed exchange rate, 
which is what Namibia practices. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
  
4. METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the methodology to be followed and the techniques to be applied 
to examine the monetary policy transmission mechanism in Namibia. In the section on 
empirical literature it is evident that the VAR approach, in particular the structural VAR, 
is a predominant approach in studies analysing MPT. This being the case, it is therefore 
important that an overview of this approach be discussed to enhance and enrich 
understanding of how this methodology works. This chapter is divided into six sections. 
Section 4.2 discusses the theoretical framework which is the theoretical basis/anchor. 
Section 4.3 presents the empirical models of the different channels estimated. Section 
4.4 outlines the analytical framework in particular the VAR or SVAR methodology in 
detail. This discussion includes the pros, cons, and justification for using this technique 
in analysing the monetary transmission mechanism in Namibia. It also extends to the 
presentation of the SVAR mainframe for elucidation of Namibia‘s monetary transmission 
process. The discussion of matters pertaining to data: sources and measurements 
makes up section 4.5.  
 
4.2 Theoretical Framework 
 
As other central banks in the world, the Bank of Namibia‘s ultimate objective of 
monetary policy is price stability (BON, 2008:8). In practice central banks have 
additional objectives other than price stability. On the basis of this the theoretical 
framework of this study is based on the seminal work by Taylor (1993) on using 
monetary policy rules. One practical issue in the Taylor rule is the monetary policy 
objectives. According to this rule there are only two objectives of monetary policy: 
output and inflation (Malik, 2007:5). Furthermore, the Taylor rule specifies how a central 
bank should alter its nominal interest rate in a systematic manner in response to 
developments in inflation and macroeconomic activity (Orphanides, 2007:6).  
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Based on a seminal paper, Taylor (1993) suggests a very specific and simple rule for 
monetary policy. The original formulation is shown in the following equation:  
 
)(5.0*)(5.0* tttt yri                 (4.1) 
 
where  
 
ti = Central bank policy rate  
*r = Equilibrium real interest rate  
t = Average inflation rate over the contemporaneous and prior three quarters 
*  = Inflation target of the central bank  
ty = Output gap (100 x (real GDP-potential GDP) / potential GDP).  
 
This simple rule was based on the assumption of a closed economy. These are 
economies where the exchange rate channel of monetary policy is critical in the 
transmission mechanism. 
 
Monetary policy objectives are often summarised by a monetary authority‘s loss 
function. Then depending on the monetary policy framework, policy instrument is 
characterised by either explicit reaction function like the Taylor type rule or by an implicit 
reaction function in inflation targeting rules. But whatever is the policy framework, the 
objective of the monetary policy remains to minimise the loss function defined over 
certain variables. In the literature, loss function is normally defined over two main 
objectives: inflation and output (Romer, 2001) as, 
 
*),(   ttt yfL                  (4.2) 
 
Where ty  is is deviation of output from potential level while t and 
* are current and 
target level of inflation, respectively. 
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However, in practice, central banks have more than two objectives. For instance, 
Mishkin (2001) states six objectives of monetary policy: employment, economic growth, 
price stability, interest rate stability, financial sector stability, and exchange rate 
stabilisation. So a number of researchers, when estimating the Taylor rule or monetary 
policy reaction function, have included different variables/targets in the reaction 
function. So if we take all of the objectives of monetary policy in the loss function then it 
becomes: 
 
),,*,,( 1
t
tt
t
ttttttt iiereriiyfL                 (4.3) 
 
Where ti  is policy instrument rate, er and 
ter  are exchange rate and trend value of 
exchange rate and fi is the foreign interest rate. In this case the reaction function will 
depend on all these variables, i.e. 
 
),,*,,( 1
t
tt
t
ttttttt iiereriiyii                 (4.4) 
 
One important point of discussion is that although this function explains how interest 
rate would change when any of the variables in the loss function changes, complete 
modelling of the short interest rate requires inclusion of other variables in the reaction 
function that significantly explains variation in the interest rate. This is important in 
estimation process as two variables might be correlated because of their joint 
correlation with a third variable that is missing. In this case, one may find significant 
impact of a variable because of another missing variable. The theoretical discussion of 
how changes in the monetary policy instrument—the short interest rate affect the 
monetary policy objectives and how the other factors in the reaction function affect the 
interest rate has been highlighted in the theoretical literature. The empirical models 
follow in the next section. 
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4.3 Empirical Models 
 
The focus of this study is to measure the relative importance of the various channels of 
monetary policy transmission. In order to appraise the monetary transmission process, 
the various empirical models are constructed. These models include the generic model 
and other specific models of the various transmission channels. Four channels are 
considered, the interest rate channel, the credit channel, the exchange rate channel and 
money effect model.  
 
The modeling strategy used in this study is based on the idea that the complex 
interaction between the real and nominal sides of the economy implied by the various 
channels of the transmission mechanism can be capture, empirically, within structural 
VAR and structural VECM models. In designing such models specific attention has to 
be paid to both long and short run relations between economic variables. These 
relations are based on economic theory. The theoretical basis for the choice of the 
variables that enters the various structural VARs are discussed below. 
 
The supply side of the economy can be represented by the aggregate supply (AS). It is 
described that AS is where expected inflation and potential output evolve over time. In 
addition to the supply side relation, the model also builds on portfolio balance and 
arbitrage relations. Based on the portfolio theory, money demand can be specified as a 
function of a scale factor and a vector of relative rates of return as the model includes 
three assets (M2, short term bills and long terms bonds). Furthermore, the models also 
leans on the theory of term structure which shows one arbitrage relationship links which 
yields on short term bills and long term bonds. Other arbitrage relationships can be 
described by Fisher parity and also under stock market. In case of Fisher, an arbitrage 
relationship links the rate of return on capital with the short term interest rate, where 
interest rate is a sum of the real short term interest rate and the inflation risk premium.  
 
The other theoretical basis is that of IS equation where it is assumed that the goods 
market equilibrium output is negatively related to the long term real interest rate 
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(investment component), positively related to stock market price index (Tobin‘s q effect/ 
balance sheets component) and also depends on the nature of a shock, for example a 
transitory shock, possibly related to fiscal policy. The joint equilibrium in financial and 
goods markets determines aggregate demand (AD). On the assumption that the short 
term interest rate is the policy variable, then the short term Fisher parity can be 
considered as the rule for setting the short term rate by the monetary authority. 
 
The AD/AS deals with short term macroeconomic equilibrium where output and inflation 
gaps can be solved for. The model predicts that short and long term interest rate 
innovations have a negative impact on inflation and output. The theoretical model 
presented above shows that there are two possible ways of thinking about monetary 
policy in the model, in other words it involves two dimensions: medium to long term, is 
the setting of inflation objective reflected in excess nominal growth of money. Another, 
short term, is maintaining inflation on track by changing short term interest rates taking 
into account all shocks hitting the economy. However, there is an additional component 
that captures non-systematic determinants of monetary policy.   
 
4.3.1 The generic model 
Evaluation of the monetary transmission process begins with a simple three-variable 
generic (basic) VAR model. The vector of endogenous variables included in the model 
is presented in equation (4.5): 
 
 tttt RCPGYY 
'                  (4.5) 
 
with tGY  denoting output growth, tCP the rate of inflation; R is the repo rate. Following 
the identification scheme of the system of equations, the equation separating structural 
economic shocks from the estimated reduced form residuals for the generic model is 
presented as:  
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4.3.2 Interest rate channel 
The vector of endogenous variables for the interest rate channel model includes: 
 
 RLRSCPGYY ttt ,
'                  (4.7) 
 
with tGY  denoting output growth, tCP the rate of inflation; RS is the short-term 
interest rate, represented by the three-month Treasury Bills or money market rates and 
RL is the long-term interest rate, represented by 10-year government bond. The 
equation separating structural economic shocks from the estimated reduced form 
residuals for the interest rate channel model is presented as:  
 




























RL
t
RS
t
CP
t
GY
t
a
a




100
0100
001
0001
43
21





























RL
t
RS
t
CP
t
GY
t
b
b
b
b




44
33
22
11
000
000
000
000
          (4.8) 
            
4.3.3 The credit channel 
The vector of endogenous variables for the credit channel entails: 
 
 RBLCPGYY ttt ,
'                        (4.9) 
with tGY  denoting output growth, tCP the rate of inflation; BLare the bank loans and 
R is the repo rate. The equation separating structural economic shocks from the 
estimated reduced form residuals for the credit channel model is presented as:  
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4.3.4 Exchange rate channel 
The vector of endogenous variables of the exchange rate model includes: 
 
 RXRCPGYY ttt ,
'              (4.11) 
 
with tGY  denoting output growth, tCP the rate of inflation; XR is the exchange rate 
and R is the repo rate. The equation separating structural economic shocks from the 
estimated reduced form residuals for the exchange rate model is presented as:  
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4.3.5 The money effect model 
The vector of endogenous variables for the money effect model includes: 
 
 RMCPGYY ttt ,2
'            (4.13) 
 
with tGY  denoting output growth, tCP the rate of inflation; 2M is the aggregate money 
supply and R is the repo rate. The equation separating structural economic shocks from 
the estimated reduced form residuals for the money effect model is presented as:  
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4.3.6 Exchange rate pass-through model 
The vector of endogenous variables for the exchange rate pass-through is: 
 
],,,[' CPGYSCPSAYt              (4.15) 
 
with tGY  denoting output growth, tCP the rate of inflation; 2M is the aggregate money 
supply and R is the repo rate. The equation separating structural economic shocks from 
the estimated reduced form residuals for the exchange rate pass-through model is 
presented as:  
 
.      (4.16)  
 
In order to examine a reinforcing mechanism between domestic prices and the 
exchange rate, a VAR analysis is considered appropriate. Studies such as those of 
McCarthy (2000), Hahn (2003) and Faruqee (2004) use a VAR approach for an analysis 
of pass-through of several types of shocks to domestic inflation. Although the VAR 
approach is used in the first instance, the study will explore the use of the single-
equation approach further because the pass-through question is to examine the 
direction from the exchange rate to domestic prices. There is a large body of literature 
on pass-through effects, with a single-equation regression explaining the responses of a 
domestic price index from the changes in the exchange rate. See, for example, 
Feenstra (1989), Olivei (2002), Campa and Goldberg (2005), Campa, Goldberg and 
Gonzáles-Mínguez (2005), Otani, Shiratsuka and Shirota (2005). 
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Following Oyinlola (2009) and Takhtamanova (2010), this study adopts the following 
specification for estimating the degree of ERPT to domestic prices in Namibia. This 
price-generating process incorporates the following factors:  
lnCPt =α0 +α1 lnCPt-1  + α2 lnSt +α3 lnCPSAt +α4 lnM2t + µt…………………...........…(4.17) 
 
where all the other variables are as defined above while St is the nominal effective 
exchange rate and CPSAt is the CPI for South Africa. 
 
4.4 Analytical Framework 
 
To assess the monetary policy transmission mechanism in Namibia, the VAR approach 
is used. The choice of this approach is influenced by the fact that the VAR technique 
appears to be the most useful tool in illustrating a macro view of interrelation among all 
channels of the transmission mechanism. In particular, the SVAR, a hybrid of the VAR, 
appears to have been widely used in an empirical analysis of monetary policy 
transmission mechanisms (McCoy & McMahon, 2000; Ford et al 2003). It has been 
applied in cases of developed countries, emerging markets and quasi-emerging 
markets. This justifies the use of a similar approach in this study.  
  
VAR models were first introduced by Sims (1980) as an alternative to traditional large-
scale dynamic simultaneous equation models. The emphasis was the need to model all 
endogenous variables jointly rather than one equation at a time. There is a large 
literature on the specification and estimation of the reduced-form VAR models (see 
Watson 1994, Lutkepohl 2005, 2011). The achievements of such VAR models as 
descriptive tools and to some extent as forecasting tools is also well acknowledged 
(Enders, 1995). He states:  
 
―Even though the model is under identified, an appropriately specified model will have 
forecasts that are unbiased and have minimum variance.”  
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The ability of structural representation of VAR models to differentiate between 
correlation and causation remains a contentious point.  
 
VAR is a system of dynamic linear equations where all the variables in the system are 
treated as endogenous. The reduced form of the system gives one equation for each 
variable, which specifies that variable as a function of the lagged values of its own and 
all other variables in the system. The reduced-form VAR time series model can be 
estimated by ordinary least squares (Thomas, 1996). However, Sims (1980) highlighted 
that the parameters estimated in the reduced form of VAR are not suitable to make 
inferences about long-run relationships. He argued that a reasonable economic 
interpretation is credible from the estimated reduced form of VAR by exploiting the long-
term structural disturbances through the analysis of the system‘s responses to typical 
random shocks after transforming the residuals to an orthogonal form.  
 
The principal interest in VARs arose due to the disagreement among economists 
regarding the economy‘s true structure. Hence, VAR practitioners thought that important 
dynamic characteristics of the economy could be revealed by these models without 
imposing structural restrictions from a particular economic theory. The dynamic 
indicators (impulse responses and variance decompositions) were initially obtained by a 
mechanical technique which was believed to be unrelated to economic theory. Cooley 
and LeRoy (1985), however, argued that this method, which is often described as 
atheoretical, actually implies ―a particular economic structure that is difficult to reconcile 
with economic theory‖. This criticism led to the development of a ―structural‖ VAR 
approach by Bernanke (1986), Blanchard and Watson (1986) and Sims (1986). This 
technique allows the use of economic theory as a tool to transform the reduce VAR 
model into a system of structural equations. The parameters are estimated by imposing 
contemporaneous structural restrictions. The crucial difference between atheoretical 
and structural VARs is that the latter yield impulse responses and variance 
decompositions that can be given structural interpretations. 
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Atheoretical VAR practitioners separate the residuals into orthogonal shocks by 
calculating a Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix for the residuals. This 
statistical decomposition depends on the succession in which the variables are ordered. 
The use of the Cholesky decomposition imposes a restriction on the ordering of the 
variables in the VAR. The policy indicative variable should be placed first in the system 
if it is assumed not to receive instant feedbacks from the innovations of other variables, 
while it should be placed last if it receives instant feedback from those innovations. This 
is due to the sequential nature of responses in the system, where each variable 
responds only to changes in the innovations of those variables that precede it, while the 
shock to that variable affects only the innovations of the variables that succeed it 
(Mousa, 2010).  In practice, atheoretical VAR studies report results from various 
orderings. The total number of possible orderings of the system is n!, a number that 
increases rapidly with n.‘ Canvassers sometimes note that certain properties of the 
model are insensitive to alternative orderings. The fact remains that result sensitive to 
VAR orderings are difficult to interpret, especially if a recursive economic structure is 
implausible (Keating, 1992:43). 
 
This atheoretical approach has also been criticized by Cooley and LeRoy (1985). First, 
if the Cholesky technique is in fact atheoretical, then the estimated shocks are not 
structural and will generally be linear combinations of the structural disturbances. 
Therefore, in this case, standard VAR analysis is difficult to interpret because the 
impulse responses and variance decompositions for the Cholesky shocks will be 
complicated functions of the dynamic effects of all the structural disturbances. Second, 
since Cholesky decompositions are atheoretical the Cholesky ordering can be 
interpreted as a recursive contemporaneous structural model. On the contrary, most 
economic theories do not imply recursive contemporaneous systems. Such criticisms of 
the atheoretical approach give advantage to structural approaches to VAR modeling. 
However, if economic theory predicts a contemporaneous recursive economic structure, 
a particular Cholesky factorization of the covariance matrix for the residuals is 
appropriate. Nevertheless, a researcher using the structural approach would not 
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experiment with various orderings, unless these specifications were predicted by 
alternative theories. 
 
To avoid the impact of the ordering restriction, there is a particular way of dealing with it; 
some researchers introduced the generalized impulse response functions (GIRF) as an 
alternate tool to the traditional Cholesky impulse response and variance decomposition 
(Koop et al, 1996; Pesaran & Shin, 1998). Furthermore, it is said that the traditional 
Cholesky impulse response and variance decomposition is only applicable to the linear 
multiple time series models, while the generalised impulse response analysis can be 
used in both the linear and the nonlinear multivariate models (Koop et al, 1996). 
Pesaran and Shin (1998) suggest using the generalised impulse response in the 
analysis of linear multivariate models.  
 
The main advantage of the suggested generalised approach is that it does not need 
orthogonalisation of shocks and is therefore not affected by the ordering of the variables 
used in the VAR model. Pesaran and Shin (1998) argue that while there are many re-
parameterisation alternatives to calculate the orthogonalised impulse responses without 
clear guidance to the preferable one, the generalised impulse responses are unique and 
take full account of the historical patterns of correlations between different shocks. 
Pesaran and Shin (1998) also show that in a non-diagonal error variance matrix, the 
orthogonalised and the generalised impulse responses are equivalent only for the first 
equation in the VAR. One major disadvantage of the generalised impulse response 
approach, however, is that one could not obtain the variance decomposition for any 
single equation of the system, which makes it impossible to distinguish between the 
direct impact of the policy shock on any single variable in the system and the impact 
resulting from innovations in other variables of the system. 
 
An alternative structural VAR method, developed by Shapiro and Watson (1988) and 
Blanchard and Quah (1989), utilizes long-run restrictions to identify the economic 
structure from the reduced form. Such models have long-run characteristics that are 
consistent with the theoretical restrictions used to identify parameters. Moreover, they 
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often exhibit sensible short-run properties as well and for these reasons, many 
economists believe that structural VARs may unlock economic information embedded in 
the reduced-form time series model. 
 
Another issue of SVAR models is that of non-stationarity. Sims, Stock and Watson 
(1990) paper shows that one can proceed with estimation of the SVAR in levels 
irrespective of whether the variables are stationary or not. The Sims, Stock and Watson 
paper demonstrates in part that the common practice of attempting to transform models 
to stationary form by difference or co-integration operators whenever it appears likely 
that the data are integrated is unnecessary because statistics of interest often have 
distributions that are unaffected by non-stationarity, which suggests that hypotheses 
can be tested without first transforming to stationary regressors. The issue, according to 
the study, is not whether the data are integrated, but rather whether the estimated 
coefficients or test statistics of interest have a distribution which is nonstandard if in fact 
the regressors are integrated. Mousa (2010:33-34) also argues that the choice between 
estimating the variables in levels and differenced variables is not clear. The determining 
factor is the co-integration analysis of the system. If the system of a set of non-
stationary variables is co-integrated, it is recommended to perform the VAR analysis 
using the variables in levels, while if co-integration does not exist, it is recommended to 
use the differenced variables. However, Enders (1995) argues that the abovementioned 
qualms are valid in the case of estimating a single structural equation. In performing the 
VAR analysis there should be no apprehensions regarding the non-stationarity for the 
variables. Hence, the VAR system could be estimated using the variables in levels.  
 
While the debate on whether to transform models to stationary form by difference or co-
integration operators when dealing with I(1) variables appears to lean towards the Sims, 
Stock and Watson (1990) conclusion, there are other authors that appeal to the 
traditional approach of transforming the data to stationary regressors prior to estimation, 
regardless of whether the point of focus is long-run or short-run relationships (see, for 
example, Enders, 2004). It has been proven that both procedures yield similar results 
(see Ngalawa and Viegi, 2011). There seem to be no clear-cut reference to this issue. 
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This study will therefore follow the procedure of the VAR analysis of the monetary 
transmission mechanism in Namibia using both the level variables and the first 
differences, depending on the stability of the VAR system. 
 
To draw the SVAR mainframe, assume that Namibia‘s monetary transmission process 
is described by a dynamic system whose structural form equation is given by: 
 
tptpttt ByyyAy   .....2211              (4.18) 
 
where A  is an invertible )( nn   matrix describing contemporaneous relations among the 
variables; ty  is an )1( n vector of endogenous variables such that; ntttt yyyy ,...,,( 21 ); 
 is a vector of constants; i  is an )( nn  matrix of coefficients of lagged endogenous 
variables ),...,3,2,1( pi  ; B is an )( nn matrix whose non-zero off-diagonal elements 
allow for direct effects of some shocks on more than one endogenous variable in the 
system; and t  are uncorrelated or orthogonal white-noise structural disturbances ie the 
covariance matrix of t  is an identity matrix 1)',( ttE  . Equation (4.18 can be 
rewritten in compact form as: 
 
titt ByLAy  )(               (4.19) 
  
where )(L  is a )( nn  finite order matrix polynomial in the lag operator .L  
 
As it is a practice analysis of a monetary transmission mechanism, using VAR models is 
about monetary policy shocks and their dynamic behaviour in the system. Monetary 
policy shocks are defined as unexpected deviations from the systematic behaviour of 
monetary policy. It is important to isolate autonomous disturbances emanating from 
monetary policy shocks from other types of shocks, which is carried out in SVARs 
(Vonnak, 2005; Ngalawa, 2009). The SVAR model is a structural-form relationship 
deduced from the reduced-form VAR. An SVAR is a standard VAR where the 
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restrictions needed for identification of the underlying structural model are provided by 
economic theory. These restrictions can be either contemporaneous or long-run 
restrictions. This depends on whether economic theory suggests the shocks are 
temporary or permanent in nature (McCoy, 1997:7).  
 
The SVAR presented in the primitive system of equations (4.18) and (4.19) cannot be 
estimated directly (Enders, 2004). However, the information in the system can be 
recovered by estimating a reduced form of VAR implicit in (4.18) and (4.19). Pre-
multiplying equation (4.18) by 1A yields a reduced form VAR of order p, which in 
standard matrix form is written as:   
titi
p
it
yy   10                 (4.20) 
 
where  10 A ; ii A 
1 ; and tt BA 
1  is an )1( n vector of error terms 
assumed to have zero means, constant variances and to be serially uncorrelated with 
all the right-hand side variables, as well as their own lagged values though they may be 
contemporaneously correlated across equations. The variance-covariance matrix of the 
regression residuals in equation (4.20) is defined as ).',( ttE   
Given the estimates 
of the reduced form VAR in equation (4.20), the structural economic shocks are 
separated from the estimated reduced form residuals by imposing restrictions on the 
parameters of matrices AandB in equation (4.21): 
 
tA = tB                   (4.21) 
 
which is derived from equation (4.20). The orthogonality assumption of the structural 
innovations ie ,1)',( ttE  and the constant variance-covariance matrix of the 
reduced-form equation residuals ie ).',( ttE   impose identifying restrictions on A  
andB as presented in equation (4.22):  
 
'' BBAA  ;              (4.22) 
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matrices AandB are both )( nn , a total of 22n  unknown elements can be identified upon 
which 2/)1( nn  restrictions are imposed by equation (4.21). To identify A and B, at 
least 2/)1(2 2  nnn other additional restrictions are required. These restrictions can be 
imposed in a number of ways. Sims (1980) suggested an approach of recursive 
factorisation based on a Cholesky decomposition of matrix .A  In this approach it is 
assumed that elements of matrix Aare recursively related and lower triangular. 
However, the shortcoming is that the identification of the structural shocks is dependent 
on the ordering of variables, with the most endogenous variable ordered last. Thus, with 
a given ordering the following outcomes can be stated: (1) the first variable will have no 
contemporaneous relationships with any other variables in the model, implying that its 
reduced form shock is identical to its structural shock; (2) the second variable will have 
contemporaneous interactions only with its own and the first structural shock; (3) the 
third variable is contemporaneously affected by its own and the first two structural 
shocks; and so on. Hence, in this framework, the system is just (exactly) identified 
(Ngalawa & Veig, 2011:4). 
 
Analysis of the SVAR will take two interlinked experiments. First, a generic model 
comprising the country‘s monetary policy goals and an operating target is estimated.  In 
this model output and price level enter as policy goals while the repo rate goes in as an 
operating target. The logic behind estimating the generic model is to establish how the 
two monetary policy goals respond to the operating target and to find out if monetary 
authorities react to changes in the policy goals. In the second stage of analysis the 
different monetary transmission mechanisms are evaluated, particularly the interest 
rate, bank lending, exchange rates and M2. They are separately appended to the 
generic model and estimated. A general identification scheme based on short run 
restrictions developed in a system of equations (4.19) is used for identifying structural 
shocks in each of the models. Analyses carried out in this study are only for the short 
run, while the long-run analysis will only be carried out for ERPT, since it is generally 
accepted that monetary policy affects only the price level in the long run.  
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The main uses of the VAR model are the impulse response analysis, variance 
decomposition, and Granger causality tests. The analysis is carried out in the following 
order. The first step requires a test for non stationary (unit root) of time series. That is, 
before the estimations, the univariate characteristics of data are established, a formal 
test for testing non stationarity is essential to select appropriate estimation 
methodology. To investigate the non stationarity of the series the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) test, the Phillips-Perrons (PP) and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 
(KPSS) tests are applied. Usually, the ADF statistic tests the null hypothesis of the 
existence of unit roots, against the alternative hypothesis of non-existence of unit roots 
(Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1991; Gujarati, 1995; 2003). Thereafter, a Granger causality test 
is performed. This is to examine whether lagged values of one variable help to predict 
another variable (Stock & Watson, 2001:104). 
 
The VAR can be considered as a means of conducting causality tests, or more 
specifically Granger causality tests. Granger causality test is considered a useful 
technique for determining whether one time series is good for forecasting the other. The 
concept of granger causality test is explored when the coefficients of the lagged of the 
other variables is not zero.  Granger causality really implies a correlation between the 
current value of one variable and the past values of others, it does not mean changes in 
one variable cause changes in another. If there are two series Yt & Xt, then it is said that 
Xt doesn't Granger cause Yt if all lagged coefficients for Xt are zero, that is:    
 
tptp1t1ptp1t10t X...XY...YY              (4.23) 
 
Then β1 = β2 = … = βp = 0, that is lagged of Xt has no effect on Yt.   
 
Granger causality test is used to see how much of a current series Y can be explained 
by the past values of Y and to know whether adding lagged values of another series X 
can improve the explanation of the variance of Y or not. By using a F-test to jointly test 
for the significance of the lags on the explanatory variables, this in effect tests for 
‗Granger causality‘ between these variables. It is possible to have causality running 
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from variable X to Y, but not Y to X; from Y to X, but not X to Y and from both Y to X and 
X to Y, although in this case interpretation of the relationship is difficult. The ‗Granger 
causality‘ test can also be used as a test for whether a variable is exogenous. i.e. If no 
variables in a model affect a particular variable it can be viewed as exogenous also also 
Granger noncausality is a  necessary condition for strong exogeneity. 
 
To determine which variable causes the other, pair-wise Granger causality tests are 
used. But since this test is affected by the number of lags, before running this test it is 
necessary to determine the number of lags. There are many criteria used to indicate the 
number of lags. These criteria are Hannan-Quinn (HQ), Schwarz information criterion 
(SC), Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Final prediction error (FPE) and Likelihood 
Ratio (LR). After determining the number of lags it is possible to run a pair wise granger 
causality test. estimated VAR satisfies  the stability condition. 
 
The following step would be to conduct tests for co-integration, ie if two or more series 
have long-run equilibrium. The econometric literature deals with the cointegration 
subject from several perspectives. The cointegration test can be applied in several 
ways, according to the nature of the equation that is tested. If it is a single one the Engle 
Granger method is used; if it is a multivariate system the Johansen Approach is applied 
to determine the existence of the long run relationship among variables. 
 
Engle Granger Method: cointegration could be defined as a linear combination of two or 
more non-stationary time series, or as the existence of a long run equilibrium 
relationship between two or more series. If this combination is stationary then it is said 
that the series are cointegrated. When running a cointegration test, one checks for the 
following relation between any two or more series: 
 
tt10t XY                        (4.24) 
 
This is called cointegration equation, it is said that Yt and Xt are cointegrated if both 
series are I(1) and the error term from cointegration equation εt is I(0). Cointegration 
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could be used as an evidence of a long-run equilibrium relationship among variables. In 
other words by investigating if two series are cointegrated, we are asking if there is a 
long run relationship between the trends in these two series.  
 
Single Equation Error Correction Model: In order to determine the existence of the 
cointegration relation between the series each single equation is investigated for an 
error correction form. This requires an investigation of the short run relationship and this 
is often done by running ordinary least squares (OLS) regression over the differenced 
series in order to eliminate the trends or the long run movement in the variables. To do 
this we estimate the following OLS regression:  
tt2t10t )1(XY                 (4.25) 
 
Where: 
∆Yt: indicates the difference in the endogenous variable 
∆Xt: indicates the difference in the exogenous variable 
ut: indicates the white noise error term and   
εt(-1) represents the lagged error term estimated from the long run relationship or 
represents what we call the Error Correction term in estimating the equations.  
 
Johansen Cointegration test: the Johansen cointegration test is used to determine the 
number of cointegration relations for forecasting and hypothesis testing. The vector 
error correction (VEC) is also estimated to investigate weak exogeneity and to do 
hypothesis testing since VEC is applied only to cointegrated series. To be able to run 
Johansen cointegrating test the data must be nonstationary. 
 
One of the drawbacks of the Johansen cointegration test is the dependency of the 
critical values of the test statistic on the trend assumptions. There are five deterministic 
trends assumptions, the first two assumptions are used when there is no trend in the 
data, and the third and fourth assumptions are used when there is a linear trend in the 
data, while the fifth assumption is used when there is a quadratic trend. The other 
drawback is related to the setting of the appropriate lag length of the VAR model. 
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The Johansen procedure uses two tests to determine the number of cointegration 
vectors: the Trace test and the Maximum Eigenvalue test. Trace statistics investigate 
the null hypothesis of r cointegrating relations against the alternative of n cointegrating 
relations, where n is the number of variables in the system for r = 0, 1, 2…n-1. Its 
equation is computed according to the following formula: 
)ˆ1log(*)/(
1



n
ri
itr TnrLR                 (4.26) 
The Maximum Eigenvalue statistic tests the null hypothesis of r cointegrating relations 
against the alternative of r+1 cointegrating relations for r = 0, 1, 2…n-1. This test 
statistics are computed as: 
)ˆ1log(*)1/(max  TnrLR            (4.27) 
 
Where λi is the Maximum Eigenvalue and T is the sample size.  
 
In some cases Trace and Maximum Eigenvalue statistics may yield different results and 
Alexander (2001) indicates that in this case the results of trace test should be preferred. 
The critical values are presented by Johansen and Julieus (1990) and Osterwald-
Lenum (1992). 
There are many steps that must be followed before applying the Johansen test. First it 
is necessary to determine the number of lags since this has a big effect in the analysis. 
There are five criteria: the sequential likelihood ratio (LR), Akaike information criterion 
(AIC), Schwarz information criterion (SC), Final prediction error (FPE) and Hannan 
Quinn information criterion (HQ).  
 
If co-integration is found among the variables, the adjustment of the short-run to the 
long-run equilibrium is obtained through the vector error correction model (VECM). The 
VEC model starts from the standard reduced form of VAR (p) model 
 
ttptp1t1t EDYA....YAY                    (4.28) 
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Where Yt is a (n × 1) vector of I(1) variables, Dt a vector of deterministic terms, and 
A1,…,Ap are (n ×n) coefficient matrices. E is the coefficient matrix associated with the 
deterministic terms, such as a constant, trend and seasonal dummies. 
 
Subtracting Yt-1 from both sides of the VAR equation we obtain the following model 
which represents a Vector Error Correction model: 
 
ttptpttt
ttptpttt
YABYYYY
waydifferentinitwritecanweor
BXYYYY






1112211
1112211
...
...
         (4.29) 
 
Thus in the VEC model one regress changes in each variable on a constant (μ), (p-1) 
lags of the variable's own changes, (p-1) lags of changes in each of the other variables, 
and the level of the h elements of Xt-1. Where 1 tYAB , represents the Error Correction 
Term. 
Xt = A
' Yt is (h × 1) stationary vector must be I(0). 
Yt: is (n × 1) vector of I(1) variables. 
B: is (n × h) matrix contains the adjustment parameters (long run relationship). 
αi: holds the short run parameters (the coefficients on the lagged terms). 
h: represent the number of cointegrating equations. 
µ: is (n × 1) constant matrix 
A': represents (h × n) matrix of cointegrating vectors, whose rows are linearly 
independent such that A'Yt is a stationary (h × 1) vector. 
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If we are interested in the long run process then our attention must be concentrated on 
matrix B, while our attention must be on αi‘s if we are interested of the short run 
process.  
 
In an event when co-integration among the variables is not found exist, then a VAR 
model specification is estimated, particularly first to estimate the structural factorisation. 
This procedure is used to estimate the factorisation matrices for a structural (or 
identified) VAR (as discussed earlier).  
In empirical applications, the main use of the VAR is the impulse response function 
which function traces the response of the endogenous variables to one standard 
deviation shock or change to one of the disturbance terms in the system. A shock to a 
variable is transmitted to all of the endogenous variables through the dynamic structure 
of the VAR. In general, the number of possible impulse responses for a structural VAR 
with n variables and hence n equations and n shocks, is the number of different 
combinations of shocks and variables, namely n2.    
 
Usually the impulse response functions will all have the same general shape, since it is 
known that all the variables in multi-equation system share similar types of dynamics, by 
virtue of having the same fundamental dynamic equation representation. If the system is 
stable, the impulse responses will all approach zero. There will be a difference in the 
timing of the effects. The impulse responses to the shock in the variable that comes first 
in the causal chain will all start in the first period. In general, only the variables that are 
below the variable in the casual chain will react within the period. Therefore, an impulse 
response function shows the interaction between/among the endogenous variables 
sequence. The assumption is that the VAR error returns to zero in the subsequent 
periods and all other errors equal to zero.  Phillips (1998) shows that the IRF will be 
inconsistent in the long horizon with unrestricted VAR with a unit root. While the VEC 
(reduced Rank Model) produces a consistent IRF. 
 
Variance decomposition is a complement method to the impulse response functions for 
examining the effects of shocks to the dependent variables. This technique determines 
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how much of the forecast error variance for any variable in a system, is explained by 
innovations to each explanatory variable, over a series of time horizons (Stock & 
Watson, 2001:106). Usually own series shocks explain most of the error variance, 
although the shock will also affect other variables in the system. It is also important to 
consider the ordering of the variables when conducting these tests, as in practise the 
error terms of the equations in the VAR will be correlated, so the result will be 
dependent on the order in which the equations are estimated in the model. This study 
also briefly reports the results from Granger causality tests, impulse responses and 
forecast error variance decompositions. 
 
4.5 Data, Data Sources and Data Measurements 
This study used quarterly time-series data covering the period 1993Q1-2011Q4.  The 
variables include a policy indicator variable, a set of variables representing the potential 
channels of the monetary transmission mechanism and a set of variables representing 
the final objectives of the monetary policy. The major sources of data include National 
Accounts 1993-2011 (Republic of Namibia, National Planning Commission, 1998; 2006; 
2008), Bank of Namibia‘s Quarterly and Annual Report, International Monetary Fund‘s 
International Financial Statistics and South Africa‘s Reserve Bank‘s website.The models 
make use of the following variables: 
 
The policy shock variable (R) in percentage: The policy indicator variable is the repo 
rate defined as the rate at which the central bank provides short-term loans to 
commercial banks and discount houses in its function as a lender of last resort. The 
variable enters the SVAR as an instrument target of monetary policy. Exchange rate 
variable ( XR ), real effective exchange rate, index for REER (2004=100), (for the 
exchange rate channel). The real effective exchange rate index is used to represent the 
exchange rate level and it enters the SVAR as an intermediate target of monetary 
policy. The credit variable (BL ), commercial bank loans and advances, measured in 
millions of N$, (for the credit channel). The variable captures commercial bank loans 
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and advances and it enters the SVAR as an intermediate target of monetary policy. 
Money supply ( 2M ), aggregate (broad) money supply, measured in millions of N$, (for 
the money effect model). Aggregate money supply is measured by the sum of currency 
in circulation, demand deposits and time deposits (M2). The variable also enters the 
SVAR as an intermediate target of monetary policy. Other variables representing the 
different channels investigated include three-month Treasury bill or money market rates 
(RS ), in percentage (for the interest rate channel), 10-year government bond (RL ), in 
percentage (for the interest rate channel), Nominal effective exchange rate (S), defined 
as an index reflecting movements in the nominal exchange rate between a home 
country and trading partners adjusted for by the respective weights of the trading 
partners.  Index for NEER (2004=100), (for exchange rate pass-through effect model) 
and Consumer (aggregate) price level for South Africa (CPSA), in percentage, (for 
exchange rate pass-through effect model). 
 
The measure of the price level is the (CP ) Consumer (aggregate) price level, in 
percentage. The CPI was published long ago and changes in it have been used as the 
official measure of inflation since then. Furthermore, it has been commonly used in 
empirical economic studies. Hence, it will be used for Namibia. The variable enters the 
SVAR as a monetary policy goal. Real gross domestic product at constant price 
(2004=100) enters the SVAR as a monetary policy goal. GDP data are used as a proxy 
for Namibia representing the final objectives for monetary policy. 
 
All variables except for the interest rates are transformed into the log form. Because the 
analysis involved quarterly data, all the variables have been seasonally adjusted before 
being entered in the VAR analysis. The data were already seasonally adjusted when 
obtained from the sources.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
  
5. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATIONS AND ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the empirical estimations and analysis. The chapter is divided into 
two sections. Section 5.2 presents a discussion on the detailed estimation, empirical 
findings of the generic model and the different monetary policy transmission 
mechanisms as selected for this study, namely, the interest rate channel, the credit 
channel, the exchange rate channel, the money effect model. This study will adopt the 
following sequence; VAR/SVAR cointegration tests, Granger causality tests (GC), 
impulse response function (IRF) and forecast error variance (FEVD) in presenting the 
results for the generic model as well as that of the different channels of monetary policy 
transmission. This discussion is followed by the presentation of the empirical findings of 
the error correction model of the ERPT. The chapter is concluded by section 5.3. 
 
5.2 Detailed estimations4 
 
The first step before estimation is to establish univariate characteristics of the data to 
determine whether the variables are stationary or not, since ―Most macroeconomic time 
series are trended and, therefore, in most cases are non-stationary. The problem with 
non-stationary or trended data is that the standard Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression procedures can easily lead to incorrect conclusions‖ (Asteriou & Hall, 2007). 
The unit roots test (stationarity test) is a testing strategy used in determining the order of 
integration of the variables. Hence, it is advisable to carry out a unit root test on any 
time series data. This study uses the ADF statistic to test the stationarity or non-
stationarity of the variables and their order of integration. Usually, the ADF statistic tests 
the null hypothesis of the existence of unit roots, against the alternative hypothesis of 
non-existence of unit roots (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991; and Gujarati, 1995; 2003).  
                                                 
4
 This process is repeated in estimating the relative importance of the different channels of the 
transmission process in the subsequent sections.  
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It is important to state that at this stage that the study concedes that the ADF statistic 
has limitations in the sense that it has low diagnostic power. It tends to under-reject the 
null hypothesis of unit roots. Because of this limitation, additional test statistics, the PP 
and the KPSS, are also used. The results of the unit root test for all the variables in 
levels are presented in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1:  Unit root tests: ADF and PP in levels 
Variable Model Specification ADF PP 
    Levels Levels 
Rt 
Intercept and trend -3.17** -1.87 
Intercept -1.52 -0.76 
lnM2t 
Intercept and trend -2.93** -2.92** 
Intercept -2.27 -2.38 
lnSt 
Intercept and trend -1.95 -1.91 
Intercept -1.81 -1.88 
lnCPSAt 
Intercept and trend -4.25** -2.76 
Intercept -4.2** -2.88 
lnXRt 
Intercept and trend -2.04 -2.04 
Intercept -1.86 -1.88 
lnGYt 
Intercept and trend -1.99 -2.69 
Intercept -1.21 -0.26 
lnCPt 
Intercept and trend -2.90 -2.03 
Intercept -2.75 -1.98 
lnRSt 
Intercept and trend -2.91** -2.24 
Intercept -1.67 -0.81 
lnRLt 
Intercept and trend -1.99 -2.95** 
Intercept -1.04 -0.85 
lnBLt 
Intercept and trend -2.56 -3.15 
Intercept  -1.72 -1.75 
Notes:(a)at 5% the critical value -2.908 for lnGY, -2.906 for lnCP, -2.906 for lnRS and -2.906 for lnRL, -
2.906 for R, -2.908 for lnM2, -2.906 for lnS,-2.906 for  lnCPSA,-2.908 for lnXR and -2.908 for lnBL. 
 
(b)** means the rejection of the null hypothesis at 5%   
 
Table 5.1 shows the unit root tests for the series and the results of the series were 
found to be non-stationary in level form. However, for some variables, such as 91-day 
Treasury Bills, CPSA for South Africa and the repo rate, the two-unit root test is 
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contrasting. The ADF indicates that the variables are stationary while the PP indicates 
otherwise.  Hence, with the exception of money supply, the hypothesis of the presence 
of the unit root could not be rejected. Therefore, the hypothesis of unit root is accepted; 
that all the other variables are non-stationary in level form. The test statistic concluded 
that this was so. The next step was then to difference them once and see if they would 
become stationary, as shown in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2:  Unit root tests: ADF and PP in differences 
Variable 
Model 
Specification ADF 
Order of 
integration PP 
 Order of 
integration 
    Levels 
 
Levels   
Rt 
Intercept and trend -4.85** 1 -4.38**  1 
Intercept -4.88** 1 -4.42**  1 
lnM2t 
Intercept and trend -9.00** 1 -8.56**  1 
Intercept -8.57** 1 -8.97**  1 
lnSt 
Intercept and trend -6.39** 1 -6.41**  1 
Intercept -6.35** 1 -6.37**  1 
lnCPSAt 
Intercept and trend -5.62** 1 -4.34**  1 
Intercept -5.66** 1 -4.39**  1 
lnXRt 
Intercept and trend -8.61** 1 -8.64**  1 
Intercept -8.56** 1 -8.56** 
 1 
lnGYt 
Intercept and trend -10.77** 1 -29.56**  1 
Intercept -10.62** 1 -26.68**  1 
lnCPt 
Intercept and trend -5.87** 1 -5.82**  1 
Intercept -5.92** 1 -5.87**  1 
lnRSt 
Intercept and trend -5.78** 1 -4.85** 
 1 
Intercept -5.79** 1 -4.89**  1 
lnRLt 
Intercept and trend -6.63** 1 -7.95**  1 
Intercept -6.62** 1 -7.89**  1 
lnBLt 
Intercept and trend -12.13** 1 -9.09** 
 1 
Intercept  -11.96** 1 -12.24**  1 
Notes:(a)at 5% the critical value -2.908 for lnGY, -2.906 for lnCP, -2.906 for lnRS and -2.906 for lnRL, -
2.906 for R, -2.908 for lnM2, -2.906 for lnS,-2.906 for  lnCPSA,-2.908 for lnXR and -2.908 for lnBL. 
 
(b)** means the rejection of the null hypothesis at 5%   
 
After differencing the variables once, both the ADF and PP show that the series became 
stationary, rejecting the hypothesis of unit root at 1per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent. 
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Thus, at all levels of significance, the hypothesis of unit root is rejected and, therefore, it 
can be concluded that all  the variables are stationary at first difference, in other words 
the variables are integrated of order one, as shown table 5.2.  
 
In general, the ADF and PP tests have very low power against I(0) alternatives that are 
close to being I(1). That is, unit root tests cannot distinguish highly persistent stationary 
processes from non-stationary processes very well. Furthermore, the power of unit root 
tests diminish as deterministic terms are added to the test regressions. That is, tests 
that include a constant and trend in the test regression have less power than tests that 
only include a constant in the test regression. To overcome the lack of success of the 
common unit root tests, the KPSS test is also used, because it is believed to be more 
efficient and have higher power than the ADF and PP tests. It is a confirmatory test for 
unit root, as table 5.3 below shows. 
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Table 5.3:  Unit root tests: KPSS in levels and differences 
Variable 
Model 
Specification KPSS 
    Levels 
First 
Difference 
Order of 
integration 
 
Rt 
Intercept and trend 0.86 0.07** 1  
Intercept 0.87 0.07** 1  
lnM2t 
Intercept and trend 0.15** 0.04** 1  
Intercept 1.07 0.14** 1  
lnSt 
Intercept and trend 0.18** 0.04** 1  
Intercept 0.8 0.13** 1  
lnCPSAt 
Intercept and trend 0.13** 0.03** 1  
Intercept 0.25** 0.04** 1  
lnXRt 
Intercept and trend 0.23** 0.05** 1 
 
Intercept 0.62 0.16** 1  
lnGYt 
Intercept and trend 0.35** 0.11** 1  
Intercept 1.07 0.099 1  
lnCPt 
Intercept and trend 0.216** 0.04** 1 
 
Intercept 0.74 0.05** 1  
lnRSt 
Intercept and trend 0.22** 0.13** 1  
Intercept 0.74 0.09** 1  
lnRLt 
Intercept and trend 0.24** 0.12** 1  
Intercept 0.88 0.18** 1  
lnBLt 
Intercept and trend 0.08** 0.08** 1  
Intercept  1.074 0.23** 1  
Notes:(a) at 5% the critical value 0.463 for all the variables. 
(b)* implies rejection of the null hypothesis at 5%.  
 
Table 5.3 shows the results of the KPSS test. The findings confirm the results of the 
earlier tests, namely the ADF and the PP. That is, the series is integrated of order one 
I(1).  
 
Having established the univariate characteristics of the variables, the reduced form VAR 
model is estimated. The information criteria for the lag order selection for the VAR 
system for the generic model and the different channels of monetary policy transmission 
is presented in table 5.4 in the appendix. Selection of the optimal lag length is usually 
dictated by the criteria namely, the LR test statistic, Final Prediction Error (FPE), Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz Information Criterion (SC) and Hannan-Quinn 
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Information Criterion (HQ). These tests show the convergence on the lag length and 
that is the essence of lag structure test. At the chosen lag length, all the inverse roots of 
the characteristic AR polynomial have a modulus of less than one and lie inside the unit 
circle, indicating that the estimated VAR is stable or satisfies the stability condition as 
shown in table 5.5 also in the appendix.  
 
The following step would be to conduct tests for co-integration, ie, if two or more series 
are non-stationary, but a linear combination of them is stationary, then the series are 
said to be co-integrated. ―The economic interpretation of co-integration is that if two or 
more series are linked to form an equilibrium relationship spanning the long-run, then 
even though the series themselves may contain stochastic trends (ie non-stationary) 
they will nevertheless move closely together over time and the difference between them 
will be stable or stationary. Thus the concept of co-integration mimics the existence of a 
long-run equilibrium to which an economic system converges over time, and μt  defined 
above can be interpreted as the disequilibrium error, ie the distance that the system is 
away from equilibrium at time t‖ (Granger, 1990). The approach used to test for 
cointegration in this study is the Johansen-Juselius (1990) method that is based on the 
full information maximum likelihood method (FIML). 
 
The standard practice in VAR analysis is that when making inferences, the reporting of 
the results includes Granger causality tests, impulse responses and forecast error 
variance decompositions. This study will adopt the following sequence; VAR/SVAR 
cointegration tests, Granger causality tests (GC), impulse response function (IRF) and 
forecast error variance (FEVD). These statistics are computed automatically by the 
econometrics packages. This sequence is followed in reporting the results for the 
generic model as well as the results of the different channels of monetary policy 
transmission. 
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5.2.1 The Generic Model 
Cointegration test 
Table 5.4: Johansen Co-integration Test: The Generic Model 
Maximum Eigen Test Trace Test 
H0: rank = r Ha: rank = r Statistic 95% 
Critical Value 
H0: rank = r Ha: rank = r Statistic 95% 
Critical Value 
r = 0 r =1 8.85 21.13 r = 0 r >=1 15.88 29.80 
r <=1 r = 2 6.92 14.26 r <= 1 r >= 2 7.03 15.49 
r <=2 r = 3 0.11 3.84 r <= 2 r >= 3 0.11 3.84 
Note: Both Max-eigenvalue and Trace tests indicates no cointegrating equations at the 0.05 level. Sample 
period 1993:Q1 to 2011:Q4.  
 
In analysing the statistical properties of the variables, it has been shown that all the 
variables in this model are integrated of order one. Therefore, it is expected that a linear 
long-run relationship will exist among these variables. However, one cannot draw 
conclusions based on assumptions. Hence, it is necessary to test whether there are 
indeed co-integration relationships among these variables. The JML approach to test for 
cointegration is used on a VAR system of three variables and it is based on FIML. The 
FIML procedure is essentially used to identify the rank of the matrix Π. The null 
hypothesis as stated above is that r=0 against the general alternative hypothesis r >= 1, 
or r >= 2, 3, 4. In this regard a λ-trace statistic is employed, since the null hypothesis is 
r=0 and there are three variables (ie, n=3). Table 5.4 shows that the null hypothesis that 
r=0 could not be rejected, since the calculated t-statistics (15.88) are smaller than the 
critical value at 5 per cent significance level (29.81).  
 
The trace-statistics have a very general alternative hypothesis. A more specific 
hypothesis is tested and in this regard a λ-maximal test is applied and the null 
hypothesis is that r=0 against the specific alternative hypotheses r=1. Table 5.4 shows 
that the null hypothesis of no co-integration could not be rejected, that r=0, meaning that 
no co-integrating vector exists among the variables in this model. This is again because 
the calculated t-statistics (8.85) are lower than the critical values (29.81) at 5 per cent 
significance level. 
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To sum up, it is evident that both the maximum and trace Eigen value statistics strongly 
accepted the null hypothesis that there is no co-integration between all these variables 
in the model (ie that r =0). This suggests that there are indeed no co-integrating vectors 
between these variables. When co-integration among the variables does not exist, the 
appropriate step to take is first to estimate the structural factorisation. This procedure is 
used to estimate the factorisation matrices for a structural (or identified) VAR. 
Thereafter, the impulses‘ response function and forecast error variance decomposition 
will be derived. 
 
Granger-causality test 
Prior to reporting the IRF and FEVD, the Granger causality statistics are examined to 
determine whether lagged values of one variable do help to predict another variable. 
Table 5.5 summarises the Granger-causality results for the three-variable VAR. It shows 
the p-values associated with the F-statistics for testing whether the relevant sets of 
coefficients are zero. The results show that output helps in predicting repo rate. This 
implies that the coefficients on their lags will not all be equal to zero in the reduced-form 
equation.  
 
Table 5.5: Granger Causality Test: The Generic Model 
 Dependent Variable in Regression 
Regressor GY CP R 
GY 
CP 
R 
0.00 
0.95 
0.52 
0.40 
0.00 
0.27 
0.00** 
0.83 
0.00 
Notes: (a) GY denotes output, CP denotes rate of price inflation and R denotes the repo rate. The entries 
in the table show the p-values for F-tests. (b)** means the rejection of the null hypothesis at 5%. 
 
Impulse Response Function 
Impulse responses trace out the response of current and future values of each of the 
variables to a one-unit increase in the current value of one of the VAR errors, assuming 
that this error returns to zero in subsequent periods and that all other errors are equal to 
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zero. The implied thought experiment of changing one error while holding the others 
constant makes most sense when the errors are uncorrelated across equations, so 
impulse responses are typically calculated for recursive and structural VARs (Stock & 
Watson, 2001:106). 
 
The great emphasis for the IRF relates to how output and inflation responds to interest 
rate (repo) shocks at the same time, it is also important to perceive how monetary 
authorities  respond to structural innovations in the policy goals (output and inflation). 
The results of the IRF of both scenarios are presented in figures 5.1 and 5.2, with the 
latter being discussed first. The impulse responses of the repo rate to structural 
innovations in output and consumer prices cover 16 quarters, and shows that an output 
shock leads to a reduction in the repo rate, while it results in a significant response by 
the CB due to shocks in consumer prices. This implies that the monetary authorities in 
Namibia are concerned with both inflation and economic growth. The CB responds to 
output shocks by relaxing monetary policy through the repo rate, which then leads to 
further expansion in output growth. In response to supply shock, monetary authorities 
exercise monetary policy tightening by raising the repo rate in order to curb the increase 
in consumer prices. 
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Figure 5.1: Impulse Responses of Repo Rate: The Generic Model 
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The results of how monetary policy goals (output growth, inflation and repo rate) are 
affected by shocks to the operating targets are presented in Figure 5.2 below. They are 
one positive standard deviation innovation calculated by making use of Monte Carlo 
integration with 500 replications and they are standardised to the same scale in order to 
compare the effects of shocks. 
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Figure 5.2: Impulse Responses of Output and Consumer Prices: The Generic Model 
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Figure 5.2 shows that a monetary policy shock, by increasing the repo rate, results in a 
decline in output. Shocks to the repo rate have transitory output effects that die out over 
time. Output follows a hump-shaped pattern in response to a contractionary policy 
shock. Output then declines below the baseline, with the peak effect occurring more 
than a year after the shock. The effects of the shocks appear to be permanent even 
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after 4 years. This hump-shaped pattern is a very common finding. The price level, 
however, responds to the monetary tightening with an increase for a very short period. 
That is, transitory price effects that dies out only after 8 quarters. Thereafter, prices 
converged to the steady state after 2 years. Overall, shocks to either monetary policy 
operating target results in a significant response in output and insignificant response of 
consumer prices. This gives an indication that monetary factors may not necessarily be 
the primary determinants of inflation in Namibia. 
 
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition 
According to Stock and Watson (2001:106) the variance decomposition separates the 
variation in an endogenous variable into the component shocks to the VAR. Thus, the 
variance decomposition provides information about the relative importance of each 
random innovation in affecting the variables in the VAR, as presented in table 5.6 
below.  
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Table 5.6: Variance Decomposition: The Generic Model  
Variance Decomposition of GY 
Quarter GY CP R 
1 100 0 0 
4 98.37 0.03 1.60 
8 94.76 0.05 5.19 
12 92.79 0.09 7.12 
16 91.85 0.14 8.01 
Variance decomposition of CP 
Quarter GY CP R 
1 0.19 99.81 0 
4 0.14 97.30 2.57 
8 0.62 96.36 3.02 
12 1.42 95.60 2.98 
16 2.07 94.96 2.98 
Variance decomposition of R 
Quarter GY CP R 
1 0.27 6.06 93.66 
4 0.41 3.78 95.81 
8 5.94 3.06 90.99 
12 14.55 2.83 82.62 
16 21.23 2.64 76.14 
  
Table 5.6 presents forecast error variance decompositions for each variable in the 
model over a 16-quarter forecast horizon. It reveals that the forecast errors in output are 
largely attributed to own innovations though the dominance declines as the forecast 
horizon increases. The table further shows that the forecast errors in output due to the 
repo rate have been increasing with an increase in the forecast horizon,  notably 
accounting for 5.2 per cent after eight quarters, 7.1 per cent after 12 quarters and 8 per 
cent after 16 quarters. The forecast errors in output due to the repo rate appear to be 
minimal. However, the forecast errors in consumer prices are also mainly attributed to 
their own shocks. The forecast errors in prices due to the repo rate have also been 
minor particularly accounting for 2.6 per cent after four quarters and for 3 per cent after 
eight quarters. This shows that shocks in the repo rate account for a larger proportion of 
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the fluctuations in consumer prices after four quarters than fluctuations in output. In the 
subsequent periods the shocks in the repo rate accounted for the larger proportion. 
 
The result shows that fluctuations in the repo rate are mostly dominated by itself, while 
the forecast errors in the repo rate are mainly due to consumer prices in the first 
quarters. However, the forecast errors in the repo rate due to shocks in output only 
started becoming dominant after eight quarters, accounting for 5.9 per cent and 14.6 
per cent after 12 quarters. 
 
In order to understand the transmission process, the analysis is extended to more 
specific transmission channels. Four channels of the monetary transmission process 
are considered, namely the interest rate, credit, exchange rate and money effect, 
particularly measuring the relative importance of each channel in the transmission 
process. The various diagnostic tests of the residuals for SVAR models are presented in 
table 5.7 in the appendix.  
 
5.2.2 The interest rate channel 
Cointegration 
Table 5.8: Johansen Cointegration Test: The Interest Rate Channel 
Maximum Eigen Test Trace Test 
H0: rank = r Ha: rank = r Statistic 95% 
Critical Value 
H0: rank = r Ha: rank = r Statistic 95% 
Critical Value 
r = 0 r =1 101.49 27.58 r = 0 r >=1 172.89 47.86 
r <=1 r = 2 35.81 21.13 r <= 1 r >= 2 71.40 29.80 
r <=2 r = 3 19.13 14.26 r <= 2 r >= 3 35.59 15.49 
r <=3 r = 4 16.46 3.84 r <= 3 r >= 4 16.46 3.84 
Note: Both Max-eigenvalue and Trace tests indicates 4 cointegrating equations at the 0.05 level. Sample 
period 1993:Q1 to 2011:Q4.  
 
Table 5.8 shows the results of the Johansen cointegration test. The results reveals that 
both the maximum and trace Eigen value statistics strongly reject the null hypothesis 
that there is no co-integration between all these variables in the model (i.e that r =0). 
The test indicate that there are actually 4 cointegrating equations suggests that there 
are indeed no co-integrating vectors between these variables.  
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Granger Causality Test 
Table 5.9 summarises the Granger causality results for the four-variable VAR. The 
results show that output can help to predict both the short-term and long-term interest 
rate as indicated by the values of 0.02 and 0.00 respectively. Moreover, short term 
interest rate also helps to predict long term interest rate as indicated by the value of  
0.05. This is to say that the coefficients on their lags are not all equal to zero in the 
reduced-form equation.    
 
Table 5.9: Granger Causality Test: Interest Rate Channel 
 Dependent Variable in Regression 
Regressor GY CP RS RL 
GY 
CP 
RS 
RL 
0.00 
0.95 
0.66 
0.65 
0.40 
0.00 
0.38 
0.29 
0.02** 
0.88 
0.00 
0.14 
0.00** 
0.45 
0.05*** 
0.00 
Notes: (a) GY denotes output, CP denotes rate of price inflation, RS denotes short-term interest rate 
(three-month treasury bill) and RL denotes long-term interest rate (10-year government bond). (b) ** 
means the rejection of the null hypothesis at 5%and *** means the rejection of the null hypothesis at 10% 
 
Impulse Response Function 
The focal point of monetary policy under the interest rate channel is how output and 
inflation responds to interest rate shocks. However, as in the case of the generic model, 
the discussion commences with how monetary authorities responds to shocks in the 
policy goals first before proceeding to the focal point. Figure 5.3 presents impulse 
responses of the repo rate to structural innovations in output (LNGY) and consumer 
prices (LNCP) over 16 quarters. The figure shows that an output shock leads to a 
reduction in the short-term market interest rate (LNRS) and an increase in prices results 
in an increase in the short-term market interest rate. The reduction in market interest 
rate is attributed to a reduction (monetary policy expansion) in a policy rate. This also 
implies that an increase in prices leads to an increase in the short-term market. All in all 
monetary authorities in Namibia are mindful of both inflation and economic growth. This 
is beause CB responds to output shocks by relaxing monetary policy through the repo 
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rate. This is reflected in a reduction in the short-term interest rates, which further leads 
to expansion in output growth. In response to price increase, monetary authorities take 
the action of monetary policy tightening by raising the repo rate, again reflected via a 
rise in short-term market interest rates in order to curb the increase in consumer prices. 
Figure 5.3: Impulse Responses of Short-term Interest Rate: The Interest Rate Channel  
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The results of the IRF of how output and inflation responds to shocks in the interest 
rates are shown in Figure 5.4 below. Based on the GIRFs to a one standard deviation, 
positive innovation to the change in the interest rate on the three-month TB shows that 
changes in this rate have  a clear impact on the variables representing the end targets 
of monetary policy actions. On the one hand, all the responses are small in magnitude, 
where a one standard deviation shock to the change in the interest rate leads to a 
decline in output until below the baseline. That is there is transitory output effects up 
until after 8 quarters, thereafter output effects appear to be permanent.  The direction of 
responses to such a shock only conforms to economic theory in a sense that an 
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increase in the policy rate results in the dampening of output growth due to low demand 
of goods and services. 
 
The response of prices to monetary policy shock is negative. This does conform to the 
economic theory that a restrictive monetary policy by the monetary authorities pushes 
up both short-term and long-term interest rates. The cost of borrowing becomes high 
and this in turn leads to less spending by interest-sensitive sectors of the economy such 
as housing, consumer durable goods and business fixed investment. These price 
effects appear to be transitory. However after 12 quarter there was convergence toward 
the steady state (baseline). In view of this the interest rate channel, the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism is effective if monetary policy action has the ability to affect a 
continuum of interest rates, ranging from short- to long-term interest rates, and in turn 
affects prices.  The response of the long-term interest rate to the short-term interest 
rates shows an increase as expected. The variation and magnitude are very small. All in 
all the negative impact on aggregate demand is expected to be transmitted into a lower 
economic growth rate as well as  lower inflation rate which is the case for Namibia as 
illustrated by these results.  
 
In the case of Namibia, shocks to the monetary policy operating target result in a 
significant response in consumer prices and relatively smaller significance in output 
response. One can conclude that it is indicative of the fact that the interest rate channel 
is effective in Namibia. Overall the results imply that monetary policies working through 
both long-run and short-run interest rates have an impact on both prices and output. 
The next discussion is on the variance decomposition. 
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Figure 5.4: Impulse Responses of Output and Consumer Prices: The Interest Rate Channel 
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Forecast Error Variance Decompositions 
Table 5.10: Variance Decomposition: The Interest Rate Channel  
Variance Decomposition of GY 
Quarter GY CP RS RL 
1 100 0 0 0 
4 86.73 5.53 1.56 6.18 
8 84.42 6.95 1.94 6.69 
12 83.57 7.68 2.02 6.74 
16 82.85 8.36 2.01 6.78 
Variance decomposition of CP 
Quarter GY CP RS RL 
1 3.15 96.86 0 0 
4 4.35 92.79 1.04 1.82 
8 4.09 92.56 0.85 2.50 
12 3.88 93.18 0.66 2.29 
16 3.79 93.47 0.54 2.20 
Variance decomposition of RS 
Quarter GY CP RS RL 
1 1.58 15.79 82.64 0 
4 1.08 15.46 83.21 0.25 
8 1.15 15.47 83.14 0.24 
12 1.02 15.69 83.07 0.21 
16 0.93 15.76 83.14 0.18 
Variance decomposition of RL 
Quarter GY CP RS RL 
1 1.13 1.53 2.89 95.98 
4 4.72 2.13 2.85 90.30 
8 4.05 2.26 3.05 90.63 
12 3.24 2.16 3.18 91.42 
16 2.71 2.09 3.22 91.99 
 
Table 5.10 presents forecast error variance decompositions for each variable in the 
model over a 16-quarter forecast horizon. The result shows that forecast error in output 
are principally due to consumer prices and long-term rates, while the forecast errors in 
output due to short-term rates are relatively small. However, the forecast errors in 
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consumer prices are also dominated by output and long-term rates, while forecast 
errors in prices due to short-term interest rates remain relatively small.  
 
Table 5.10 also reveals that the forecast error in the short-term interest rates have been 
mainly due to consumer prices over the entire period of forecast. This concurs with the 
impulse response functions of prices to short-term interest rates in the previous section. 
The forecast error in the long-term interest rates are attributed to output and short-term 
interest rates, though the fluctuations due to short-term interest rates are relatively 
small, compared to those of output. This shows that shocks in the short-term interest 
rates account for a larger proportion of the fluctuations in consumer prices than 
fluctuations in output. The findings of this paper that the long-term yields respond 
positively to monetary policy shocks support the findings of Uanguta and Ikhide (2002). 
 
5.2.3. The credit channel 
Cointegration test 
Table 5.11: Johansen Cointegration Test: The Credit Channel 
Maximum Eigen Test Trace Test 
H0: rank = r Ha: rank = r Statistic 95% 
Critical Value 
H0: rank = r Ha: rank = r Statistic 95% 
Critical Value 
r = 0 r =1 24.73 27.58 r = 0 r >=1 48.10 47.87 
r <=1 r = 2 15.34 21.13 r <= 1 r >= 2 23.37 29.80 
r <=2 r = 3 7.10 14.26 r <= 2 r >= 3 8.037 15.49 
r <=3 r = 4 0.94 3.84 r <= 3 r >= 4 0.94 3.84 
Note: Trace tests indicate 4 cointegrating equations at the 0.05 level, while the Max-eigenvalue does not 
indicates no cointegrating. Sample period 1993:Q1 to 2011:Q4.  
 
Table 5.11 presents the results for the cointegration test based on trace and maximum 
eigen value test statistics. The results for the maximum eigen values test statistic 
reveals that there are no cointegration equations, accepting the null hypothesis of no 
cointegrating variables. This is due to the fact that test statistics are less than the critical 
values. The trace test statistic shows that there are 4 cointegrating equations, rejecting 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration of variables. The results of the trace statistic are 
chosen because of its superiority in a sense that this test is more specific and not 
general like the maximum eigen values test. 
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Granger Causality test 
Table 5.12: Granger Causality Test: The Credit Channel 
 Dependent Variable in Regression 
Regressor GY CP BL R 
GY 
CP 
BL 
R 
0.00 
0.95 
0.00** 
0.52 
0.40 
0.00 
0.35 
0.27 
0.13 
0.66 
0.00 
0.02** 
0.00** 
0.83 
0.02** 
0.00 
Notes: (a) GY denotes output, CP denotes rate of price inflation, BL denotes bank loans and R denotes 
repo rate. (b) ** means a rejection of the null hypothesis at 5%. 
 
Table 5.12 summarises the Granger causality results for the four-variable VAR. The 
results show that output can help to predict the repo rate. Bank loans also help to 
predict both output and the repo rate. Similarly, the repo rate can also help to predict 
bank loans. This is to say that there is a bi-directional causal relationship between bank 
loans and repo rate.  
 
Impulse Response Function 
Figure 5.5 presents the responses of output, consumer prices and bank loans to 
innovations in the repo rate and bank lending. The figure shows that an increase in the 
bank loans results in an increase in output, as economic theory suggests. An increase 
in bank loans results in a reduction in consumer prices. Output declined in response to 
shocks in the repo rate (endogenously), while consumer prices increased slightly but 
remained steady throughout. The bank loans increased slightly and remained steady 
throughout. 
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Figure 5.5: Impulse Responses to Credit Shocks: The Credit Channel 
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The technique of comparing the impulse responses when monetary policy is 
constrained and responds endogenously is also predominantly trivial in elaborating on 
the relationship between credit and monetary policy. In particular, it can be used to 
examine the implications of monetary policy‘s reaction to a credit shock. Sims and Zha 
(1998), Brischetto and Voss (1999) and Berkelmans (2005) conducted a similar study, 
examining the consequences of constraining monetary policy while shocking a non-
policy variable. One must be very cautious in interpretation because this does not 
necessarily imply that monetary policy responds directly to credit movements in and of 
themselves. However, the endogenous changes in monetary policy are the response to 
all of the variables in the system, in particular inflation and output (Berkelmans, 
2005:17).  
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There is something to take note of in the endogenous setting of monetary policy. There 
is some evidence that this setting is somewhat effective at mitigating the impact of credit 
shocks. The effects of monetary policy in this case are particularly marked for GDP. 
There is a slightly wider deviation from the baseline when policy responds to shocks in 
output. In this case there is no grey area to indicate whether it does mitigate the impact. 
The impulse responses seem to indicate that the bank lending channel appears to be 
functional and the shocks in the repo rate are transmitted to the real side of the 
economy (output and prices) via the changes in private loans (credit variable). These 
conclusions seem to indicate the presence of bank lending. 
 
Figure 5.6: Impulse Responses of Output, Consumer Prices and Bank loans: The Credit Channel 
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Figure 5.6 shows that in line with theoretical expectations, output decreases following a 
sudden increase in the repo rate. That is the effects of the shocks are transitory on 
output and die out just after 1 year. Thereafter, there was convergence toward the 
steady state although slightly below the baseline. Furthermore, the effects remained 
constant. Consumer prices increase following an increase in the repo rate. This 
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illustrates the presence of price puzzle. Noticeably, the transitory price effects die out 
sooner compared to permanent price effects which remained persistent even after 4 
years. The IRF shows that bank loans decrease as a result of an increase in the repo 
rate. The transitory bank loans effects lasted for a year and 6 months, while the 
permanent effects remained persistent even after 4 years following monetary tightening. 
However, there is evidence that the bank lending channel is operational. 
 
The credit channel is a result of discontent with conservatism about how the interest 
rate effects explain the impact of monetary policy on the expenditure on long-standing 
assets. The view of the credit channel of the monetary transmission mechanism 
emphasises asymmetric information in financial markets (Ngalawa, 2009). Mishkin 
(1996) indicates that information problems also refer to matters related to troubles 
brought about by costly verification and enforcement of financial contracts. These in 
particular are closely related to the asymmetric information problem. Hybrid channels 
resorting under credit channels are the bank lending channel and the balance-sheet 
channel. In this study the bank lending channel is pursued, since it is a component of 
the credit channel. The bank lending channel operates through the quantity instead of 
price of credit. A monetary policy shock is assumed to be transmitted through 
adjustments in bank reserves, the total amount of bank credit and bank lending (Gertler 
& Gilchrist, 1993). The presence of imperfect information in credit markets hampers 
mostly small firms, which are largely dependent on bank loans because acquiring funds 
through other means is costly (Markidou & Tapia, 2003:12). To sum up, the two 
assumptions simply give an indication that monetary policy contraction leads to a 
reduction in the supply of bank loans and in turn affects real economic activity. 
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Forecast Error Variance Decomposition 
 
Table 5.13: Variance Decomposition: The Credit Channel  
Variance Decomposition of GY 
Quarter GY CP BL R 
1 100 0 0 0 
4 74.533 1.517 12.45 7.497 
8 56.242 3.895 31.897 7.966 
12 42.551 5.140 44.712 7.598 
16 34.231 5.881 52.577 7.311 
Variance decomposition of CP 
Quarter GY CP BL R 
1 0.204 99.796 0 0 
4 0.084 98.501 0.0856 1.329 
8 0.0722 98.231 0.228 1.469 
12 0.0834 98.123 0.312 1.479 
16 0.100 98.066 0.359 1.484 
Variance decomposition of BL 
Quarter GY CP BL R 
1 1.534 1.040 97.426 0 
4 0.880 1.140 96.062 1.918 
8 0.954 1.525 95.541 1.980 
12 1.072 1.705 95.258 1.965 
16 1.145 1.805 95.096 1.954 
Variance Decomposition of R 
Quarter GY CP BL R 
1 0.020 6.756 1.274 91.950 
4 0.276 3.847 3.343 92.535 
8 0.138 2.822 2.939 94.101 
12 0.095 2.500 2.684 94.721 
16 0.075 2.339 2.545 95.041 
 
Table 5.12 presents forecast error variance decompositions for each variable in the 
model over a 16-quarter forecast horizon. The result shows that error in the forecast of 
output are mostly attributed to bank loans and the repo rate, though the magnitude of 
bank loans is higher than that of the repo rate. Bank loans accounted for 52.6 per cent 
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after 16 quarters. That means it accounted for more than half in the forecast error. The 
fluctuations in the consumer prices dominated the repo rate but not significantly.  In 
comparing the other two variables the result also shows that fluctuations in bank loans 
are largely attributed to consumer price and the repo rate, though there is not much 
difference in the magnitude of the two variables. The error in the forecast of the repo 
rate is dominated by bank loans and consumer prices. The magnitude of these two 
variables is not much different.  
   
5.2.4 The exchange rate channel 
Cointegration test 
Table 5.14: Johansen Cointegration Test: The Exchange Rate Channel 
Maximum Eigen Test Trace Test 
H0: rank = r Ha: rank = r Statistic 95% 
Critical Value 
H0: rank = r Ha: rank = r Statistic 95% 
Critical Value 
r = 0 r =1 11.56 27.58 r = 0 r >=1 27.68 47.86 
r <=1 r = 2 9.37 21.13 r <= 1 r >= 2 16.12 29.80 
r <=2 r = 3 6.70 14.26 r <= 2 r >= 3 6.75 15.49 
r <=3 r = 4 0.05 3.84 r <= 3 r >= 4 0.05 3.84 
Note: Trace and Max-eigenvalue tests indicate no cointegrating equations at the 0.05 level. Sample 
period 1993:Q1 to 2011:Q4.  
 
The results for the Johansen cointegration test for the exchange rate channel are 
presented in table 5.14 above. The table shows that both trace and maximum eigen 
values test statistic indicate no cointegrating equations. The null hypothesis of no 
cointegration could not be rejected because the test statistics are less than the critical 
values. 
 
Granger causality test 
Table 5.15: Granger Causality Test: The Exchange Rate Channel  
 Dependent Variable in Regression 
Regressor GY CP XR R 
GY 
CP 
XR 
R 
0.00 
0.95 
0.34 
0.52 
0.40 
0.00 
0.43 
0.27 
0.88 
0.99 
0.00 
0.77 
0.00** 
0.83 
0.21 
0.00 
Notes: (a) GY denotes output, CP denotes rate of price inflation, XR denotes real effective exchange rate 
and R denotes repo rate. (b) ** means a rejection of the null hypothesis at 5%. 
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Table 5.15 summarises the Granger causality results for the four-variable VAR. The 
results show that output can help to predict the repo rate. However, all the other 
variables do not help to predict one another. This is to say, there is no causality among 
the rest of the variables.  
 
Namibia is a small open economy and the exchange rate is crucial in monetary policy 
transmission for small open economies. The transmission mechanism of the exchange 
rate works directly through its impact on import prices aggregate demand via net 
exports (Ramos-Francia & Sidaoui, 2008:369). Monetary easing, for example, brings 
about a nominal depreciation, which in turn, given sticky prices in the short run, results 
in real exchange rate depreciation and hence higher exports (Afandi, 2005:187). There 
is an understanding that there are two ways in which monetary policy can maintain a 
degree of independence with the exchange rate channel present in the case of a fixed 
exchange rate regime. In particular, the exchange rate might not be completely fixed but 
vary slightly and secondly, monetary policy can influence the real exchange rate by 
working through the price level. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate whether the 
exchange rate is responsive to monetary policy shocks. 
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Impulse Response Function 
Figure 5.7: Impulse Responses to Exchange Rate Shocks: The Exchange Rate Channel 
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Figure 5.7 presents the responses of output and prices to shocks in the exchange rate. 
Innovations in the exchange rate resulted in output response remaining above and very 
close to the baseline, though there have been fluctuations throughout the entire horizon 
of estimate but not so major. The response of consumer prices to innovations in the 
exchange rate is only visible after two quarters. Consumer prices declined and went up 
again but above and very close to the baseline almost similar to that of output. The 
response of output to the repo rate in this case is not big because the line remains 
around the baseline. However, consumer prices decreased in response to innovations 
in the repo rate but very minor fluctuations. In spite of the weak responses, there is an 
indication of the importance of the exchange rate in monetary policy transmission.  
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Figure 5.8: Responses of Output, Consumer Prices and Exchange rate: The exchange rate 
channel 
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Figure 5.8 demonstrates that impulse responses of output and consumer prices to the 
repo rate differ when the exchange rate is endogenous from when it is exogenous. The 
response of output to monetary tightening is in line with economic theory. Repo rate 
shocks has transitory output effects that die out very quickly, the same can also be said 
about the response of consumer prices to monetary tightening. The figure shows 
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transitory price effects that die out on the short term. The exchange rate appreciated 
after an increase in the repo rate. The deviation of the responses is very minor and 
remains close to the steady line, meaning they are close to the baseline. This leaves a 
grey area in terms of whether or not the exchange rate is functional in Namibia. This is 
no surprise, in view of the fact that there existence of capital controls and the rigid 
exchange rate regime in Namibia.  
 
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition 
Table 5.16: Variance Decomposition: The Exchange Rate Channel  
Variance Decomposition of GY 
Quarter GY CP XR R 
1 100 0 0 0 
4 95.300 0.032 3.532 1.133 
8 89.570 0.124 6.576 3.730 
12 85.773 0.230 9.595 4.402 
16 83.352 0.298 12.147 4.204 
Variance decomposition of CP 
Quarter GY CP XR R 
1 0.112 99.888 0 0 
4 0.166 97.299 0.439 2.097 
8 0.340 95.622 1.670 2.368 
12 0.817 93.976 2.691 2.516 
16 1.225 92.894 3.263 2.618 
Variance decomposition of XR 
Quarter GY CP XR R 
1 0.316 0.120 99.564 0 
4 0.276 0.061 99.063 0.600 
8 1.003 0.069 92.620 6.308 
12 1.603 0.117 88.125 10.156 
16 1.906 0.169 86.621 11.304 
Variance decomposition of R 
Quarter GY CP XR R 
1 0.437 5.776 0.228 93.558 
4 0.501 3.295 0.980 95.224 
8 4.184 2.595 4.536 88.685 
12 10.852 2.424 7.993 76.672 
16 16.072 2.251 10.167 71.511 
 
Table 5.16 presents forecast error variance decompositions for each variable in the 
model over a 16-quarter forecast horizon. The result shows that fluctuations in the 
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output are mostly attributed to the exchange rate, reported to account for 6.6 per cent 
after eight quarters, 9.6 per cent after 12 quarters and 12.1 per cent after 16 quarters. 
The repo rate also accounts for fluctuations in the output but not as much as the 
exchange rate. It accounts for 4.4 after 12 quarters and 4.4 after 16 quarters. The 
variations in the consumer prices are also mostly dominated by the exchange rate, 
which accounts for 2.7 per cent after 12 quarters and 3.3 per cent after 16 quarters. The 
repo rate is the second variable that accounts for variations in consumer prices, but with 
relatively lower fluctuations compared to the exchange rate.  
 
The table also shows that fluctuations in the exchange rate are largely attributed to the 
repo rate, accounting for 6.3 per cent after eight quarters, 10.2 per cent after 12 
quarters and 11.3 per cent after 16 quarters. The variations in the repo rate are 
dominated by the output, accounting for 10.9 per cent after 12 quarters and 16.1 per 
cent after 16 quarters. The second variable that accounts for fluctuations in the repo 
rate is the exchange rate, accounting for 8 per cent and 10.2 per cent after 12 and 16 
quarters respectively. The relationship between output and the repo rate accounting for 
variations among them is not surprising, as it is evident from the result of the Granger 
causality and impulse responses. However, notably, the exchange rate accounts for 
fluctuations in almost all the other variables. This implies that inclusion of the exchange 
rate provides important additional information to the monetary transmission process but 
not so significant.  
 
5.2.5 The money effect model 
Cointegration test 
Table 5.17: Johansen Cointegration Test: The Money Effect Model 
Maximum Eigen Test Trace Test 
H0: rank = r Ha: rank = r Statistic 95% 
Critical Value 
H0: rank = r Ha: rank = r Statistic 95% 
Critical Value 
r = 0 r =1 99.65 27.58 r = 0 r >=1 172.89 47.86 
r <=1 r = 2 30.78 21.13 r <= 1 r >= 2 73.02 29.80 
r <=2 r = 3 22.69 14.26 r <= 2 r >= 3 42.24 15.49 
r <=3 r = 4 19.55 3.84 r <= 3 r >= 4 19.55 3.84 
Note: Both Max-eigenvalue and Trace tests indicates 4 cointegrating equations at the 0.05 level. Sample 
period 1993:Q1 to 2011:Q4.  
 
157 
 
Table 5.17 show the results of the cointegration test for the money effect model. The 
results confirm that there are 4 cointegrating equations as demonstrated by both the 
trace and maximum eigen values test statistics. 
 
Granger causality 
The results of the Granger causality for the four-variable VAR are presented in table 
5.18 below. The results show that output can help to predict the repo rate and money 
supply. Money supply helps to predict repo rate. However, all the other variables do not 
help to predict one another. This is to say there is no causality among the rest of the 
variables.  
 
Table 5.18: Granger Causality Test: The Money Effect Model 
 Dependent Variable in Regression 
Regressor GY CP M2 R 
GY 
CP 
M2 
R 
0.00 
0.95 
0.07 
0.52 
0.40 
0.00 
0.46 
0.27 
0.09*** 
0.97 
0.00 
0.36 
0.00** 
0.83 
0.04** 
0.00 
Notes: (a) GY denotes output, CP denotes rate of price inflation, M2 denotes money supply and R 
denotes repo rate. (b) ** means rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% and *** means rejection of the null 
hypothesis at 10%. 
 
The monetarist view is an alternative channel of monetary policy transmission. The 
underlying argument of this channel undermines the role of interest rates and liquid 
asset adjustment in the transmission mechanism, reducing the process to a direct link 
between changes in aggregate money supply and absorption (Bolnick, 1991). This view 
advocates that prices and output respond to monetary impulses because households 
and businesses fail to anticipate all the future implications of past and current actions 
(Meltzer, 1995). Ngalawa (2009:25) argues that the cause of this is the time lag 
between observing the impulses and differentiating between permanent and transitory 
impulses, as well as real and nominal shocks. A monetary shock drives in a wedge 
between money supply and money demand, allowing for portfolio adjustments, which in 
turn also alter spending decisions. This study used aggregate money supply (M2) as an 
indicator of the money effect to make an analysis of this model.  
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Impulse Response Function 
Figure 5.9 presents the responses of output, consumer prices and money supply to 
innovations in the repo rate and money supply. The figure shows that an increase in the 
money supply results in a decrease in output and this is inconsistent with what 
economic theory suggests. However, an increase in money supply results in an 
increase in consumer prices only after eight quarters. An increase in money supply 
results in an immediate increase in the repo rate, suggesting that the monetary 
authorities do take cognizance of the effect of money as an attribute of inflation. Hence, 
they respond with monetary tightening to curb inflation.  
 
Figure 5.9: Impulse Responses to Money Supply Shocks: The Money Effect Model 
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Figure 5.9 also shows that output decreases in response to the repo rate in the 
presence of shock to a non-policy variable. The consumer prices remain steady 
throughout in response to the repo rate. The response of the money supply to the repo 
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rate is not consistent with what economic theory suggests. Money supply increases in 
response to monetary tightening. Again a word of caution when interpreting these 
results, because this does not necessarily imply that monetary policy responds directly 
to money supply movements in and of themselves. But the endogenous changes in 
monetary policy are the response to all of the variables in the system, in particular 
inflation and output (Berkelmans, 2005:17).  
 
Figure 5.10: Responses of Output, Consumer Prices and Money Supply: The Money Effect model 
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Figure 5.10 demonstrates the impulse responses of output, consumer prices and money 
supply to the repo rate. There are similarities between the responses of output and 
money supply to monetary tightening. There appears to be no clear indication apart 
from a short decrease after two quarters for output and four quarters for money supply. 
However, both lines are moving around the baseline with some countable up and down 
swings. These fluctuations are noticeable in the entire horizon estimated. The same can 
be said about consumer prices. That is, the output transitory effects, price transitory 
effects and money supply transitory effects are present over the entire period of 
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estimate. These results seem to suggest that M2 does not contain important information 
in the monetary transmission process in Namibia. 
 
The results in figure 5.10 are in contradiction with those of figure 5.9, where increases in 
money supply results in an immediate increase in the repo rate, suggesting that 
monetary authorities do take cognizance of the effect of money as an attribute of 
inflation. Hence, they respond with monetary tightening to curb inflation. In actual fact 
Namibia practices a pegged exchange rate regime. A commitment to maintain the peg 
involves an obligation of the Central Bank to limit money creation to levels comparable 
to those of the country to whose its domestic currency is pegged (Mishkin, 2001:2). The 
pegged exchange rate becomes useful because money creation is associated with 
domestic inflation pressures. Under a pegged exchange rate, excessive expansionary 
monetary policies are restrained.  
 
The result of figure 5.9 confirms that in Namibia monetary policy had to be implemented 
in order to maintain the pegged exchange rate. That means that the money stock 
growth rate in Namibia had to be maintained at a similar growth rate as in South Africa 
(BON, 1996:21-23). This is a challenge to monetary authorities in Namibia because 
money stock is influenced by various factors, including open market operations of the 
Central Bank and financial flows into and out of the country. Monetary policy is precisely 
about how the central bank responds to these financial flows through its open market 
operations in order to achieve the money stock that its policy objective requires. The 
evidence of the credit channel suggests that the Namibian monetary authorities have 
conducted their open-market operations in such a manner that the net effect on the 
growth of the money stock of Namibia is apparent and effective.  
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Forecast Error Variance Decomposition 
Table 5.19: Variance Decomposition: The Money Effect Model  
Variance Decomposition of GY 
Quarter GY CP M2 R 
1 100 0 0 0 
4 90.74 3.78 2.68 2.81 
8 73.41 16.62 6.79 3.18 
12 78.60 8.76 8.15 4.49 
16 80.13 6.13 9.30 4.45 
Variance decomposition of CP 
Quarter GY CP M2 R 
1 4.06 95.94 0 0 
4 20.56 76.32 1.99 1.13 
8 62.55 21.94 10.76 4.76 
12 72.02 12.99 12.01 2.98 
16 76.33 11.51 9.02 3.13 
Variance decomposition of M2 
Quarter GY CP M2 R 
1 2.76 0.01 97.23 0 
4 67.06 2.25 25.07 5.63 
8 71.03 11.16 15.28 2.53 
12 71.24 10.88 14.12 3.76 
16 75.99 6.64 12.89 4.49 
Variance decomposition of R 
Quarter GY CP M2 R 
1 0.54 8.39 1.87 89.20 
4 70.57 2.36 2.42 24.66 
8 56.57 16.46 6.91 20.06 
12 65.00 9.78 7.22 18.00 
16 71.72 6.97 11.27 10.04 
 
Table 5.19 presents forecast error variance decompositions for each variable in the 
model over a 16-quarter forecast horizon. The result shows that fluctuations in the 
output are mostly attributed to consumer prices, particularly after four, eight and twelve 
quarters. Consumer prices account for 3.8, 16.6 and 8.8 per cent respectively. Money 
supply also accounted for fluctuations in output more notably after 16 quarters. The 
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fluctuations in consumer prices are mostly accounted for by output throughout the entire 
forecast horizon, with 76 per cent after 16 quarters. Money supply also accounts for 
variations in consumer prices but its magnitude is smaller compared to that of output.  
 
The table also shows that fluctuations in money supply are largely due to output, with 76 
per cent after 16 quarters. The fluctuation due to consumer prices also has an effect but 
it is relatively smaller in magnitude in comparison with that due to money supply. The 
variations in the repo rate are largely dominated by output throughout the entire forecast 
horizon, followed by those of consumer prices and money supply. However, the 
variation due to consumer prices and money supply are of relatively smaller magnitude 
compared to that due to output. Although there is no clear indication of the money effect 
in the impulse response, the variance decompositions suggest that inclusion of the 
money effect also provides important additional information to the monetary 
transmission process.  
 
5.2.6 The exchange rate pass-through 
Cointegration test 
Cointegration mimics that there exist a long run relation between the variables. The 
results for cointegration test for the ERPT model indicates that there is 1 cointegrating 
equation. This is confirmed by both the trace and maximum eigen values test statistics. 
 
Table 5.20: Johansen Cointegration Test: The Exchange Rate-Pass Through Model 
Maximum Eigen Test Trace Test 
H0: rank = r Ha: rank = r Statistic 95% 
Critical Value 
H0: rank = r Ha: rank = r Statistic 95% 
Critical Value 
r = 0 r =1 37.64 27.58 r = 0 r >=1 59.39 47.86 
r <=1 r = 2 16.52 21.13 r <= 1 r >= 2 21.74 29.80 
r <=2 r = 3 4.73 14.26 r <= 2 r >= 3 5.22 15.49 
r <=3 r = 4 0.49 3.84 r <= 3 r >= 4 0.49 3.84 
Note: Both Max-eigenvalue and Trace tests indicates 1 cointegrating equation at the 0.05 level. Sample 
period 1993:Q1 to 2011:Q4.  
 
Granger causality 
The results of the Granger-causality for the four-variable VAR are presented in table 
5.21 below. The results show that the exchange rate can help to predict consumer 
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prices. However, all the other variables do not help to predict one another, ie there is no 
causality among the rest of the variables.  
 
Table 5.21: Granger Causality Test: Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
 Dependent Variable in Regression 
Regressor CPSA NS GY CP 
CPSA 
NS 
GY 
CP 
0.00 
0.71 
0.06 
0.57 
0.50 
0.00 
0.42 
0.71 
0.60 
0.72 
0.00 
0.95 
0.40 
0.00** 
0.40 
0.00 
Notes: (a) CPSA denotes the inflation rate for South Africa, NS denotes exchange rate, GY denotes 
output and CP denotes rate of price inflation. (b) ** means rejection of the null hypothesis at 5%. 
 
Impulse Response Function 
Figure 5.11 plots the impulse responses for consumer prices, to one standard deviation 
shock to the exchange rate change. The vertical axes report the approximate 
percentage change in domestic prices in response to a 1 per cent shock in exchange 
rate. An increase in exchange rate reflects an appreciation. In response to one standard 
deviation shock to the exchange rate (in the form of appreciation), the price level index 
exhibits a continuous decline at least over 10 quarters. The plot seems to suggest that 
the shock to the exchange rate does contemporaneously affect the domestic price level 
in Namibia. This is contrary to the theoretical propositions, that domestic prices respond 
with lagged effect from the exchange rate shocks due to factors such as pricing strategy 
by firms, the dynamics of demand response, payment lags etc. 
 
Given the fact that the variables are co-integrated, it is expected that the shock to the 
exchange rate will lead to a deviation of the price level from its equilibrium in Namibia 
only for a short period of time, after which the rates are expected to converge to their 
long-run levels; this is the case, as shown in figure 5.11. There appear to be price 
transitory effects after 2 quarters and started to stabilise thereafter but far below the 
baseline or far from the steady state. The consumer prices effect appears to be of 
permanent in nature as from eight quarters onwards. In general, the analysis of the 
impulse responses suggest a high and long-lasting effect from changes in exchange 
rates to inflation in Namibia, or high ERPT into domestic inflation.  
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Figure 5.11: Impulse Responses to Exchange Rate Shocks: The Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
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Table 5.22 shows the results of the forecast error variance decomposition of the price 
level. The results demonstrate that the variations in the ERM are mostly explained by its 
own innovations in Namibia. Shocks to the exchange rate explain around one quarter or 
more of the movements in the price level and increases with time forecast. This result is 
comparable to the one reported by McCarthy (1999), who used the VAR model to 
investigate the ERPT in a set of nine industrial countries. From his variance 
decomposition analysis, McCarthy found changes in the exchange rate to account for 
about 5 to 30 per cent of the variations in consumer prices. Another study by Al Yahyaei 
(2011) on the relevancy of the US dollar peg to the economies of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council countries reported the same results. Such results imply that shocks to the 
exchange rate are partly responsible for explaining the forecast error variance of the 
price level. They also reflect that changes in the price level evolve endogenously with 
changes in the exchange rate, confirming the earlier findings above regarding the 
significant effect of the exchange rate variable, though incomplete, on the former 
variable. 
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Forecast Error Variance Decomposition 
 Table 5.22: Variance Decomposition: The Exchange Rate Pass-Through  
Variance Decomposition of CP 
Quarter CPSA NS GY CP 
1 18.09 2.13 0.26 79.52 
4 14.45 19.42 0.15 65.98 
8 14.37 25.22 0.13 60.28 
12 14.28 29.06 0.15 56.51 
16 14.12 30.95 0.15 54.73 
 
This study continues to estimate a single equation in order to compare the results from 
the VECM with restrictions and a single-equation approach better known as the error 
correction model (ECM). This is simply a re-estimation of the extent of the ERPT into 
the inflation rate in Namibia. It is an extension of the estimations of the simple OLS due 
to the fact that there are deficiencies in applying the OLS technique solely. Therefore, 
using an alternative or complementary technique is deemed necessary.  
 
One of the major drawbacks in the single equation techniques is that they do not allow 
for endogenous determination between the variables in the model. The assumption is 
that the dependent variable is endogenous to the movements or changes in 
independent variables, which are assumed to be exogenous. However, a number of 
studies, such as that by Taylor (2000), have argued that the pricing strategies of firms 
do not depend solely on the market conditions, but also on monetary policy or the 
expected future of monetary policy (Bandt & Banerjee, 2008). In fact, Taylor (2000) 
indicated that the extent of pass-through from the exchange rate to domestic prices 
depends on the inflationary environment of a nation. A low inflation environment 
decreases the extent of pass-through, because it reflects the expected impact of 
monetary shocks on current and future costs, which in turn are reduced by a stable 
inflation environment (Choudhri & Hakura, 2006). This argument has also been 
supported in various empirical studies, including those of Devereux and Yetman (2002) 
and Gagnon and Ihrig (2004). There has been a trend of empirical studies failing to find 
a co-integration relationship between the variables prior to estimating the pass-through 
using this framework of single equation or other techniques such as VAR.  
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Conventional theory in the literature on ERPT states that the level of variables is linked 
in the long term. According to Engel and Granger (1987), if a linear combination of two 
or more non-stationary variables is stationary, these variables are said to be co-
integrated, with the co-integrating equation interpreted to represent a long-run 
equilibrium relationship among the variables. The existence of co-integration implies the 
presence of an error correction representation showing the short-run adjustment to the 
long-run equilibrium among the variables. The strength of the ECM is its ability to 
incorporate short-run dynamics with long-run equilibrium relations among the variables 
(Kim, 1998). In this model inflation is explained in terms of past inflation, exchange rate, 
partner inflation and money supply. Where Pt is the domestic CPI, St is the nominal 
effective exchange rate (NEER), PSAt is the trading partner CPI, and M is money 
supply. The presentation of the results will follow that in the previous sections starting 
with cointegration test. 
 
Cointegration test 
Table 5.23: Johansen Cointegration Test: The Exchange Rate Pass-Through: Error Correction 
Model 
Maximum Eigen Test Trace Test 
H0: rank = r Ha: rank = r Statistic 95% 
Critical Value 
H0: rank = r Ha: rank = r Statistic 95% 
Critical Value 
r = 0 r =1 36.50 27.58 r = 0 r >=1 63.41 47.86 
r <=1 r = 2 16.21 21.13 r <= 1 r >= 2 26.92 29.80 
r <=2 r = 3 9.38 14.26 r <= 2 r >= 3 10.71 15.49 
r <=3 r = 4 1.34 3.84 r <= 3 r >= 4 1.34 3.84 
Note: Both Max-eigenvalue and Trace tests indicates 1 cointegrating equation at the 0.05 level. Sample 
period 1993:Q1 to 2011:Q4.  
 
Table 5.23 show the results of the cointegration test for the exchange rate pass through 
model. The results confirm that there is 1 cointegrating equation as demonstrated by 
both the trace and maximum eigen values test statistics. 
 
 Error correction model 
The long run equilibrium relation between variables may be found through co-integration 
analysis, but the regulating speed cannot be obtained when these variables depart from 
their common random trend. This problem may be solved using ECM. The error 
correction can be made with a group of variables with a co-integration relation. So error 
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correction, including the correction term, should be made based on the co-integration 
test so as to study the short-run dynamic regulating relation among the each of the 
above variables. The estimates for the ECM are displayed below in table 5.24. 
 
Table 5.24: ECM estimation 
Variables Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 
D(LNP(-1)) 
D(LNS(-1)) 
D(LNPSA(-1)) 
D(LNM(-1)) 
RESID01(-1) 
-0.044181 
0.394201 
-0.895234 
0.252648 
0.0783631 
-0.252690 
0.036136 
0.110026 
0.737257 
0.067252 
0.597458 
0.063060 
-1.222608 
3.582787 
-1.214274 
3.756722 
0.131161 
-4.007144 
0.2265 
0.0007 
0.2297 
0.0004 
0.8961 
0.0002 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log Likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
0.552166 
0.489313 
0.151608 
1.310144 
35.69414 
2.092854 
Mean Dependent Var 
S.D Dependent Var 
Akaike info criterion 
Schwarz criterion 
F-statistic 
Prob(F-statistic) 
-0.003512 
0.212151 
-0.808913 
-0.510324 
8.784928 
0.000000 
 
Source: Estimation using E-views 
 
Table 5.24 presents the results from the estimation of the ECM. In particular it illustrates 
all the variables lagged once plus the residual or error term. The error term appears with 
a statistically significant coefficient. The coefficient shows the speed of adjustment to a 
long-run solution that enters to influence short-run movements in inflation. It should be 
negative and less than unity in absolute terms, since a 100 per cent or instantaneous 
adjustment is not expected. It can be observed that domestic prices do adjust following 
disequilibrium in the long-run relationship. This conclusion is supported by the 
significance and correct sign (negative) of the adjustment coefficient in the equation, 
suggesting that domestic prices are endogenous. The results show that prices in the 
previous quarter have a significant impact on prices in the current quarter. This confirms 
the hypothesis of response of prices with lags, meaning there is no instantaneous 
adjustment but the impact is felt some time later. To be specific, a 1 percentage change 
in prices from the previous quarter leads to a 39 per cent change in the prices in the 
current quarter. 
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According to the results in table 5.24, of all variables investigated, the exchange rate 
variable appears to have the strongest impact on Namibian inflation, with a negative 
coefficient of 0.895234. This coefficient simply indicates that when the exchange rate 
depreciates by 1 per cent, inflation in Namibia increases by 90 per cent. This is 
consistent with monetary theory, which suggests that a decline in exchange rates can 
lead to an increase in domestic prices, except if it is being accommodated by the 
monetary authority; lowering the interest rate in turn increases aggregate demand and 
consequently output. However, the coefficient is not statistically significant. Taking 
everything into account, there is evidence of ERPT from the exchange rate to inflation. 
 
The results on the relationship between Namibian inflation and South African inflation 
are in line with the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between the Namibian 
CPI and the South African CPI. This can be attributed to the fact that there have been 
several occasions where Namibian monetary policy conduct was not following that of 
South Africa. Despite that, the coefficient for South Africa‘s CPI also has a strong 
impact on Namibia‘s inflation; however, this relationship is positive. This is expected for 
two reasons. First, Namibia and South Africa, together with Lesotho and Swaziland, are 
members of the CMA and with the inclusion of Botswana they are members of the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU). The second is that these two countries 
(Namibia and South Africa) are engaged in a currency arrangement in which the 
Namibian dollar is pegged to the South African rand at a 100 per cent rate. Therefore, 
the degree of economic integration between the two countries is very high and since the 
South African economy is the biggest in the region, the smaller economies will inherit 
both its benefits and drawbacks; inflation is no exception. 
 
There is a positive relationship between the Namibian CPI and the money supply 
(money supply defined as M2) but not statistically significant. The positive relationship 
between inflation and money supply can be explained by the quantity theory. The 
quantity theory is derived from the equation of exchange, which relates nominal income 
to the quantity of money and its velocity: M*V=P*Y. Monetarists assume that V and Y 
are constant in the short run (V because it depends on technological progress and this 
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takes time, Y because they believe that the economy at times is at full employment), so 
in the short run the equation above becomes M=P, which suggests that any increase in 
money supply leads to a proportionate increase in prices. 
 
The transmission mechanism by which money supply growth is transformed into 
inflation is made up of two processes: the direct process and the indirect process. The 
direct process involves increases in money supply finding their way into the pockets of 
economic agents (consumers, producers and suppliers of factors of production), who 
spend the money on goods and services. The resulting upward pressures on aggregate 
demand then lead to inflation. The indirect process involves the new money being 
deposited by economic agents with commercial banks and other financial institutions. 
These deposits provide a basis for further increases in money supply; they increase the 
capacities of these institutions to extend credit to economic agents. Monetarists, 
therefore, offer a reduction in the rate of growth in money supply as the only remedy for 
inflation, on the assumption that money supply is exogenously determined by the 
monetary authorities.     
 
Namibia being in a currency board arrangement, empirical studies suggest that in a 
currency board regime or exchange rate peg close to a currency board, the expansion 
of money supply is mainly done by running current account surplus. In the case of 
Namibia and South Africa this is done through higher exports over imports or through an 
increase in SACU revenue payments.   When the increase in money supply drives 
inflation above 6 per cent, which is the inflation target range implemented by South 
Africa, measures must be taken to bring it back to the targeted range or a fall in inflation 
is needed. The SARB increases the repo rate so that it can sell government securities 
to commercial banks to reduce the level of short-term liquidity in the economy. That will 
reduce the level of money supply in the economy; thereafter, inflation also falls. If the 
measure is to increase inflation, then the repo rate is decreased and the opposite 
happens. 
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As a consequence of being a member of the CMA, Namibia is not in a position to set its 
monetary policy fully independently from South Africa, which is the anchor country. 
However, it still has the ability to deviate to some extent from South Africa by using 
capital controls and prudential requirements that can be imposed on Namibian financial 
institutions. It is therefore possible for the BON to maintain a repo rate different from the 
repo rate of the SARB, when so required, and gives discretion to control the domestic 
money supply. This discretion enables the BON to control domestically induced 
inflation, which is estimated to contribute about 35 per cent to overall inflation in 
Namibia. 
 
The results of the ECM show that changes in the exchange rate have an impact on 
inflation in the long-run in Namibian. However, findings from other studies (Gagnon & 
Ihrig, 2004: Choudhri & Hakura 2006) have indicated that there is a declining trend in 
the extent of ERPT in various countries, including developing countries. However, 
Beirne and Bijsterbosch (2009) study in Central and Easter Europe found that there is 
evidence of high exchange rate pass-through and even higher for countries with fixed 
exchange rate. Nevertheless, the relatively higher ERPT into the inflation rate in 
Namibia in the long run can be explained by a number of factors. 
 
The degree of openness of an economy has been presented in a number of studies 
(Dornbusch, 1987). An economy would be exposed to higher pass-through if it is more 
open. Literature has alluded to the relative importance of the imports penetration ratio in 
the consumption basket of consumers. Namibia‘s economy is relatively open and highly 
import-dependent.  
 
Based on Taylor‘s (2000) theory, the persistence of inflation is expected to influence 
and dictate the relationship between movements in the exchange rate and domestic 
prices. For example, if increases in domestic prices are regarded as of persistent 
nature, there is a high chance that traders will pass the higher cost to their prices. This 
would lead to higher inflation.  
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Empirical analysis has illustrated that there is evidence of incomplete pass-though. A 
number of reasons can be cited from the vast body of theoretical literature on the pass-
through of exchange to explain the incomplete pass-through or the failure of the PPP 
theory in Namibia. The most common reason is that incomplete pass-through could be 
attributed to the low share of traded goods in the CPI baskets of Namibia. Despite the 
fact that the share of imported goods is considerable in Namibia‘s GDP, this share could 
be modest compared to the weight of non-tradables.  
 
A further reason for incomplete pass-through could be that the presence of relatively 
modern financial markets in Namibia has allowed importers to cover their profit and 
consequently consumer prices from fluctuation in exchange rates through hedging 
contracts. Moreover, the composition of a nation‘s import is also crucial in determining 
the extent of pass-through, for example moving away from importing raw materials and 
moving towards manufacturing. 
 
The monetary environment of Namibia could also have played another significant role in 
lowering pass-through from the exchange rate to inflation. For example, an inflationary 
expectation through depreciation of effective exchange rates in the Namibian dollar is 
believed to have been anchored through the pegged exchange rate regime. 
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5.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter presents the empirical estimations, analysis of the six models of the SVAR 
model and that of the price-generating process (ERPT) of the Namibian economy. In 
presenting the empirical findings the study adopts the following sequence; VAR/SVAR 
cointegration tests, Granger causality tests (GC), impulse response function (IRF) and 
forecast error variance (FEVD). The results from the empirical models show that the 
interest rate channel and credit channel are effective in Namibia, while the exchange 
rate is operative but weak (not effective). The money effect model may imply that 
inflation might not be a monetary phenomenon in Namibia. The exchange rate pass-
through model shows that there is a long-lasting effect from exchange rate to inflation in 
Namibia. This is confirmed by both the SVAR and ECM models. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 6. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter summarises the work, results and implications of chapter two, as well as 
the empirical results presented in chapter 6 in section 6.2. It also presents the general 
and specific conclusions and recommendations on the different channels of monetary 
policy transmission, as well as ERPT in Namibia. Section 6.3 addresses issues for 
future research. 
 
6.2 Summary 
 
This thesis investigated some aspects of the role of monetary policy in Namibia. 
Specifically, it investigated the relative importance of the different channels of monetary 
policy transmission and the implications of the exchange rate policy for the efficiency of 
monetary policy. Using the Granger causality as well as impulse response functions and 
forecast error variance analysis in VAR analysis, the study investigated the potential 
channels of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, with the objective of 
exploring the channels that serve as good vehicles to transmit shocks innovated by 
monetary policy actions to the real side of the economy and therefore of evaluating the 
efficiency of monetary policy. Using co-integration and equilibrium-correction models, 
the study investigated the existence of long-run relationships between changes in the 
exchange rate and domestic prices. This was done with the aim of estimating the ERPT 
and determining whether the purchasing power theory holds for Namibia. The main 
findings of the research pursued within the framework of this thesis are presented 
below. 
 
Chapter two presents an overview of Namibia‘s monetary policy. It starts off with the 
definition of monetary policy, which is defined broadly as any policy relating to the 
supply of money. The chapter then focuses on the conduct of monetary policy. This is 
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done by analysing the various monetary policy frameworks by comparing their 
advantages and disadvantages. The discussion extends to monetary policy rules. This 
is done with the aim of enhancing understanding of how the Central Bank alters the 
nominal interest rate in response to developments in inflation and macroeconomic 
activities. The chapter also considers the alternative or unconventional monetary policy 
to understand how the Central Bank responds in the wake of a financial crisis. The 
discussion also touches on the case of small open economies, of which Namibia is one, 
by taking an interest in the problem trilema (having free capital flows, a fixed exchange 
rate and an independent monetary policy). Finally, the chapter describes the evolution 
of monetary policy in Namibia. Thereafter, an evaluation of monetary policy in terms of 
macroeconomic indicators is made. The indicators include inflation, interest rates, 
money supply credit as ratio of GDP and output.  The reason for this attention is that 
monetary policy can have important effects on aggregate demand and through it on real 
GDP, unemployment, real foreign exchange rates, real interest rates, the composition of 
output and many other things. 
 
Chapter three presents a literature review for each channel of the monetary policy. The 
channels discussed in this chapter are the interest rate channel, the credit channel and 
the exchange rate and asset price channel. In addition to the various channels, the 
discussion also extends to the ERPT. The aim of this discussion is to find some gaps in 
the literature that may be filled in for the purpose of this study. The discussion is divided 
into two parts, namely theoretical literature and empirical literature. The theoretical 
section presents various theoretical arguments on how monetary policy impulses are 
transmitted to the real sector. The discussion is extended to look at how changes in the 
exchange rate alter relative prices, better known as ERPT. The empirical literature 
reviewed the empirical modelling of monetary policy shocks. Subsequently, empirical 
evidence of the channels of monetary policy transmission both locally and 
internationally is discussed, to draw lessons from what is being done in terms of current 
empirical work. Furthermore, the purpose is to identify gaps in the empirical work thus 
far and to indicate how these gaps could be filled. 
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Chapter four presents the methodological framework employed in conducting empirical 
analysis of the different channels of monetary policy transmission in Namibia. In doing 
so the chapter reviews the VAR framework, its critics and a formal exposition of the 
VAR model. The chapter extends the discussion to identification strategies. It also 
presents the construction of an SVAR model for Namibia. This model is estimated to 
assess the relative strength of channels of monetary policy transmission in Namibia. 
The chapter also presents a single equation model for analysing the ERPT in Namibia. 
A brief discussion on the various steps of analysis is also presented. Finally, the chapter 
presents the data, data sources and data measurements. This is to inform the reader on 
the variables used to capture the data employed. 
 
Chapter five presents the empirical estimation of the six models of the SVAR model and 
that of the price-generating process (ERPT) of the Namibian economy, as specified. 
These results are used in examining the extent to which these specifications are able to 
identify the effects of monetary policy shocks in Namibia. The chapter thus analyses the 
impulse response function of each variable to a monetary policy-tightening shock based 
on individual model specification. The specifications, together with their identification 
assumptions, are assessed by comparing the implied dynamic responses to monetary 
policy disturbances with the predictions derived from the theory.  
 
Chapter six concludes the thesis. It briefly highlights the main empirical findings and 
makes some policy recommendations. The chapter also extends the discussion on the 
shortcomings of this study and makes suggestions for future research. 
 
The empirical findings on the interest rate channel show that shocks to the monetary 
policy operating target result in a significant response in consumer prices and 
insignificant output response. One can conclude that it indicates that the interest rate 
channel is effective in Namibia. Overall, the results imply that monetary policies working 
through both long-run and short-run interest rates have a significant effect on prices, but 
not output. 
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The results on the credit channel show two notable outcomes. Firstly, consumer price 
response to an increase in the repo rate shows a price puzzle. Secondly, the bank 
channel only start working after two quarters and not immediately following monetary 
tightening. However, there is evidence that the bank lending channel is operational. This 
is consistent with economic theory. The bank lending channel thus appears to have 
operated in the same manner as is evident in other international empirical studies. For 
example, in response to a monetary policy shock, commercial banks often cut down on 
the supply of credit. This in turn has a greater impact on macroeconomic activity.  
 
The results on the exchange rate channel demonstrate that impulse responses of output 
and consumer prices to the repo rate differ when the exchange rate is endogenous 
rather than exogenous. The response of output to monetary tightening is in line with 
economic theory. The same can also be said about the response of consumer prices to 
monetary tightening. The exchange rate appreciated after an increase in the repo rate 
but only relatively. This leaves a grey area in terms of whether or not the exchange rate 
is functional in the Namibian case. This is no surprise in view of existing capital controls 
and the rigid exchange rate regime of Namibia. Overall, there is evidence that the 
exchange rate channel has operated as a monetary policy transmission in Namibia. 
However, the effect is not particularly significant, since Namibia practises a pegged 
exchange rate and capital controls. These results conform with other international 
studies that found that the exchange rate is functional but not significantly so. 
 
The money effect model confirms that inflation in Namibia is not a monetary 
phenomenon. This is supported by the empirical findings, which confirmed that the 
monetary policy had to be implemented in order to maintain the pegged exchange rate. 
That means that the money stock growth rate in Namibia had to be maintained at a 
similar growth rate as in South Africa. This is a challenge to monetary authorities in 
Namibia because money stock is influenced by various factors, including open market 
operations of the Central Bank and financial flows into and out of the country. Monetary 
policy is precisely about how the central bank responds to these financial flows through 
its open market operations in order to achieve the money stock that its policy objective 
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requires. The evidence of the credit channel suggests that the Namibian monetary 
authorities have conducted their open market operations in such a manner that the net 
effect on the growth of the money stock of Namibia is apparent and effective.  
 
The results for ERPT from SVAR show a high and long-lasting effect from changes in 
exchange rates to inflation in Namibia. Alternatively, there is high ERPT into domestic 
inflation. Since the variables are co-integrated, it is expected that a shock to the 
exchange rate will lead to the deviation of the price level from its equilibrium in Namibia 
only for a short period of time, after which it is expected to converge to its long-run 
levels. The impulse response confirms that hypothesis. The results for ERPT from ECM 
confirm the hypothesis of response of prices with lags, meaning there is no 
instantaneous adjustment, but the impact is felt some time later. Statistically, the error 
term appears with a statistically significant coefficient. The coefficient shows the speed 
of adjustment to a long-run solution that enters to influence short-run movements in 
inflation. This conclusion is supported by the significance and correct sign (negative) of 
the adjustment coefficient in the equation, suggesting that domestic prices are 
endogenous. The results also confirm the incomplete pass-through, indicating that the 
PPP theory does not hold, with regard to the price level, in the context of Namibia. The 
increasing long-run pass-through in Namibia can be attributed to many factors, such as 
the degree of openness of the Namibian economy and the current exchange rate 
regime, namely the peg system for Namibia. By considering the current conditions of 
the Namibian economy, the monetary authority can effect actions such as partial 
monetary policy (required reserve, credit controls, and open-market operations), 
containing domestic demand and addressing supply bottlenecks, to enable the 
Namibian economy to maintain a low impact from the external side on domestic prices 
and generally to control rising inflation. 
 
To sum up, the results on the different channels of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism indicate that the interest rate channel and the credit channel are effective in 
transmitting monetary policy actions. The exchange rate channel is also operative, but 
not effective.  The results of the study on the pass-through relationship suggest that for 
178 
 
Namibia, importing monetary policy from South Africa via the dollar peg to the rand 
ensure stable domestic inflation is viable. Furthermore, it does not reflect a high risk 
posed by the existing Namibian dollar peg to the South African rand.  This is reflected in 
the fact that on several occasions Namibian monetary policy conduct was not following 
that of South Africa. This suggests significant freedom for local monetary authorities in 
Namibia to pursue macroeconomic goals.  
 
Furthermore, there is consensus that the evaluation or pronunciation of the 
appropriateness of an exchange rate regime should be based on how it performs over 
time and not only on how it performs in a strenuous situation. In this view, the Namibia 
dollar peg to the South African rand is still viewed as viable and effective. An evaluation 
of monetary policy in terms of macroeconomic indicators shows that these indicators 
have been stable over the past two decades. This further confirms that the existing 
pegged exchange rate regime has served its purpose and supported the economic 
performance of Namibia. The estimated results from both models confirmed the 
relationship between movements in exchange rate and inflation in Namibia. 
 
6.3 Issues for Future Research 
 
The findings of this thesis raise some concern regarding the effectiveness of bank 
lending, a component of the credit channel, particularly the issue of identification. 
Though evidence of the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission is detected, this 
is not enough. The findings of the thesis provoke the need for further research into the 
following issues:  
First, a future study should address the problem of identification on the bank lending 
channel in Namibia by either using disaggregated data or employing a technique that 
addresses this issue, such as identifying or differentiating between supply and demand 
for loans.  
 
179 
 
Second, this study did not address the issue of monetary-induced changes in the goods 
markets, for example the extent to which investment, consumption and other 
components of aggregate demand play a role in the monetary policy transmission. The 
study by Uanguta and Ikhide (2002) only examined the investment component. That 
leaves questions about other components unanswered. Empirical studies on all aspects 
of the behaviour of different economic agents in Namibia are rare and a lot of work is 
needed in this regard. Further investigation of the channels of monetary policy 
transmission, especially the asset prices channel, might cast new light on the 
mechanism in which this transmission takes place. 
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APPENDIX  
 
Review of Stationarity, Co-integration and Diagonstic Test  
It is important to know the statistical properties of individual series because they can 
determine the distributions of estimators and test statistics in models 
 
Stationarity 
Stationarity in variables is very important in econometric analysis particularly when 
studying the behavioural pattern of different time series. According to Rothman and May 
(1999) a series is said to be stationary if the following three conditions are 
simultaneously satisfied: 
 
 the mean is constant through time, that is, 
)( tXE                                   (1) 
 the variance is constant through time, that is, 
2)][()(   tt XEXVar                     (2) 
 the covariance depends only upon the number of periods between two values, 
that is, 
kkttktt XXEXXCov    )])([(),(                   (3) 
 
The importance of this characteristic becomes handy as models containing variables 
that are non-stationary could lead to spurious (misleading) regression results. These 
could lead to incorrect conclusions being made thus leading to incorrect policy 
formulations. However, the problem of non-stationarity can be addressed by 
differencing the variables a number of times to generate stationarity (Gujarati, 2003). 
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Test for Stationarity 
There are various two approaches for testing for stationarity of a variable. The first 
method involves looking at the visual plot of the variable to see if there is an obvious 
trend in the data. The second method better known as the formal method and more 
preferred involves performing the Dickey-Fuller (DF) tests of stationarity by testing the 
hypothesis that a serie is unit root (AR(1)). Regression analysis in respect of the DF test 
is done according to three different forms as follows: 
ttt YY   1                                   (4) 
ttt YY   11                       (5) 
tttt YY   121               (6) 
Equation 4 shows that tY  is a random walk, equation 5 shows that tY  is a random walk 
with drift while, Equation 6 shows that tY  is a random walk with drift around a stochastic 
trend. The null hypothesis in all the three equation is that ,0  which implies presence 
of a unit root, hence the non-stationarity in the time series. The alternative hypothesis is 
that is less than zero, implying stationarity in the time series.  The subscript t refers to 
time or the trend variable. The decision of rejecting the null hypothesis confirms 
stationarity in the time series. The DF test has a disadvantage of being based on the 
AR(1) process only and it assumes that the error term, t  , is not correlated with 1t  . 
This makes the DF test not a very useless test whenever the error terms ( t  and 1t  ) 
are correlated. The problem of having correlated error terms is solved by augmenting 
the three forms above by including a lagged dependent variable tY  . This refers to a new 
test, called the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. There are other tests such as 
Phillip-Perron(PP), KPSS e.t.c.  The ADF specifically refers to the transformation of 
Equation 6 above to the following regression model: 
t
m
t
ittttt YYY   


1
121                    (7) 
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Where t  is a white noise error term. The main aim of the ADF is to ensure that the 
error term in Equation 7 is serially uncorrelated through the inclusion of enough terms. 
The null hypothesis remains the same for both the DF and the ADF tests. 
 
Co-integration 
Co-integration refers to a long-run relationship of variables linked to form an equilibrium 
relation when individual series are non-stationary in levels, but become stationary with 
differencing. This implies that if two or more series are non-stationary, given that a 
linear combination of them is stationary, then the series are said to be cointegrated. 
Two or more series are co-integrated when they have comparable long-run properties. 
This implies that although individual series could be unstable and diverge from each 
other in the short-run, they may converge towards a long-run equilibrium value. Co-
integration is very important as it provides a way of eliminating the problem of spurious 
regressions in non-stationary series. It also helps in identifying both the long and short-
run relationships. 
 
Testing for Co-integration 
Co-integration seeks to avoid spurious regressions of non-stationary series as 
highlighted earlier. Two non-stationary series are said to be co-integrated if they tend 
tomove together through time. One can adopt the Engle-Granger (E-G) two step 
approach in testing for univariate co-integration or the Johansen cointegration test for 
multivariate cointegrating vectors. The Engle-Granger approach tries to investigate the 
possibility of co-integration in bivariate models. When a set of economic variables are 
co-integrated, a statistical foundation is laid which enables the use of an ECM. The null 
hypothesis is usually that the two series are not co-integrated while the alternative 
hypothesis is that the two series are co-integrated. These hypotheses can be 
formulated formally as follows: 
 
H0: X and Y are not co-integrated, this implies that i  ‘s are I(1); versus 
H1: X and Y are co-integrated, this implies that i  ‘s are I(0) 
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The decision is made based on the following condition: if the test statistic is less than its 
critical value, then the null hypothesis is rejected, and hence, the alternative hypothesis 
is accepted. The test of co-integration is applied to residuals from which the co-
integration regression Dickey-Fuller (CRDF) test is performed. Let‘s consider: 
 
ttt w 1ˆˆ                         (8) 
 
Subtracting 1ˆ t from both sides of (10) yields: 
 
ttt w 1ˆ)1(ˆ                         (9) 
Or 
ttt w 1ˆˆ   
 
Where 1    
 
It is worth noting that there is no constant in the regression. The null hypothesis is no 
co-integration against the alternative hypothesis that X and Y are co-integrated. This 
implies that we test for: 
 
H0: 0 (hence 1 ) and tˆ  is I(1); versus 
H1: 1  (hence 1 ) and tˆ  is I(0) 
Equation 4.11 above is estimated by OLS. The test statistic is calculated as the t-
statistic associated with the coefficient on the residuals, given as t = 
)ˆ(

SE
. 
The decision to reject the null hypothesis is based on the following condition; if 
calculated value of test statistic is greater than critical value, then the null hypothesis of 
no co-integration is rejected. This means that Xt and Yt are co-integrated. 
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Model Diagnostic Testing 
This section presents various econometric diagnostic tests, which can be adopted to 
investigate whether a certain model is a reasonable fit for the data. One of the main 
reasons for diagnostic testing is to determine whether the model conforms to the 
classical assumptions of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions such as 
normality, no serial correlation, homoscedasticity and correct functional form. The 
diagnostic tests are shown by the various statistics, such as the coefficient of 
determination, R2, the D-W statistic, the F-statistic and others. The R2 simply helps give 
an indication of how well the sample regression line fits the data. An R2 equal to one 
indicates a perfect fit of the sample data while an R2 equal to zero indicates that there is 
no relationship between the dependent and the explanatory variables. This implies that 
the higher the R2, the better the regression model. It also shows how much of the 
dependent variable is explained by the independent variables in the study. 
 
The Jargue-Bera (JB) test for normality is performed to test the null hypothesis that the 
error term is normally distributed. This test follows a chi-square distribution with two 
degrees of freedom. The normality of the error term allows the use of hypothesis testing 
for statistical inference. 
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Table 3.2.1: Summary of Empirical Studies on the Interest Rate Channel 
Author(s), 
Year 
Country(ies) Study 
Period 
Model & 
Method of 
Estimation 
 
Variables Included Key Finding(s) 
Cook and Hahn 
(1989) 
USA 1974-1979 OLS Term interest rates 
(treasury rate), one 
year forward rate and 
commodity prices 
Federal Funds rate 
caused large 
movements in short-
term rates and smaller 
but significant 
movements in 
intermediate- and long-
term rates. In particular 
monetary policy raises 
long term real interest 
rates at all maturities 
 
Roley and 
Sellon (1995) 
USA 1993-1994 OLS Term interest rates 
(treasury rate), one 
year forward rate and 
commodity prices 
Short-term rates in the 
US follow the same 
trend as the federal 
funds rate, which the 
monetary policy 
instrument in the US.  
 
Levy, J. and 
Halikias, I. 
(1997) 
France 1983-1995 
(monthly 
data) 
Structural 
VAR with 
non-recursive 
identification 
restriction. 
French call-money 
interest rate, German 
call-money interest 
rate, nominal effective 
exchange rate, credit to 
the French economy, 
long term (10 year) 
bond yield, money 
aggregates (M1), CPI, 
Quarterly GDP 
interpolated using 
monthly industrial 
production figures. 
The short term interest 
rate for both countries 
had little impact on 
prices. However, an 
increase in short term 
interest for German 
leads to a strong and 
statistically significant 
dampening of output 
while for France was 
zero and insignificant. 
Hardy (1998) Germany 1985-1995 OLS 3month interbank rate, 
Lombard rate, discount 
rate and repurchase 
rate 
German‘s market 
interest rates responded 
significantly to changes 
in the official rates 
during the 1990s. These 
responses became even 
stronger when the 
changes in official rates 
are categorized into 
anticipated and 
unanticipated changes. 
 
Kusmiarso,  
Sukawati,  
Pambudi,  
Angkoro,  and 
Hafidz  (2002) 
Indonesia 1989-2000 
(monthly 
data) 
Granger 
Causality and 
4-variable 
Interbank 
rate(monetary policy 
indicator), real 3-month 
(1-month) deposit rate, 
real bank investment 
loan rate (cost of 
capital proxy), and 
investment growth, 
consumption growth 
and percentage 
Pre crisis: the cost of 
capital was effective in 
transmitting the effects 
of monetary policy due 
to stable banking and 
real sector; monetary 
policy-induced 
substitution effect 
between the real one 
month deposit rate and 
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change in consumption 
deflator 
consumption growth was 
weak due to rigidity of 
deposit rate 
Post crisis: investment 
grows negatively and 
real bank investment 
rate declines in 
response to monetary 
policy tightening. 
Al-Mashat 
(2003) 
India 1980 – 
2002 
(quarterly) 
VECM Interest rate, exchange 
rate, GDP and CPI 
Interest rate is effective 
Peersman and 
Smets (2003) 
Euro and 
USA 
1980-1998 VAR model Short term interest 
rate, output, prices and 
exchange rate. 
In both economies an 
increase in interest rate 
reduces output and 
prices immediately. 
Output recovers later 
while reduction in prices 
is gradual and become 
significant and 
permanent later on. 
Bredin and 
O‘Reilly (2004) 
Ireland 1980-1996 
(quarterly 
data) 
Structural 
VAR model 
Interest rate, output, 
prices, exchange rate 
Exogenous temporary 
increase in the short-
term interest rate leads 
to a decline in output 
and prices with the latter 
responding more 
sluggishly 
Ramlogan 
(2004) 
Carribean 1970 - 
2000 
(quarterly 
data) 
Structural 
VAR 
GDP, reserves, 
deposits, loans, 
exchange and prices. 
Interest rate not effective 
Cheng (2006) Kenya 1977-2005 Structural 
VAR model 
Interest rate, output, 
price and nominal 
effective exchange 
rate. 
Exogenous increase in 
the short term interest 
rate leads to a decline in 
prices but has 
insignificant impact on 
output. 
Dabla-Norris 
and 
Floerkemeier 
(2006) 
Armenia 2000-2005 
(monthly 
data) 
Granger 
causality test 
and VAR 
model 
Repo rate, nominal 
effective exchange 
rate, narrow money, 
GDP and prices 
Interest rate channel 
was found to be weak. 
Al-Mashat 
(2007) 
Egypt    Interest rate is efective 
Al-Mashat and 
Billmeier 
(2007) 
Egypt 1996 - 
2005 
(monthly 
data) 
VAR model Nominal effective 
exchange rate, output, 
prices and three-month  
deposit rate 
Interest rate channel is 
weak 
Aziakpono et al 
(2007) 
South Africa 1973 - 
2004 
 overnight prime 
interbank lending rates 
(PIRB), the three-
month negotiable 
certificate of deposit 
(NCD)  
The results show that all 
the variables are highly 
responsive to monetary 
policy actions by South 
Africa‘s Reserve Bank 
(SARB).   
 
Maturu (2007) Kenya  Structural 
VAR 
Oil prices, FEDRATE, 
TOT, GDP, CPI, 
RMONEY, NEER, 
REPORATE. 
Interest rate channel is 
operational 
Amarasekana 
(2008) 
Sri-Lanka 1978 to 
2005 
VAR GDP, CPI, SDR 
Exchange rate, reserve 
Interest rate effective 
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(monthly) money and interbank 
call 
Neaime (2008) MENA 
countries 
 Structural 
VAR 
Interest rate, output, 
exchange rate and 
prices 
Direct linkages between 
the interest and inflation 
rates do not significant 
for Jordan, Lebanon and 
Turkey, but significant 
for Egypt, Morocco, and 
Tunisia. The extent to 
which the interest rate 
works through the 
through GDP to 
decrease inflation 
remains substantially 
uncertain. 
Shabbir (2008) Fiji and PNG Fiji: 
1971:Q1 
to 2003: 
Q4 
PNG: 
1974:Q1 
to 2003: 
Q4 
VAR Effective exchange 
rate, reserves, 
deposits, loans, CPI 
and GDP. 
Interest rate is not 
operational for Fiji but 
not for PNG. 
Bates and 
Hachichanga 
(2009) 
Tunisia 1988-2007 
(monthly 
data) 
Structural 
VAR 
Interest rate, lending 
rate, domestic credit, 
real effective exchange 
rate, GDP and 
prices(inflation rate) 
The interest rate 
channel is effective 
Ngalawa 
(2009) 
Malawi 1988 to 
2005 
(monthly 
data) 
Structural 
VAR model 
Bank rate (monetary 
policy indicator), 
reserve money, 
commercial bank 
loans, exchange rate, 
aggregate money 
supply, consumer 
prices and output 
Bank rate is a more 
effective measure of 
monetary policy 
compared to reserve 
money in pursuance of 
both price stability and 
high growth and 
employment objectives. 
However, consumer 
prices respond weakly to 
monetary impulses 
suggesting that inflation 
in Malawi may not be 
predominated by 
monetary factors. 
Bonga-Bonga 
(2009) 
South Africa 1979-2007 
(quarterly 
data) 
Structural 
VAR 
Output, consumer 
price, short term 
interest rate and long 
term interest rate 
The study showed that 
the interest rate channel 
is effective in monetary 
policy transmission in 
South Africa. 
Skriner (2010) Austria, 
Germany, 
Spain and 
Greece 
1999-2010 Structural 
VAR 
interest rates, bank-
lending, economic 
growth and prices 
The interest rate 
channel is effective only 
in Austria and Germany. 
Tsangarides 
(2010) 
Mauritius 1990 to 
2009 
(quarterly 
data) 
Structural 
VAR 
GDP, CPI, M2 repo 
rate and NEER 
Interest rate is effective 
but not significant 
Acosta-
Ormaecheo 
and Coble 
(2011) 
Chile, New 
Zealand, Peru 
and Uruguay 
1999 -
2010 
(monthly) 
VAR Money market rate, 
output and inflation rate 
Interest rate is effective 
in Chile and Nee 
Zealand 
Javid and 
Munir (2011) 
Pakistan 1992 – 
2010 
Structural 
VAR 
Inflation, TB6, interest 
rate, CPI, exchange 
Interest rate ineffective 
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(monthly) rate and money supply 
Kabundi and 
Ngwenya 
(2011) 
South Africa 1985 to 
2007 
(monthly) 
FAVAR GDP, CPI, repo 
reserve, commodity 
price index, credit, SA 
all share index, 
business confidence 
Interest rate is effective 
Ncube and 
Ndou (2011) 
South Africa 2000 – 
2010 
(monthly) 
Bayesian 
VAR 
Foreign exchange 
reserve, GDP, inflation 
rate, growth in nominal 
rand, NEER, REER, oil 
price, real interest rate 
Interest rate is 
ineffective 
Kashif and 
Abdul (2012) 
Pakistan 1992 – 
2010 
(monthly) 
VAR and 
FAVAR 
GDP, money supply, 
CPI and interest rate 
Interest rate channel is 
effective 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
219 
 
Table 3.2.2: Summary of Empirical Studies on the Credit Channel 
Author(s), 
Year 
Country(ies) Study 
Period 
Model & 
Method of 
Estimation 
 
Variables Included Key Finding(s) 
King, S.R. 
(1986) 
USA 1953-1984 
(quarterly) 
Unrestricted 
VAR model 
Real GNP, demand deposit, 
sum of bank loans, rate on 
short term bank loans and 
three month Treasury bill 
rate 
Bank deposits were 
more superior that 
commercial and 
industrial loans or 
total bank loans in 
terms of monetary 
policy transmission. 
Bernanke 
(1986) 
USA 1953-1995 
(quarterly 
data) 
Structural VAR  Real GNP, GNP price 
deflator, real defense 
spending, money stock, 
monetary base, the sum of 
commercial bank loans and 
nominal interest 
rate/3month Treasury bill 
rate. 
Aggregate demand 
innovations 
significantly 
depended on the 
shock to bank loans. 
Credit is important 
in the transmission 
mechanism of 
monetary policy.  
Bernanke and 
Blinder (1988) 
USA 1974-1985 Instrumental 
Variable 
Real GNP, GNP 
deflator,3month Treasury 
bill rate, credit aggregate. 
Credit was more 
correlated with 
output.  
 
      
Oliner and 
Rudebusch 
(1994) 
USA 1973-1991 Structural VAR 
model 
Debt (bank loans, 
commercial paper, other 
non-bank debt), monetary 
policy indicators (Romer‘s 
dummies and changes in 
the Fed fund rate) 
The findings are 
consistent with the 
view of the broad 
creditchannel that 
there is information 
asymmetries 
problem for the 
lenders. 
 
Buttigliani and 
Ferri (1994) 
Italy 1988-1993 
(monthly 
data) 
VAR(recursive 
structure) 
Overnight rate (monetary 
policy indicator), rate on 
government paper, amount 
of credit approved by banks 
(credit supply), amount of 
credit actually drawn (credit 
demand), average loan 
interest rate and index of 
industrial production; 
Exogenous variables: 
industrial production price 
index and three dummies 
that capture the intervention 
of the Central Bank of Italy 
in 1988 and 1989. 
Monetary tightening 
shock has negative 
impact on credit 
supply and widens 
the gap between 
loan interest rate 
and rate on 
government paper. 
Moreover, industrial 
production also 
responds positively 
to credit supply 
shocks.  
Kakes (2000) Netherlands 1979-1993 
(quarterly 
data) 
Vector Error 
Correction 
Model (VECM) 
Interest rate on bank loans, 
long term interest rate, real 
GDP, banks‘ bond holding 
and bank loans. 
Bank lending is 
insignificant in 
monetary policy 
transmission. 
Disyatat and 
Vongsinsirikul 
(2003) 
Thailand 1993-1999 
(quarterly 
data) 
VAR model 
(recursive 
structured) 
GDP, consumer price index, 
14 day repurchase rate and 
one of these (bank credit, 
real exchange rate, stock 
price) 
Bank lending has 
been the strongest 
but weakened after 
the 1997 financial 
crisis. 
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responding more 
sluggishly 
Ramlogan 
(2004) 
Carribean 1970 - 
2000 
(quarterly 
data) 
Structural VAR GDP, reserves, deposits, 
loans, exchange and prices. 
The credit channel 
has been 
operational but not 
very significant. 
Markidou and  
Nikolaidou 
(2005)  
Greece 1995-2005 
(monthly 
data) 
Structural VAR 
model 
Output, price level, money 
stock, credit and monetary 
policy variable. 
The credit channel 
has been 
inoperative meaning 
monetary policy was 
ineffective. 
Dabla-Norris 
and 
Floerkemeier 
(2006) 
Armenia 2000-2005 
(monthly 
data) 
Granger 
causality test 
and VAR 
model 
Repo rate, nominal effective 
exchange rate, narrow 
money, GDP and prices 
The credit channel 
is effective but not 
so significantly 
Schaller and 
Junayed 
(2006) 
Canada 1980 - 
2004 
Structural VAR 
model 
Price level, output, money, 
interest rate (overnight), 
exchange rate, world price 
commodities, Fed funds 
rate and other variables 
The credit channel 
has been effective.   
 
Al-Mashat 
(2007) 
Egypt    Bank channel 
ineffective 
Al-Mashat and 
Billmeier 
(2007) 
Egypt 1996 - 
2005 
(monthly 
data) 
VAR model Nominal effective exchange 
rate, output, prices and 
three-month  deposit rate 
The credit channel 
has been effective. 
Maturu (2007) Kenya  Structural VAR Oil prices, FEDRATE, TOT, 
GDP, CPI, RMONEY, 
NEER, REPORATE. 
The credit channel 
has been 
operational 
Amarasekara 
(2008) 
Sri-Lanka 1978 – 
2005 
(monthly) 
VAR GDP, CPI, SDR exchange 
rate, reserve money and 
interbank call 
Money not effective 
Shabbir 
(2008) 
Fiji and PNG Fiji: 
1971:Q1 
to 2003: 
Q4 
PNG: 
1974:Q1 
to 2003: 
Q4 
VAR Effective exchange rate, 
reserves, deposits, loans, 
CPI and GDP. 
The credit channel 
is effective for PNG 
but not for Fiji. 
Suzuki (2008) Australia and 
New Zealand 
1988-2005 Structural VAR Output, prices, interest rate, 
exchange rate, lending rate 
and quantity of loan. 
Monetary policy 
tightening leads to a 
decline in the supply 
of loans. Output 
also falls. 
 
Bates and 
Hachichanga 
(2009) 
Tunisia 1988 to 
2007 
(monthly) 
Structural VAR Interest rate, lending rate, 
domestic credit, real 
effective exchange rate, 
GDP and prices(inflation 
rate) 
The credit channel 
has been effective 
Aleem (2010) India 1996 – 
2007 
(quarterly) 
VAR  Credit channel is 
effective 
Ogun and 
Akinlo (2010) 
Nigeria 1986 to 
2006 
(quarterly 
data) 
Structural VAR 
model 
Bank rate (monetary policy 
indicator), reserve money, 
commercial bank loans, 
exchange rate, aggregate 
money supply, consumer 
prices and output 
Bank deposits, 
securities holdings 
and total loans and 
advances 
responded slowly to 
monetary policy 
shock during the 
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simulation period. 
The bank credit 
channel is 
ineffective. 
Tsangarides 
(2010) 
Mauritius 1999 to 
2009 
(quarterly 
data) 
Structural VAR GDP, CPI, M2 repo rate 
and NEER 
The credit channel 
is effective but not 
so significant 
Ncube and 
Ndou (2011) 
South Africa 2000 – 
2010 
(monthly) 
Bayesian VAR Foreign exchange reserve, 
GDP, CPI, growth in 
nominal rand, NEER, 
REER, oil price and real 
interest rate. 
Credit is effecting 
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Table 3.2.3: Summary of Empirical Studies on the Exchange Rate Channel 
Author(s), 
Year 
Country(ies) Study Period Model & 
Method of 
Estimation 
 
Variables Included Key Finding(s) 
Cushman and 
Zha (1997) 
Canada  VAR Output, prices, 
interest rate and 
exchange rate. 
Exchange rate is 
effective in monetary 
policy transmission. 
 
Zengin (2000) Turkey  Granger-
causality 
Real exchange rate, 
export prices and 
import prices. 
Exchange rate was 
ineffective in monetary 
policy transmission.  
 
Sezer  (2002) Turkey  Impulse 
Response 
Functions. 
Output prices, 
interest rate and 
exchange rate. 
Exchange rate is 
effective in monetary 
policy transmission. 
Citu (2003) New Zealand  VAR Output, prices, 
interest rate and 
exchange rate 
Exchange rate was 
effective in the 
transmission of the 
dynamic effect of 
monetary policy in 
smaller developed 
countries but not in big 
developed countries 
Bitans, Stikuts 
and Tillers  
(2003) 
Latvia 1995-2002 
(monthly data) 
Structural 
VAR 
3-month RIGIBOR, 
Nominal effective 
exchange rate, 
interest rate, 
imports, exports and 
GDP. 
Monetary shocks are 
transmitted to the 
economy mainly 
through the exchange 
rate channel.  
 
Muco, Safey 
and Taci 
(2003) 
Albania 1994-2003 
(monthly) 
VAR model Money supply, 
exchange rate, 
prices and interest 
rate. 
Exchange rate channel 
was effective after 
introducing indirect 
instruments of monetary 
policy. 
Hwee (2004) Singapore  VAR model Output, prices, 
interest arte and 
exchange rate. 
Output reacts 
immediately and 
significantly to a 
contractionary monetary 
policy shock and that 
exchange rate was 
more effective in 
transmitting monetary 
policy to the economy.  
Ramlogan 
(2004) 
Carribean 1970 to 2000 
(quarterly 
data) 
Structural 
VAR 
GDP, reserves, 
deposits, loans, 
exchange and 
prices. 
Exchange rate has 
been operational but 
not so significantly 
Dabla-Norris 
and 
Floerkemeier 
(2006) 
Armenia 2000-2005 
(monthly data) 
Granger 
causality test 
and VAR 
model 
Repo rate, nominal 
effective exchange 
rate, narrow money, 
GDP and prices 
Exchange rate has a 
strong impact on prices. 
Hung (2007) Vietnam 1996-2005 
(quarterly 
data) 
Structural 
VAR model 
and Granger 
causality test 
Real Interest rate, 
real output, price 
level. Money, real 
exchange rate and 
credit. 
All channels shown 
weak transmission but 
credit and exchange 
rate appeared to be 
more significant 
channels.  
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Al-Mashat 
(2003) 
India 1980 – 2002 
(quarterly) 
VECM Interest rate, 
exchange rate, 
output and prices 
Exchange rate effective 
Al-Mashat 
(2007) 
Egypt    Exchange rate effective 
Al-Mashat and 
Billmeier 
(2007) 
Egypt 1996 to 2005 
(monthly data) 
VAR model Nominal effective 
exchange rate, 
output, prices and 
three-month  
deposit rate  
Exchange rate channel 
plays a strong role in 
propagating monetary 
shocks to output and 
prices.  
 
Maturu (2007) Kenya  Structural 
VAR 
Oil prices, 
FEDRATE, TOT, 
GDP, CPI, 
RMONEY, NEER, 
REPORATE. 
Exchange rate channel 
has been operational 
Amarasekara 
(2008) 
Sri-Lanka 1978 – 2005 
(monthly) 
VAR GDP, CPI, SDR 
exchange rate, 
reserve money and 
interbank call 
Exchange rate not 
effective 
Shabbir (2008) Fiji and PNG Fiji: 1971:Q1 
to 2003: Q4 
PNG: 
1974:Q1 to 
2003: Q4 
VAR Effective exchange 
rate, reserves, 
deposits, loans, CPI 
and GDP 
The exchange rate 
channel is effective for 
PNG but not for Fiji. 
Samkharadze 
(2008) 
Georgia 2002-
2007(monthly 
data 
VAR model Interest rate, output, 
exchange rate and 
prices 
Exchange rate is 
significant in 
determining inflation in 
Georgia. 
Bates and 
Hachicha 
(2009) 
Tunisia 1988 to 2007 
(monthly data) 
Structural 
VAR 
Interest rate, 
lending rate, 
domestic credit, real 
effective exchange 
rate, GDP and 
prices(inflation rate) 
The exchange rate 
channel is weak. 
Ornek (2009) Turkey  Structural 
VAR model 
 Exchange rate channel 
works. 
Tsangarides 
(2010) 
Mauritius 1999 to 2009 
(quarterly 
data) 
Structural 
VAR 
GDP, CPI, M2 repo 
rate and NEER 
The credit channel is 
effective but not so 
significant 
Acosta-
Ormaecheo 
and Coble 
(2011) 
Chile, New 
Zealand, Peru 
and Uruguay 
1999 – 2010 
(monthly) 
VAR Money market rate, 
output and inflation 
rate 
Exchange rate effective 
in Peru and Uruguay 
Bhattacharya, 
Patnaik and 
Shah (2011) 
Emerging 
economies 
1997 – 2009 
(monthly) 
VECM Exchange rate, 
interest rate, output, 
price index, oil price 
and import price 
Exchange rate effective 
Ncube and 
Ndou (2011) 
South Africa 2000 – 2010 
(monthly) 
Bayesian 
VAR 
Foreign exchange 
reserve, GDP, 
inflation, growth in 
nominal rand, 
NEER, REER, oil 
price and real 
interest rate 
Exchange rate 
ineffective 
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Table 3.2.4: Summary of Empirical Studies on the Exchange Rate Pass-through 
Author(s), 
Year 
Country(ies) Study 
Period 
Model & 
Method of 
Estimation 
 
Variables Included Key Finding(s) 
McCarthy 
(2000) 
Industrialized 
countries 
1976-1998 VAR Exchange rate, import 
prices, producer 
prices, consumer 
prices and trade 
openness. 
Exchange rate pass-
through to consumer 
prices is modest. 
 
Hufner and 
Schroeder 
(2002) 
Germany, 
France, Italy,  
Netherlands 
and Spain. 
1981 – 
2001 
(monthly) 
VECM Nominal national 
effective exchange 
rate indices, short-
term interest rates, 
output gaps 
constructed from 
industrial production, 
the oil price, import, 
producer and 
consumer prices. 
The extent of pass-
through declines 
along the distribution 
chain with the largest 
effect occurring in 
import prices. 
Sahminan 
(2002) 
Thailand, 
Singapore and 
Philippines 
1974-2000 Cointegration 
and Error 
Correction 
Model 
Exchange rate, import 
prices, foreign prices 
and foreign demand. 
In the short run 
exchange rate does 
not have a significant 
impact on import 
prices.  
 
Wimalasuriya  
(2005) 
Sri Lanka  VAR Exchange rate, import 
prices, factor input 
prices, trade prices, 
wholesale producer 
prices and retail 
consumer prices. 
There is evidence of 
exchange rate pass-
through.  
Aliyu, Yakub, 
Sanni and 
Duke (2008) 
Nigeria 1986-2007 VECM Exchange rate, import 
and consumer prices. 
Exchange rate pass-
through was low. 
Su, Shu and  
Chow (2008) 
China 2001 – 
2007 
(quarterly) 
OLS Nominal Effective 
Exchange rate, import 
prices, domestic 
demand, foreign 
prices, commodity 
prices and domestic 
prices. 
There is a fairly large 
and speedy  
exchange rate pass-
through (ERPT) to 
import prices 
Beirne and 
Bijsterbosch 
(2009) 
Central and 
Eastern 
Europe 
monthly VAR Consumer prices, 
producer prices, oil 
prices, nominal 
effective exchange 
rate and industrial 
production 
There is evidence of 
high exchange rate 
pass-through and 
even higher in 
countries with fixed 
exchange rate. 
Oyinlola  
(2009) 
Nigeria 1980-2008 
(annual 
data) 
VECM Exchange rate, money 
supply, world export 
price, income and 
tariff. 
There is a long run 
relationship between 
exchange rate and 
domestic prices. 
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Table 5.4: Lag Length Selection for the Generic Model and the Different Channels 
 
The Generic Model: 
       
       
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       
0 -177.0342 NA   0.037059  5.218383  5.315518  5.256919 
1  32.96172  395.6445  0.000109 -0.607586 -0.219046 -0.453439 
2  53.12705  36.23914  7.93e-05 -0.931219  -0.251273* -0.661462 
3  61.36012  14.07974  8.14e-05 -0.908989  0.062362 -0.523622 
4  79.51729  29.47251  6.29e-05 -1.174414  0.088342  -0.673437* 
5  90.65967   17.11728*   5.98e-05*  -1.236512*  0.317649 -0.619925 
6  96.63052  8.653411  6.65e-05 -1.148711  0.696855 -0.416513 
7  102.5651  8.084761  7.45e-05 -1.059857  1.077114 -0.212050 
       
        
Interest Rate Channel: 
       
       
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       
0  282.6780 NA   3.65e-09 -8.077623  -7.948110*  -8.026241* 
1  297.9962  28.41642  3.72e-09 -8.057861 -7.410294 -7.800950 
2  308.3037  17.92597  4.41e-09 -7.892860 -6.727239 -7.430419 
3  330.5149  36.05297  3.73e-09 -8.072894 -6.389220 -7.404924 
4  348.8145   27.58200*   3.57e-09*  -8.139549* -5.937821 -7.266050 
5  357.4598  12.02825  4.60e-09 -7.926370 -5.206588 -6.847341 
6  372.6745  19.40428  4.98e-09 -7.903608 -4.665772 -6.619050 
       
        
Credit Channel: 
       
       
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       
0 -122.6267 NA   0.000461  3.670341  3.799854  3.721723 
1  139.1798  485.6702  3.72e-07 -3.454488  -2.806921*  -3.197577* 
2  159.6672   35.63022*   3.28e-07*  -3.584557* -2.418936 -3.122116 
3  166.3691  10.87835  4.35e-07 -3.315045 -1.631371 -2.647075 
4  183.5375  25.87709  4.30e-07 -3.348913 -1.147185 -2.475414 
5  201.1304  24.47712  4.27e-07 -3.395085 -0.675303 -2.316057 
6  210.9991  12.58613  5.40e-07 -3.217366  0.020470 -1.932808 
7  220.3358  10.82513  7.13e-07 -3.024226  0.731663 -1.534139 
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Exchange Rate Channel: 
       
       
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       
0 -177.5706 NA   0.002269  5.262917  5.392431  5.314299 
1  91.03119  498.2759  1.50e-06 -2.058875  -1.411308*  -1.801964* 
2  111.1730  35.02920  1.34e-06 -2.178927 -1.013306 -1.716486 
3  122.8667  18.98117  1.53e-06 -2.054108 -0.370434 -1.386139 
4  145.4189  33.99165  1.30e-06 -2.244026 -0.042298 -1.370527 
5  160.3111  20.71953  1.39e-06 -2.211915  0.507867 -1.132886 
6  171.7622  14.60432  1.69e-06 -2.080063  1.157773 -0.795506 
7  212.4317   47.15303*   8.97e-07*  -2.795121*  0.960768 -1.305034 
       
        
 
 
Money Effect Model: 
       
       
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       
0  119.8229 NA   4.09e-07 -3.357186  -3.227673*  -3.305804* 
1  139.5010  36.50428  3.68e-07 -3.463797 -2.816230 -3.206886 
2  149.4767  17.34908  4.41e-07 -3.289180 -2.123560 -2.826740 
3  172.1533  36.80840  3.68e-07 -3.482705 -1.799031 -2.814735 
4  194.9058  34.29351  3.09e-07 -3.678428 -1.476699 -2.804929 
5  214.6050   27.40764*   2.89e-07*  -3.785652* -1.065870 -2.706624 
6  225.1604  13.46200  3.58e-07 -3.627838 -0.390003 -2.343281 
       
        
Exchange Rate Pass-Through Model: 
       
       
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       
0 -7.383505 NA   1.63e-05  0.329957  0.459470  0.381339 
1  248.7738  475.1903  1.55e-08 -6.631124 -5.983557 -6.374213 
2  300.6809  90.27333  5.51e-09 -7.671911  -6.506291* -7.209471 
3  317.3462  27.05093  5.47e-09 -7.691196 -6.007521 -7.023226 
4  351.1679  50.97754  3.34e-09 -8.207765 -6.006037  -7.334266* 
5  373.9723  31.72789  2.85e-09 -8.404994 -5.685212 -7.325966 
6  383.3986  12.02189  3.65e-09 -8.214451 -4.976615 -6.929893 
7  413.2351   34.59305*   2.66e-09*  -8.615509* -4.859620 -7.125422 
       
        
Note: * Indicates lag order selected by the criterion; LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 
5% level); FPE: Final Prediction Error; AIC: Akaike Information Criterion; SC: Schwarz Information 
Criterion; HQ: Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion. 
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Table 5.5: Stability Condition for the VAR model for the Generic Model and the 
Different Channels 
 
The Generic Model: 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: LNGY LNCP R  
Exogenous variables: C  
  
  
     Root Modulus 
  
  
 0.999027  0.999027 
 0.739879  0.739879 
 0.681498 - 0.241469i  0.723013 
 0.681498 + 0.241469i  0.723013 
-0.461277  0.461277 
 0.069423  0.069423 
  
  
 No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
 
Interest Rate Channel: 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: D(LNGY) D(LNCP) D(LNRS) 
D(LNRL)  
Exogenous variables: C  
  
  
     Root Modulus 
  
  
-0.326526 - 0.488207i  0.587337 
-0.326526 + 0.488207i  0.587337 
 0.258630 - 0.435093i  0.506157 
 0.258630 + 0.435093i  0.506157 
 0.021187 - 0.490822i  0.491279 
 0.021187 + 0.490822i  0.491279 
-0.153813  0.153813 
 0.070850  0.070850 
  
  
 No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
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Credit Channel: 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: LNGY LNCP LNBL R  
Exogenous variables: C  
  
  
     Root Modulus 
  
  
 0.994400  0.994400 
 0.739006  0.739006 
 0.682849 - 0.234778i  0.722083 
 0.682849 + 0.234778i  0.722083 
 0.448096  0.448096 
-0.445874  0.445874 
-0.231344  0.231344 
 0.074361  0.074361 
  
  
 No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
 
Exchange Rate Channel: 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: LNGY LNCP LNXR R  
Exogenous variables: C  
  
  
     Root Modulus 
  
  
 0.992955  0.992955 
 0.884083  0.884083 
 0.724726  0.724726 
 0.684483 - 0.212173i  0.716613 
 0.684483 + 0.212173i  0.716613 
-0.443333  0.443333 
 0.070666  0.070666 
-0.011799  0.011799 
  
  
 No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
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Money Effect Model: 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: D(LNGY) D(LNCP) D(LNM2) 
D(R)  
Exogenous variables: C  
  
  
     Root Modulus 
  
  
-0.261845 - 0.484994i  0.551164 
-0.261845 + 0.484994i  0.551164 
 0.268983 - 0.388263i  0.472334 
 0.268983 + 0.388263i  0.472334 
-0.296675  0.296675 
-0.043485 - 0.288033i  0.291297 
-0.043485 + 0.288033i  0.291297 
 0.173442  0.173442 
  
  
 No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
 
Exchange Rate Pass-Through Model: 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: LNCPSA LNS LNGY LNCP  
Exogenous variables: C  
  
  
     Root Modulus 
  
  
 0.986818  0.986818 
 0.924257  0.924257 
 0.617464 - 0.424575i  0.749350 
 0.617464 + 0.424575i  0.749350 
 0.684678  0.684678 
-0.458233  0.458233 
 0.214055  0.214055 
 0.021644  0.021644 
  
  
 No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
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Table 5.7: Diagnostic Tests of the Residuals for SVAR 
 
Generic Model 
Tests Statistic P-value Null Hypothesis 
PORTMANTEAU 139.7544 0.0744 No serial correlation up to lag h 
LM 4.0327 0.9092 No autocorrelation up to lag h 
ARCH-LM 121.5077 0.6913 No Heteroskedasticity 
NORMALITY 148.9236 0.0000 Residuals are multivariate normal 
 
Interest Rate Channel 
Tests Statistic P-value Null Hypothesis 
PORTMANTEAU 142.3490 0.0888 No serial correlation up to lag h 
LM 7.3158 0.9667 No autocorrelation up to lag h 
ARCH-LM 230.3136 0.5456 No Heteroskedasticity 
NORMALITY 118.0022 0.0000 Residuals are multivariate normal 
 
Credit Channel 
Tests Statistic P-value Null Hypothesis 
PORTMANTEAU 150.5548 0.0947 No serial correlation up to lag h 
LM 7.8722 0.9526 No autocorrelation up to lag h 
ARCH-LM 206.6241 0.5899 No Heteroskedasticity 
NORMALITY 574.0588 0.0000 Residuals are multivariate normal 
 
Exchange Rate Channel 
Tests Statistic P-value Null Hypothesis 
PORTMANTEAU 185.9146 0.0787 No serial correlation up to lag h 
LM 8.4496 0.9343 No autocorrelation up to lag h 
ARCH-LM 251.1924 0.9558 No Heteroskedasticity 
NORMALITY 370.1066 0.0000 Residuals are multivariate normal 
 
Money Effect  
Tests Statistic P-value Null Hypothesis 
PORTMANTEAU 164.2650 0.0258 No serial correlation up to lag h 
LM 9.0357 0.8259 No autocorrelation up to lag h 
ARCH-LM 415.8942 0.2816 No Heteroskedasticity 
NORMALITY 624.2371 0.0000 Residuals are multivariate normal 
 
Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
Tests Statistic P-value Null Hypothesis 
PORTMANTEAU 228.8005 0.0844 No serial correlation up to lag h 
LM 8.7203 0.9245 No autocorrelation up to lag h 
ARCH-LM 267.1232 0.4887 No Heteroskedasticity 
NORMALITY 397.1075 0.0000 Residuals are multivariate normal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
